The New Northern Dimension of the European Neighbourhood. CEPS Paperbacks. January 2009 by Aalto, Pami et al.
 
 
 
THE NEW NORTHERN 
DIMENSION OF THE EUROPEAN 
NEIGHBOURHOOD 
 
 
EDITED BY 
PAMI AALTO 
HELGE BLAKKISRUD 
HANNA SMITH 
 
FOREWORD BY  
MICHAEL EMERSON 
 
CONTRIBUTORS 
PAMI AALTO 
AADNE AASLAND 
MORTEN ANKER 
HELGE BLAKKISRUD 
BJØRN BRUNSTAD 
IRINA BUSYGINA 
MIKHAIL FILIPPOV 
JAKUB M. GODZIMIRSKI 
ALF HÅKON HOEL 
SIGVE R. LELAND 
KARI LIUHTO 
KATRI PYNNÖNIEMI 
HANNA SMITH 
NINA TYNKKYNEN 
INDRA ØVERLAND  
 
The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) is an independent policy 
research institute based in Brussels. Its mission is to produce sound 
analytical research leading to constructive solutions to the challenges facing 
Europe today. The views expressed in this publication are those of the 
authors writing in a personal capacity and do not necessarily reflect those 
of CEPS or any other institution with which the authors are associated.  
 
 
ISBN 978-92-9079-834-7 
© Copyright 2008, Centre for European Policy Studies. 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system 
or transmitted in any form or by any means – electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording 
or otherwise – without the prior permission of the Centre for European Policy Studies. 
 
Centre for European Policy Studies 
Place du Congrès 1, B-1000 Brussels 
Tel: 32 (0) 2 229.39.11 Fax: 32 (0) 2 219.41.51 
e-mail: info@ceps.eu 
internet: http://www.ceps.eu 
 
 
Cover photograph of Longyearbyen, the Svalbard Archipelago, printed with permission  
from Tommy Dahl Markussen ©  
CONTENTS 
 
Foreword 
Michael Emerson....................................................................................................... i 
Acknowledgements.............................................................................................iv 
1.  Introduction 
Pami Aalto, Helge Blakkisrud & Hanna Smith .............................................. 1 
2.  Russian foreign policy, regional cooperation and  
northern relations 
Hanna Smith ................................................................................................. 19 
Part I. Regional and Sectoral Partnerships 
3.  Learning by doing: The Barents cooperation and development 
of regional collaboration in the north 
Sigve R. Leland & Alf Håkon Hoel ............................................................... 36 
4.  Best practices in fisheries management: Experiences from 
Norwegian–Russian cooperation 
Alf Håkon Hoel.............................................................................................. 54 
5.  Experiences of environmental cooperation between the Nordic 
countries and Russia: Lessons learned and the way forward 
Nina Tynkkynen............................................................................................ 71 
6.  Assessing the Northern Dimension Partnership in Public Health 
and Social Well-being 
Aadne Aasland .............................................................................................. 91 
7.  EU–Russian cooperation on transport: Prospects for the Northern 
Dimension transport partnership 
Katri Pynnöniemi........................................................................................ 109 
Part II. Prospects for New Energy and Public–Private Partnerships 
8.  Natural gas projects in the Russian north: Implications for 
northern European cooperation 
Indra Øverland............................................................................................ 131 
9.  Russia’s energy strategy and prospects for a Northern Dimension 
energy partnership 
Jakub M. Godzimirski.................................................................................. 145  
10.  Foreign involvement in the Russian energy sector: Lessons learned 
and drivers of change for the Northern Dimension 
Morten Anker & Bjørn Brunstad................................................................ 164 
11.  Strategic sectors of the Russian economy: Implications for 
developing new Northern Dimension partnerships 
Kari Liuhto................................................................................................... 180 
Part III. Towards a New Northern Agenda 
12.  End comment: EU–Russian relations and the limits of the 
Northern Dimension 
Irina Busygina & Mikhail Filippov............................................................. 204 
13.  Policy recommendations for northern cooperation 
Pami Aalto, Hanna Smith & Helge Blakkisrud........................................... 220 
Glossary of Abbreviations.............................................................................. 235 
About the Authors............................................................................................ 237 
 
 | i 
 
FOREWORD 
MICHAEL EMERSON 
he Centre for European Policy Studies greatly appreciates having 
been invited to publish this book on the new Northern Dimension, 
which serves as an important piece in the jigsaw puzzle of the 
European Union’s multiple policies towards its neighbours.  
The puzzle has many pieces indeed. To the north there is the EU’s 
uneasy relationship with Russia, for which the new Northern Dimension is 
seen by the EU as its north-west regional adjunct (but I comment in a 
moment on the role of Norway and Iceland in this initiative); to the east a 
newly baptised Eastern Partnership is currently being shaped against the 
background of the eastern branch of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP), and which also has its regional dimension in the Black Sea Synergy 
initiative; to the south-east there is the stabilisation and association process 
for the Balkan states that are not yet members of the EU; and to the south 
the Barcelona process has morphed into the southern branch of the ENP, 
which is in turn now morphing into the Union for the Mediterranean. This 
multiplicity of constantly changing initiatives is already telling us that there 
is an intense but complex search process going on, seeking the optimal 
arrangements between the EU and its very different neighbours. To put this 
in a somewhat dramatised historical perspective, this is the story of the 
newly post-modern contemporary Europe trying to shape its relationship 
with the former Russian empire and Soviet Union, and the former Ottoman 
and Arab empires.  
To this vast landscape of neighbourhood relations the new Northern 
Dimension brings a number of interesting particularities, which this book 
shows to be a combination of qualities and limitations.  
First, it is an exercise in neighbourhood policy, in which Norway, 
Iceland and the EU ally to try to do something useful with north-west 
Russia. Within the EU, Finland took the first initiative in 1998 to launch the 
(old) Northern Dimension policy, and it sustains a highly active role in the 
(new) Northern Dimension. This book is sponsored jointly by the Finnish 
T ii | MICHAEL EMERSON 
and Norwegian ministries of foreign affairs, in itself a discreet message. 
The new Northern Dimension sees the EU and the two non-EU partners of 
the European Economic Area join in a foreign policy initiative with the EU.  
Second, it is an exercise in what the introductory chapter to this book 
brands as ‘small-but-smart’ policies, and third, an operation that seeks to 
‘fly below the radar’ of the high politics of EU–Russian relations and of 
Russian geo-politics. Can this work? This is the question the book 
addresses.  
The small-but-smart test seems to have been passed quite 
successfully. Should this remark seem to be vague and lacking in vivid 
interest, remember what ‘small-but-not-smart’ policies in Russia’s 
neighbourhood means. This summer’s war in Georgia gives the 
perspective, in which this tragic episode resulted from the underlying lack 
of trust between Russia and Georgia, and then miscalculation in response 
to provocation. By contrast, for Finland and Norway the new Northern 
Dimension is an extension of consistent bilateral policies of engagement 
with Russia.  
The new Northern Dimension also ranks as small but smart in 
relation to the EU, in that Finland and Norway have exercised leading roles 
while smoothly securing joint ownership of it with the EU, which brings 
larger political and financial resources into play. The tensions that arose 
within the EU in the last year over French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s 
initiative on the Union for the Mediterranean shows that regional 
leadership and EU ownership are not always the easiest of qualities to 
combine.  
The test on flying below the radar, however, reveals limitations. As 
the book shows, sectoral programmes for public health and the 
environment have made substantial progress, and these can rank as largely 
de-politicised activities. They could indeed fly below the radar. In two 
other respects, however, the limitations are seen to be significant. The 
energy sector is of outstanding importance and potential for the Northern 
Dimension area, with huge new investments due in oil and gas fields (the 
offshore Shtokman field and the Yamal Peninsula). But here the new 
Northern Dimension has not been able to achieve real traction. The big 
action has been taking place elsewhere in dealings between Moscow and 
major European oil companies with national governments (including 
Norway) behind them. Also, at the level of foreign investment in Russia 
more generally, the experience of Finnish and Norwegian companies 
shows that Russia’s current policies of economic nationalism in favour of FOREWORD | iii 
‘strategic’ sectors are a serious hindrance, which the Northern Dimension 
cannot overcome.   
On the other hand, the new Northern Dimension would seem to 
score positively as a confidence-building or confidence-deepening measure 
with Russia. Here flying below the radar has seen adoption of a work 
programme jointly with Russia, even if in practice this has meant the 
exclusion of some topics of the highest interest to the European parties, 
such as democracy and its many component parts. So this is a plus and a 
minus at the same time. 
 
Michael Emerson 
Senior Fellow, CEPS  
Brussels, December 2008 iv | 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
PAMI AALTO, HELGE BLAKKISRUD & 
HANNA SMITH 
1.  A new northern dimension of Europe’s neighbourhood? 
In this book, we examine regional cooperation in Europe’s northern 
neighbourhood. Regional cooperation remains an important part of 
European integration and the external relations of the European Union. In 
northern Europe in particular, the numerous formats of bilateral 
collaboration and multilateral policy initiatives during the past decade and 
a half have served to keep the agenda for northern regional cooperation a 
busy one.  
By speaking of a ‘new northern dimension’ of Europe’s 
neighbourhood in the title of this book, we wish to indicate how some old 
features have persisted in the northern regional agenda while others have 
changed in character and new issues have emerged. The old features 
include continuing collaboration among the Nordic states and their role as 
motors of regional cooperation. Today, however, EU funding has long since 
replaced Nordic funds as the most significant provider of practical means 
and incentives. At the same time, the Nordics have taken very different 
paths in their efforts at bolstering regional cooperation. 
Finland and Norway look to intensify economic and political 
relations with Russia, now re-emerging as a great power. Additionally, for 
Finland, business and other forms of integration with Estonia is a natural 
and continuing process. Denmark’s relations with Russia largely pertain to 
economic and agricultural cooperation, whereas the political aspects 
remain somewhat troubled. Iceland’s geographical remoteness could be 
overcome with the new focus on Arctic energy and transport cooperation. 2 | PAMI AALTO, HELGE BLAKKISRUD & HANNA SMITH 
The severe economic problems Iceland is experiencing at the time of 
writing (autumn 2008) may dampen such hopes or alternatively the 
proposed Russian investment/loans to Iceland may bolster mutual ties. 
Sweden has been a notable investor in regional cooperation with Russia, 
but its interest has begun to shift more exclusively to the Baltic area. And 
together with the Baltic EU member states and Poland, Sweden is seeking 
to facilitate the Ukrainian aim of European integration and simultaneously 
to approach the western part of former Soviet territory in general, largely 
omitting Russia from these activities. The Balts and Poles, for their part, 
have longstanding conflicts with Russia on the interpretation of history – 
an issue that has again become pivotal as a side effect of the souring of their 
energy trade relations with Russia.1 
This new situation presents a clear challenge for engaging Russia 
positively in northern European regional cooperation. We also feel that it is 
extremely important for the new northern dimension of Europe’s 
neighbourhood to cultivate its good record and continue to include Russia 
as a natural and essential partner. Any work towards that goal can in turn 
pave the way for finding better working relations between the EU, its 
member states and Russia. Regardless of growing disillusionment, or a 
reality check on all sides compared with the promises of the early 1990s, a 
European–Russian partnership remains a widely shared goal in the wider 
European area. The webs of economic and energy policy interdependence 
between the two sides make such a partnership imperative. 
The means by which this policy goal of ensuring Russia’s place in the 
northern dimension of Europe’s neighbourhood can be facilitated and the 
limitations along the way are our main concerns in this book.2 We propose  
 
                                                      
1 For more on these divisions, see P. Aalto and N. Tynkkynen, “The Nordic 
Countries: Engaging Russia, Trading in Energy or Taming Environmental 
Threats?”, in P. Aalto (ed.), The EU–Russia Energy Dialogue: Europe’s Future Energy 
Security?, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007, pp. 119–29; and E. Berg, “The Baltic Gateway: 
A Corridor Leading towards Three Different Directions?”, in P. Aalto (ed.), The 
EU–Russia Energy Dialogue: Europe’s Future Energy Security?, Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2007, pp. 145–62. 
2 The book is based on the Finnish–Norwegian research project, “The New 
Northern Dimension and the Possibility of an Energy Partnership – Cooperation 
between Finland and Norway”, funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Finland and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, 2007–08. INTRODUCTION | 3 
a practical agenda that is in line with the evolving policy environment in 
Europe’s wider neighbourhood and one that relies on the legacy of – as 
well as several recent tendencies in – northern European regional 
collaboration. We also offer our own policy recommendations for setting 
further priorities on this agenda. Yet, to identify where the northern 
experiences of regional cooperation can generate broader insights, we first 
need to situate the northern agenda in the wider framework of the 
European neighbourhood. 
2.  A pragmatic approach to Europe’s neighbourhood 
In the contemporary policy debate on Europe’s neighbourhood, grand 
designs are transforming into more pragmatic considerations. This process 
also means that the northern, eastern and southern directions are re-
emerging as distinct policy platforms. One reason for the re-emergence of 
such ‘dimensionalism’ is the current internal dissonance within the EU.3 
Among other things, this obstructs the Union’s ability to take a concerted 
look at its borders and make decisions on its institutional arrangements 
pertaining to relations with neighbours, such as the division of 
competencies, use of funds and setting of priorities. 
Especially the 2004 ‘big bang’ enlargement into an EU-25 highlighted 
and aggravated the Union’s internal heterogeneity. By 2008, the number of 
member states had grown to 27, with several Balkan countries waiting in 
the wings for entry. The rejection of the EU’s Constitutional Treaty by 
French and Dutch voters in 2005, and Ireland’s rejection of the Treaty’s 
watered-down version in 2008 for their part, meant dropping or at least 
postponing institutional reforms geared towards enhancing the conduct of 
relations with neighbours. For some disillusioned observers, the Union’s 
internal integration is on the verge of collapse, while the associated 
enlargement fatigue is forcing EU policy-makers towards a practical, 
incremental or even minimalist policy agenda.4 
 
                                                      
3 For ‘dimensionalism’ within the EU, see H. Haukkala, A Hole in the Wall? 
Dimensionalism and the EU’s New ‘Neighbourhood Policy’, UPI Working Paper No. 
41/2003, Finnish Institute of Foreign Affairs, Helsinki, 2003.  
4 See A. Clesse, “The Enlargement Mess”, Europe’s World, No. 8, Spring 2008 
(retrieved from www.europesworld.org/EWSettings/Article/tabid/191/Article 
Type/articleview/ArticleID/20805/Default.aspx).  4 | PAMI AALTO, HELGE BLAKKISRUD & HANNA SMITH 
These gloomy views may best be understood as wake-up calls rather 
than accurate reflections, as the EU is nevertheless continuing to attract 
many of its neighbours in the Balkans and beyond. On balance, it is fair to 
say that the practicable but very necessary work with the neighbourhood 
that we are witnessing in the current difficult conditions is leading to 
sector-specific, regional initiatives and to more clearly delimited policy 
agendas. To some extent, this merely reflects the enlarged form and 
territory of the EU, where it is only natural that regional interests should 
surface. Each corner of the EU has something special to it. This means 
encountering different neighbours and consequently having some region-
specific needs for policy-making across the EU’s borders. 
One policy that is under pressure from these developments is the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2004 for developing a 
zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood. The grand goal of 
developing a coherent strategic view of the Union’s environs continues to 
exist in the EU’s parlance and policy-making machinery, but for example 
the policy’s funding instrument still consists of regional components 
reminiscent of the previous fragmented instruments. The policy has also 
met increasing scepticism on the part of partner countries. Many of them 
have difficulties in finding their own priorities reflected in the policy’s 
action plans, regardless of the declared principles of differentiation 
according to each partner’s own individual merits and predicaments, and 
joint ownership of the policy.5 Russia, for one, has opted not to become a 
party to the ENP even though it benefits from the funds available through 
the policy’s funding instrument. At the same time, there is a debate on 
whether a new and more realistic strategic package should be introduced 
into EU–Russian relations,6 or whether it is still possible to continue on the 
basis of the old ‘common’ (albeit strongly EU-defined) values including 
                                                      
5 See P. Aalto, European Union and the Making of a Wider Northern Europe, London: 
Routledge, 2006(a), pp. 55–56; E. Barbé and E. Johansson-Nogués, “The EU as a 
Modest ‘Force for Good’: The European Neighbourhood Policy”, International 
Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 1, 2008, pp. 86–89 and 95–96. 
6 See e.g. M. Emerson, Time to Think of a Strategic Bargain with Russia, CEPS Policy 
Brief No. 160, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, May 2008; M. Leonard 
and N. Popescu, A Power Audit of EU–Russia Relations, European Council on 
Foreign Relations, London, 2007; R. Lyne, “Blueprint for a New Relationship with 
Russia”, Europe’s World, No. 9, Summer 2008, pp. 52–58.  INTRODUCTION | 5 
democracy and human rights, alongside the somewhat less controversial 
principles of rule of law and market economy.7 
In this book, we take a note of these sobering events, which instruct 
us to examine the merits of a pragmatic approach to issues of neighbourhood 
and regional cooperation across borders. A pragmatic approach should 
ideally be based on common interests shared by all parties and should 
include realistic short-term targets within clearly defined areas of policy. In the 
new northern dimension of Europe’s neighbourhood, it is possible to test 
such an approach and develop it further. We suggest that although 
Europe’s north is on the whole a well-researched topic, in current policy 
research it is not adequately covered as an example of practical, country- 
and sector-specific collaboration. 
When it comes to engaging Russia, the northern experiences offer a 
mixture of bilateral and multilateral ties. Especially the latter have 
remained insufficiently covered in the recent policy literature. For example, 
a widely read blueprint for re-focusing the EU’s Russian relations mentions 
how the bilateral track can be used to enforce common EU objectives 
instead of each member state striking its own selfish deals with Russia.8 
Although this may help in advancing objectives defined on the EU side, the 
authors fail to take note of the potential offered by multilateral platforms in 
regional cooperation with Russia.9 And in northern Europe, there are many 
platforms of that kind. 
We thus suggest that drawing lessons from practical bilateral and 
multilateral regional cooperation with Russia in the north can prove highly 
relevant not only for developing the northern policy agenda, and but also 
for engaging Russia on a more general level. Bilateral collaboration on 
northern environmental and natural resource issues was initiated in the 
1970s, across the political divides of the cold war. Environmental and other 
scientific cooperation between Finland and the Soviet Union was paralleled 
by Norwegian–Soviet fisheries research and joint management of the fish 
stock within the Barents Sea. Since the early 1990s, collaboration has 
extended to various forms of soft security issues in both the Baltic and 
                                                      
7 For a slightly different interpretation, see H. Haukkala, False Premises, Sound 
Principles: The Way Forward in EU–Russia Relations, UPI-FIIA Briefing Paper No. 20, 
Finnish Institute for International Affairs, Helsinki, April 2008(a). 
8 See Leonard and Popescu (2007), op. cit. 
9 Ibid. 6 | PAMI AALTO, HELGE BLAKKISRUD & HANNA SMITH 
Barents Sea areas, which has helped to expand bilateral work to the 
multilateral level. 
Our primary research task in this b o o k  i s  t o  a s s e s s  t h e s e  w e l l -
established examples of practical regional cooperation in northern Europe, 
in both bilateral and multilateral formats. Our second research task is to 
assess new challenges of a more strategic nature that northern cooperation 
faces, for example as a result of the increasing role of the Baltic Sea in the 
transit of energy and other raw materials from resource-rich north-western 
Russia to European markets. Moreover, there are clear prospects for 
Norwegian–Russian energy sector cooperation, making the Barents Sea a 
similar playground of economic opportunities and environmental risks. 
The possible freeing of the Arctic Sea from multiyear ice in perhaps at most 
some 15–20 years as a result of global warming adds new opportunities for 
shipping from the North Atlantic to the Pacific. Such circumstances would 
make it easier for Russia to expand the currently minor northern energy 
transit route from Murmansk and its other northern territories, while also 
reducing its dependence on the Baltic and Black Sea ports. Even more 
notably, it will make the potentially huge energy resources in the Arctic’s 
seabed available for exploitation, if the necessary technologies can be 
developed. 
Many of these issues pertain, or may do so in the future, either 
implicitly or explicitly to the new Northern Dimension policy of the EU, 
Iceland, Norway and Russia, which was launched in a revamped format in 
2006 to sharpen both sectorally and geographically the policy’s old format 
initiated in the late 1990s (see Figure 1.1). INTRODUCTION | 7 
Figure 1.1 The Northern Dimension – Geographical scope 
 
Source: The Northern Dimension Partnership in Public Health and Well-being 
(retrieved from www.ndphs.org/?about_nd). 
3.  New policy framework for Europe’s north 
The old Northern Dimension was an EU-defined policy aimed at creating a 
policy framework and at introducing coherence, efficiency and added value 
to the mosaic of existing northern policies. It has been claimed that the first 
versions of the ENP picked up on these intentions, while the ENP’s joint 
ownership principle is also reminiscent of the Northern Dimension’s 
‘partner-oriented’ approach.10 
On the initiative of Finland, the old Northern Dimension was 
adopted by the EU as its policy in 1998. The birth of the policy has been 
attributed to various factors – for example, that it represented Finland’s 
                                                      
10 See E. Lannon and P. van Elsuwege, “The EU’s Northern Dimension and the 
EMP-ENP: Institutional Frameworks and Decision-Making Processes Compared”, 
2004, p. 69 (retrieved from www.fscpo.unict.it/EuroMed/EDRC5/euneighbours 
01.pdf).  8 | PAMI AALTO, HELGE BLAKKISRUD & HANNA SMITH 
response to the collapse of the cold war era ‘Nordic balance’ and that 
Finland’s accession to the Union in 1995 created a new 1,300 km long EU–
Russian border, and thus there was an urgent need to engage Russia 
actively in foreign and regional policy issues.11 Simultaneously, the 
initiative reflected a need to institutionally coordinate the network of 
regional organisations in which the EU enjoyed a growing role as an 
agenda-setter: the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), the Barents Euro-
Arctic Council (BEAC) and the Arctic Council (AC) (in the latter, however, 
the involvement of the United States has diminished the EU’s weight). 
Some 600 sub-state organisations with a capacity for transborder activity12 
add to the sense of a vivid regional landscape in northern Europe. 
The old Northern Dimension prompted a lively scholarly and policy 
debate, including both positive and critical assessments.13 Especially the 
EU’s action plans for the Northern Dimension for the years 1999–2006 
encountered criticism from various angles, but perhaps most notably from 
the Russian government for not taking its views properly into 
consideration. The political declarations and lists of projects in the action 
plans failed to translate into tangible, practically implemented and financed 
projects. The Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP), 
launched in 2001, improved the situation in the sector of environmental 
protection and nuclear safety. Today, the NDEP remains a workable model 
for concrete project collaboration in these spheres, having a special fund for 
which €243 million has already been pledged and which is eventually set to 
reach over €2 billion. The Northern Dimension Partnership in Public Health 
and Social Well-being (NDPHS) is also in operation. Unlike the NDEP, it 
does not have a special fund and its projects are mostly financed by a single 
                                                      
11 See e.g. P. Aalto, S. Dalby and V. Harle, “The Critical Geopolitics of Northern 
Europe: Identity Politics Unlimited”, Geopolitics, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2003, pp. 7–13; D. 
Arter, “Small State Influence within the EU: The Case of Finland’s ’Northern 
Dimension Initiative’”, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 38, No. 5, 2000, pp. 
679–81. 
12 See J.W. Scott, “Baltic Sea Regionalism, EU Geopolitics and Symbolic 
Geographies of Co-operation”, Journal of Baltic Studies, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2002, p. 142. 
13 See Aalto, Dalby and Harle (2003), op. cit.; P. Aalto, “The Northern Dimension’s 
Role in EU–Russia Relations”, in H. Smith (ed.), The Two-Level Game: Russia’s 
Relations with Great Britain, Finland and the European Union, Aleksanteri Institute, 
Helsinki, 2006(b), pp. 104–17. INTRODUCTION | 9 
source. Yet it represents an important experiment in creating a regional 
forum for the joint management of cross-border health challenges. 
The new Northern Dimension that got underway in 2007 has a less 
EU-centric and more flexible framework. For the first time, Russia, 
Norway, Iceland and the EU are equal partners. As the partners declared in 
2006: 
The present policy framework document is a joint achievement of the 
partners. The Northern Dimension partners recognize that their 
cooperation framework can only be driven by the spirit of partnership 
and based on shared confidence. The Northern Dimension policy is 
henceforward a common project and a common responsibility. It will 
help to ensure that no dividing lines are established in the North of 
Europe.14 
Russia’s longstanding concerns are addressed in the introduction of 
the notion of equality along with the reference to not creating dividing 
lines. This is what the Russian side has repeatedly asked for in the post-
cold war era, but without becoming adequately understood in the 
enlargement frenzy of Western alliances. 
Although the new Northern Dimension is declared to be founded on 
‘internationally recognised principles’, it does not operate on the basis of 
conditionality, otherwise so typical of EU neighbourhood and external 
policies. Alongside the partners, other actors include the CBSS, BEAC, AC 
and the Nordic Council of Ministers as well as international financial 
institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD), the European Investment Bank and Nordic 
Investment Bank. In addition, various sub-state regional organisations 
participate. Moreover, in the new, more inclusive format of the policy, the 
US and Canada have become observers.15 Still, the real centre of gravity in 
the new policy is the EU–Russian interface in the north:  
                                                      
14 See the Northern Dimension Policy Framework Document (Helsinki, 24 
November 2006), p. 1 (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ 
north_dim/doc/frame_pol_1106.pdf). 
15 See C. Browning, “A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Regional Co-operation: 
The United States and the Northern European Initiative”, European Security, Vol. 
10, No. 4, 2001, pp. 84–108; C. Browning, “Competing or Complementary Policies? 
Understanding the Relationship between the NEI and ND”, paper presented at the 
ISA conference, New Orleans, 24–27 March 2002.  10 | PAMI AALTO, HELGE BLAKKISRUD & HANNA SMITH 
The Northern Dimension will be a regional expression of the 
Common Spaces EU/Russia. Russia and the European Union will 
make the Northern Dimension policy a cross-cutting topic and a tool 
where appropriate for the implementation of the road maps for the 
Common Spaces with full participation of Iceland and Norway in 
matters relevant to [the] Northern Dimension.16 
Much like the old Northern Dimension, the new policy “will seek 
complementarity among its partners and participants” and “will focus on 
areas of cooperation where a regional and sub-regional emphasis brings 
added value”. Nevertheless, priority is now to be given to “result-oriented 
proposals”.17 All this reflects the down-to-earth, practical nature of the 
policy that is very clearly based on concrete projects with a strong Russian 
focus. It is hence logical that the tried and tested NDEP and NDPHS 
partnerships remain at the policy’s core. In the course of autumn 2008, the 
logistics and transport sector will become the next new area for setting up a 
formal partnership. The possibility of an energy  partnership is being 
explored. The political declaration on the new Northern Dimension states 
that the partners “ will ask [the Northern Dimension senior officials] to 
examine enhanced cooperation in the field of energy efficiency and 
renewable energy, inviting for this purpose also experts and international 
financing institutions”.18 Although not mentioned in the founding 
documents, debate at the policy-maker level indicates that a cultural 
partnership may also enter the picture. 
4.  The policy challenges of the new Northern Dimension 
The policy challenges facing the new Northern Dimension include matters 
relating to principles, policy environment, institutional structures and 
implementation, as discussed below. 
1)  Principles: How to put the equality principle into practice? The 
predecessor to the new Northern Dimension already had a partner-
oriented aim. Even so, real equality remained unlikely as long as Russia 
struggled economically and the regional aid paradigm from the Nordics to 
Russia persisted. Only the strong growth of the Russian economy since 
                                                      
16 See the “Political Declaration on the Northern Dimension Policy” (Helsinki, 24 
November 2006), pp. 3–4. 
17 Ibid., p. 3. 
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1998, which by the new millennium had made it a capable investor in 
regional cooperation, helped to institute the equality principle properly not 
only at the level of rhetoric but also in the more solid form of co-financing 
projects. 
The EU–Russia ‘common spaces’ became a concrete manifestation of 
the EU–Russian strategic partnership in 2003, which were bolstered by the 
road maps in 2005. The notions of ‘common spaces’ and ‘strategic 
partnership’ in themselves imply the concept of an equality of sorts. At this 
grand level of EU–Russian relations we encounter Russia’s goal of re-
establishing itself as a great power of equal standing with the European 
power(s). The cornerstones of the EU–Russian relationship prior to the 
common spaces project – the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA), the TACIS funding instrument and the EU’s ill-fated common 
strategy on Russia – were mostly built on EU-defined principles, despite 
ostensibly being jointly agreed.19 Today, many of these principles are 
contested in Russia. The implementation of the common spaces has 
encountered problems as well (see chapter 2 in this book).20 Given this 
situation, the Northern Dimension has a big task ahead if it is to act as a 
‘face-saver’ and a reminder of successful cooperation. 
2) Policy environment: How to compete/coordinate with other initiatives? 
The new Northern Dimension is to function as a coordinating policy within 
northern European regional cooperation, in the midst of other fora and 
initiatives. It has mediated the work of the regional councils CBSS and 
BEAC with increasing success.21 Nonetheless, there is a notable challenge in 
the form of the planned Baltic Sea strategy for the EU. This strategy was 
initiated by the European Parliament during 2006–07. The European 
Commission is to give a report in the course of autumn 2008, with the 
strategy supposed to be adopted during Sweden’s EU presidency in 2009. 
The beginning of the drafting process for the Baltic Sea strategy was geared 
largely towards solving problems in which Russia is an important party, 
but unfortunately, the process was initiated without consulting Russia. The 
considerable geographical overlap between the Baltic Sea strategy and the 
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Northern Dimension poses the dilemma of how to link the two fruitfully 
without damaging the Northern Dimension’s promising start in engaging 
Russia constructively. 
3)  Institutional structures: How to coordinate institutionally? 
Institutionally, the successful implementation of the Northern Dimension 
relies on using flexible coordination mechanisms.22 Within the EU, the 
Northern Dimension is part of the Union’s external relations but cuts across 
all its three pillars: the funding instruments stem from the first pillar of the 
single market, the objectives come at least partly from the second pillar of 
external relations and some of the problems relate to the third pillar of 
justice and home affairs, including management of border regimes. 
Furthermore, the Northern Dimension includes cooperation among the EU, 
EU member state governments, regional organisations, international 
financial institutions and businesses.23 The core activities of the new 
Northern Dimension – the partnerships – are flexible and open in terms of 
their composition. To handle all this, the institutional framework of the 
Northern Dimension involves ministerial meetings every two years and 
senior official meetings at least on every alternate year between them. 
Partners, observers and participants are invited to both sets of meetings. A 
steering group spearheaded by the partners meets three times a year and 
can invite participants and observers into its work. This all means that 
motivated and well-resourced parties can exert considerable influence on 
policy, and that there is relatively little institutionalisation in the formal 
sense for a policy with EU involvement. 
4) Implementation: How to develop existing partnerships and put into effect 
new and planned partnerships? The new Northern Dimension promises to 
extend the experiences gained from the NDEP and NDPHS into the 
transport and logistics sectors, and possibly into the sphere of energy. 
Energy is set to remain one of the key themes in European policy. The 
geographical area covered by the Northern Dimension represents a 
significant reservoir of mostly untapped energy sources. Energy transport 
routes that are increasingly important cross the area. The region is home to 
some innovative experiments in environmentally friendly energy 
technology and boasts the example of the avant-garde Nordic electricity 
                                                      
22 See Council of the European Union, Full Report on Northern Dimension Policies, 
9804/01, Brussels, 12 June 2001. 
23 See Lannon and van Elsuwege (2004), op. cit., pp. 25–26. INTRODUCTION | 13 
market Nordpool and its related NORD-EL grid and regulatory 
mechanisms. The harsh northern conditions also create a suitable 
environment for testing energy efficiency policies and technical solutions. 
In short, it would be foolish not to consider the role energy can and should 
play in the Northern Dimension, as energy is already part and parcel of the 
northern policy agenda. Yet, extending Northern Dimension cooperation 
into the energy and transport sectors (which in Russia are increasingly 
viewed in a strategic light) may strip the policy of some of its 
uncontroversial and pragmatic qualities. 
5.  A policy research challenge 
The goal we set concerning the Northern Dimension in policy research is to 
move beyond the commonplace debate on the policy’s overall merits. To 
this end, we analyse specific policy questions and sectors of northern 
European collaboration. 
To situate the Northern Dimension in its wider context, in chapter 2 
Hanna Smith discusses the policy as part of the broader picture of 
regionalism in international politics, in particular towards the former 
Soviet territory and Russia. Russia’s efforts of building regional 
cooperation frameworks in its former Soviet sphere of interest have largely 
backfired. The new Northern Dimension’s focus on advancing practical 
objectives enables Russia to maintain its great-power status as it does not 
push integration on unacceptable terms. At the local level in Russia, there is 
a demand for even more intensive practical collaboration. The deeper 
involvement of Canada and the US, two countries with some interests in 
the region, has been limited by Canada’s fairly explicit Arctic focus and the 
shifting of US programmes from the Baltic Sea area towards the western 
parts of post-Soviet space. Nuclear safety cooperation represents a field in 
which they can meaningfully be involved regardless of the sensitive nature 
of this sector. Finally, Smith contends that gearing the Northern Dimension 
towards workable and sectoral partnerships may provide a model for how 
to resolve some of the problems in the PCA negotiations between the EU 
and Russia. 
P a r t  I  o f  t h i s  b o o k  m o v e s  o n  t o  assess existing practical forms of 
northern cooperation. In chapter 3, Sigve R. Leland and Alf Håkon Hoel 
discuss the experiences of cooperation in the Barents region since the early 
1990s. Problems of coordination between the two Barents councils – the 
intergovernmental and the regional ones – and their various working   
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groups finally led to the establishment of an international secretariat in 
2007 to complement national secretariats. In the health sector, there is a 
pattern of cooperation and potential competition prevailing between the 
Barents Health and Social Programme and the Northern Dimension’s 
NDPHS. The chapter concludes by noting how regional cooperation also 
remains important for its own sake: actors ‘learn by doing’, and more time 
invested is likely to generate more of the trust and mutually shared 
objectives that Leland and Hoel deem important conditions for success. 
In chapter 4, Alf Håkon Hoel deepens the examination of 
collaboration in the ‘High North’, to use the Norwegian term, into the 
cooperation in fisheries management between Norway and the Soviet 
Union/Russia from the 1970s onwards. The best practices accounting for 
the relative success in this case have included a robust but flexible legal 
regime at the wider international and the bilateral levels; learning over 
time; scientific cooperation to develop a joint framework acceptable to both 
parties; deliberately limiting cooperation to technical matters; and the 
ability and willingness to update the focus and working formats as 
necessary, not forgetting to synchronise actions with other relevant fora.  
In chapter 5, Nina Tynkkynen analyses six cases of environmental 
cooperation in the Barents and Baltic Sea areas with a special focus on 
Finnish–Russian experiences. Concerning drivers of success, she stresses 
the role of common interests, shared objectives, expert-level collaboration, a 
learning-by-doing approach and trust, very much as Leland and Hoel 
concluded in the analysis of the Barents cooperation and the Norwegian–
Russian fisheries management cases. In addition, she accentuates the 
benefits of finding partners and working formats that can be relatively 
independent from the central authorities. Joint funding is crucial as well. 
Additionally, Tynkkynen takes note of the very real effects of differences in 
cultural backgrounds that can hamper efforts at collaboration. 
Aadne Aasland finds in chapter 6 that the relatively decentralised 
organisation of Russia’s health sector has helped to stimulate cooperation 
in this sphere. He also mentions Russia’s increasing financial capability, 
which will probably prove far more significant for addressing 
communicable diseases in the region than for example the NDPHS can ever 
do, regardless of the useful extra attention it assigns to the issue. That 
HIV/AIDS has been accepted as an issue at the political level in Russia has 
been a precondition of progress. Still, Aasland considers the overlapping 
Barents and Northern Dimension health-sector programmes to be hardly  
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an ideal arrangement. He concludes by recommending greater involvement 
by research communities to foster the emerging expert and practitioner 
consensus in the field. 
In chapter 7, Katri Pynnöniemi notes that two of the EU’s five major 
trans-European transport axes pass through northern territories: the 
Motorways of the Seas and the Northern Axis. On the Russian side, 
however, policy planning has shifted from EU-defined corridors/axes to 
developing Russia’s own ‘international transport corridors’ to facilitate 
energy exports, including pipelines and oil terminals. Unilateralism by the 
EU and Russia has similarly hampered efforts to solve the problems of the 
infamously long lorry queues on the Finnish–Russian border, and the 
Siberian overflight fees continue to be enforced for European aviation 
companies. Overall, Russian actors are in need of Western investments in 
this sector, but the new Northern Dimension transport and logistics 
partnership faces a daunting task if it is to succeed in helping to find 
acceptable formats and priorities. 
In part II of this book, we turn to the second research task of assessing 
the new challenges facing northern cooperation. In chapter 8, Indra 
Øverland presents two major gas projects that increase the strategic 
significance of the European north and which can cover Russia’s gas 
exports to Europe for decades: the Yamal Peninsula and the Shtokman 
fields in the Barents Sea. Whereas Yamal may eventually prove to be a 
predominately Russian project, in Shtokman the Russian actors will have a 
greater need for foreign partners owing to their own lack of expertise. 
French Total and Norwegian StatoilHydro have preliminarily acceded as 
minority shareholders in the company developing the fields. Although the 
Shtokman project will generate considerable cross-border activity in the 
north, Øverland laments how it has been conspicuously absent from the 
Northern Dimension, the main initiative for coordinating such issues 
among the EU, Russia and Norway. 
Jakub M. Godzimirski’s discussion of Russia’s energy strategy in 
chapter 9 sheds further light on the difficulties of bolstering the Northern 
Dimension’s take on energy. The Russian state has been consolidating its 
hold over the energy sector, limiting the role of foreign companies, co-
opting the economic and political elite, using energy as a political tool and 
attempting to establish tighter control over energy transit routes. Foreign 
access to the Russian energy sector is being limited or closed, while Russian 
companies are aggressively trying to invest in the European downstream 
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view the Murmansk area, which is pivotal for Shtokman’s development, as 
strategically significant. This means that at best the Northern Dimension 
can play a role in improving the energy efficiency of the Russian economy, 
and to a somewhat lesser degree, in promoting renewable energy 
technology in Russia. Local Russian actors have a particularly keen interest 
in these matters. Renewable energy technology companies in the Nordic 
states and Germany complement the potential partnership, which should 
have a strong public–private component. 
In chapter 10, Morten Anker and Bjørn Brunstad survey the 
experiences of Norwegian companies working in Russia. They draw 
important conclusions regarding what policies like the Northern 
Dimension can offer for the inclusion of companies into public–private 
partnerships. In general, Western companies can enter into large-scale 
energy projects in the Russian energy sector only with considerable 
political support. In the energy services sector, however, the outlook is less 
restricted. Overall, considerable risks remain in the Russian economy. If the 
Northern Dimension can help with business risk mitigation by assisting in 
partner selection, project support, infrastructure development and moving 
administrative barriers, it will be of use. That being stated, in terms of 
project support, large companies have their own sources and direct 
contacts with top-level decision-makers in Russia. As for project funding, 
Norwegian companies have several already existing channels – and often 
even these are not used to their full potential. 
Kari Liuhto concludes our review of possibilities for new public–
private partnerships in chapter 11 by dividing the Russian economy into 
the strategically non-sensitive, economically sensitive, militarily sensitive 
and top-sensitive sectors. He also notes that in addition to Russia’s new law 
on the strategic sectors of the economy, economic nationalism has many 
other features that Western investors must take into account, such as state 
corporations and Kremlin-supported oligarchs. Any Northern Dimension 
activities in the fields of transport, logistics and even electricity generation 
will be subject to the rising strategic significance of these sectors. 
Nevertheless, that consumer goods remain outside the strategic realm 
opens up good prospects for cross-border economic activity in the region. 
Interestingly, according to Liuhto, the Russian leadership will sooner or 
later have to consider re-opening Russia’s economy.  
In the end comment we invited for this book, Irina Busygina and 
Mikhail Filippov revisit the connections between the strategic and regional 
levels in EU–Russian relations. They contend that for reasons related to the INTRODUCTION | 17 
respective internal politics of Russia and the EU, tensions at the strategic 
level are likely to continue. To ensure that the Northern Dimension is 
insulated from this unfortunate cycle, it should be limited to localised and 
non-politicised matters where it can make a real difference. Issues such as 
democracy, human rights and the strategic aspects of energy security are 
best left out. Keeping the Northern Dimension tightly focused would best 
recognise the effectiveness of ‘small and smart’ strategies that various 
northern actors have utilised in their relations with Russia, and this 
approach is likely to benefit Russian regional actors most directly. In this 
way, those living in the Northern Dimension area could also best ensure a 
degree of ‘subsidiarity’ and ownership of the policy.  
Finally, in the conclusions to the book, we briefly evaluate the degree 
to which the Northern Dimension can respond to the four policy challenges 
identified above. We also summarise our policy recommendations for 
developing each of the existing and planned Northern Dimension 
partnerships. 
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2.  RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY, REGIONAL 
COOPERATION AND NORTHERN RELATIONS 
HANNA SMITH 
1.  Introduction 
Since the late 1980s, various forms of regionalism have emerged 
throughout the world. The concept of ‘new regionalism’ is often connected 
with developments in the Asia–Pacific region. But looking at developments 
especially during the past 10 years in Europe and the European Union, we 
can start talking about a new regionalism in Europe as well. 
The widening and deepening of European integration is perhaps the 
most pronounced example of this trend. Regional cooperation now also 
forms part of the external relations of the EU. Examples here include the 
Northern Dimension policy, the Black Sea cooperation initiative, the 
Mediterranean Union, the Barcelona process and the proposal for a specific 
eastern dimension in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Each of 
these initiatives involves different partners and operates within varying 
remits, but they all fall into the category of regional cooperation. It is 
against this background and the broader context of Russia’s relations with 
the West that this chapter examines the place of the Northern Dimension.  
2.  Regional organisations in the former Soviet space 
Some EU-led initiatives involve partners from the post-Soviet space, 
although we also find patterns of regional cooperation and attempts at 
multilateral action without EU involvement. Such Eurasian regionalism has 
generally been dominated by Russian initiatives. References to a “social 
construction of Europe” that emphasise “polity formation through rules 
and norms, the transformation of identities, the role of ideas and the uses of 20 | HANNA SMITH 
language” are not so different from the way in which Russia has attempted 
to build regional cohesion on the ruins of the Soviet Union.1 In these 
arrangements, Russia would naturally be the patron. 
The most notable attempt at economic and political integration has 
been the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), set up to manage the 
collapse of the Soviet Union peacefully. Today, however, it has the weakest 
prospects of all the integration projects in this area. Another attempt – this 
time at total integration – has been the proposed union between Russia and 
Belarus. Today, that process also seems further from its initial goal than 
ever before, and the idea of Belarusian statehood has grown stronger. 
In the field of economic cooperation, the idea of a Single Economic 
Space (SES) among Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine has been on 
and off the agenda. At first, the SES gathered momentum as each of the 
four members ratified the deal quickly. But then, just as rapidly as it had 
been initiated and pushed forward, it came to a halt and is now fading 
away. The Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) is a more successful 
project. Growing out of the CIS customs union, it was established by 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan in 2001. The 
Organisation of Central Asian Cooperation merged with EurAsEC after 
having been an international organisation from 1991 to 2006, consisting of 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Russia. Georgia, 
Turkey and Ukraine had observer status in the latter.  
Yet, economic cooperation and integration in the Eurasian region has 
proven difficult, owing to highly differing approaches and notions of 
identity. The current leadership of Ukraine, being the only potential rival 
power to Russia (besides Kazakhstan), has a clear Western orientation and 
robustly challenges Russian initiatives and motives for integration. For 
reformers in Ukraine, the idea of European integration is closer to their 
hearts than is the Russian version. 
In the area of security, it has been easier to find a common approach, 
since in security matters smaller states will often join the bandwagon of a 
stronger one. The Eurasian organisations on security cooperation are the 
Collective Security Treaty Organisation, which is a Russian-led defence 
alliance of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan; and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which is 
                                                      
1 See T. Christiansen, K. Jørgensen and A. Wiener, “The Social Construction of 
Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1999, p. 528. RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY, REGIONAL COOPERATION AND NORTHERN RELATIONS | 21 
composed of China and five post-Soviet states – Russia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Regional integration processes in 
the former Soviet space that are clearly moving away from Russian 
domination include GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova) 
and the Community of Democratic Choice that was established in 2005 
(Georgia, Ukraine, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Moldova). The latter also 
includes full members from outside the post-Soviet area, i.e. Romania, 
Slovenia and the Republic of Macedonia, as well as members with observer 
status: Azerbaijan, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, the United 
States, the EU and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. Eurasian regional cooperation has been rich in ideas since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, but has also largely been a rollercoaster ride, 
with the best forms of cooperation not yet agreed. 
3.  Russian foreign policy and the new regionalism 
Developments in the post-Soviet space have influenced Russian foreign 
policy and brought regionalism to prominence on the Russian foreign 
policy agenda. Arguably, there are two main principles driving Russian 
foreign policy – great-power politics and regionalism. Under these two 
main headings are four sub-themes: multilateralism, ressentiment, 
imperialism (in various forms and meaning more of a mindset than actual 
action) and the principle of sovereignty.2  
The Northern Dimension framework is a case in which Russia 
engages in regional cooperation as an equal partner – and crucially, outside 
the post-Soviet space. At the same time, the Northern Dimension includes 
both of the main principles of Russian foreign policy: great-power politics 
and regionalism. In this manner, the Northern Dimension can facilitate the 
identification of overlapping interests and best practices in achieving 
common goals and mutual interests on two different levels. Furthermore, 
what makes the Northern Dimension framework different from most of the 
Eurasian initiatives is that practical cooperation, once begun, has been quite 
successful (see chapters 5 and 6). It also provides possibilities for new 
forms of collaboration, even during times when cooperation between 
Russia and the West is otherwise deadlocked (see chapter 7). Whether the 
Northern Dimension is looked at as a ‘policy framework with projects’ or 
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as ‘projects with a policy framework’, the result is the same: projects 
expressing common interests are advanced much more effectively than in 
the former Soviet space. One reason is that the equality principle of the 
Northern Dimension does not readily give the upper hand to any of the 
partners. It also constitutes a new kind of regional cooperative framework – 
cooperation without expectations of integration – thereby minimising the 
effect of politics and questions of identity. On the other hand, this can also 
be seen as a drawback, since a member may choose not to participate in 
some initiatives, hence making it less effective. 
‘New regionalism’ is situated at the interface of globalisation, 
regionalism and multilateralism. Of these, regionalism may be either a 
stumbling block or a building block to multilateralism.3 As an expression of 
new regionalism, the Northern Dimension is variously used in Russian 
foreign policy: to achieve practical goals (on the environment, health, 
education, cross-border cooperation, etc.); as one type of identity marker 
(northern countries, northern identity); and as an important political tool 
(being an equal partner, obtaining inside access to EU politics and 
establishing a counterweight to other regional developments in the former 
Soviet region). Chief characteristics of new regionalism are its 
multidimensionality, complexity, fluidity and non-conformity, and that it 
involves a range of state and non-state actors, who often come together in 
fairly informal ways. This is the strength of the Northern Dimension, but it 
also poses a potential threat to its success. For the future, the test of the new 
regionalism is to go beyond ‘safe’ subjects that are not politically volatile. 
Issues commonly taken up in the framework of regional cooperation are 
environmental and health matters as well as cross-border cooperation on a 
small scale. Education and culture also fall into this category. It will be a 
challenge, however, to extend this cooperation to sectors like energy. 
The Northern Dimension is not as such an organisation or an 
institution, which may be an advantage or disadvantage for the success of 
the framework. Either way, it serves as a case study of how new 
regionalism can offer solutions to longstanding problems in relations 
between Russia and Europe. 
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4.  Neighbours for better and for worse4 
Towards the end of 2007, there was more and more talk about stagnating, 
declining and troubled Russian–EU relations. Even the nomination of a 
new president for Russia, Dmitry Medvedev, with a reputation of being 
more ‘liberal’ than his predecessor Vladimir Putin, did not ameliorate the 
diplomatic climate. At the same time, economic ties were flourishing. As a 
result, there has been a widespread call to redefine the strategic partnership 
between the EU and Russia. In the West, Russia is seen as pursuing a more 
aggressive foreign policy. The Russian position, by contrast, is that the 
West cannot handle a revived Russia and shows no respect for Russian 
views. Several high profile analyses have appeared on the Russian side 
about the reasons behind the troubled times for Russia’s relations with the 
West in general and for Russian–EU relations in particular since Putin’s 
Munich speech in February 2007.5 Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov has even 
used the term ‘post-Munich era’. In an article for Expert, he put the 
principle of sovereignty at the core of Russian international politics 
together with international law and market principles.6 Nevertheless, 
Lavrov defines the economy as the first priority guiding Russian foreign 
policy. The interesting aspect of Russian analyses in the post-Munich era is 
the emphasis on Russian traumas not being so much about the Soviet 
period as about the 1990s. 
                                                      
4 At the time of writing, the Russian–EU relationship has been thrown into turmoil 
by the conflict between Georgia and Russia in August 2008. While this threatens to 
slow down the development of cooperation in the immediate future, the longer-
term impact is unclear. 
5 Notable Western analyses on Russia were published in 2007 by bodies such as the 
Finnish Parliament’s Committee for the Future (O. Kuusi, H. Smith and P. Tihonen 
(eds), Russia 2017: Three Scenarios, Committee for the Future, Parliament of Finland, 
Helsinki, 2007); the UK House of Commons Committee for Foreign Affairs (Global 
Security: Russia Report, UK Parliament, London, November 2007 (retrieved from 
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmselect/cmfaff/51/5102.htm); 
the European Council on Foreign Relations (M. Leonard and N. Popescu, A Power 
Audit of EU–Russia Relations, European Council on Foreign Relations, London, 
2007); and in the US, by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (A. 
Kuchins, Alternative Futures for Russia to 2017, Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies, Washington, D.C., 2007). 
6 See S. Lavrov, “The Foreign Policy of Russia: A New Phase”, Expert, 17 December 
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Any frameworks launched or agreements made in the 1990s are 
mostly viewed in a negative light in Russia: it is argued that the West took 
advantage of a weak Russia. Such an analysis objects to any claims of the 
West as being the winner of the cold war. To the contrary, proponents of 
this argument claim that the West has lost its unity since the Soviet threat 
has disappeared. One reason many Western analyses are so keen to keep 
Russian domestic affairs on the international agenda is said to be that they 
need to continue portraying Russia as a threat. In Russian interpretations of 
world politics there is also a strongly stated desire to cooperate and avoid 
direct confrontation. Lavrov, in fact, has called for a new great power 
concert of the 21st century.7 
Since the Munich speech, the rhetoric of Russian foreign policy has 
toughened considerably but three major areas appear especially 
problematic in Russian–Western relations. According to Konstantin 
Kosachev, chairperson of the State Duma’s committee for international 
affairs, 
if we put aside the root cause of our present problems – that is, an 
adherence to winner/loser logic – and thoroughly examine the key 
points of our differences, we will find that none of them are truly 
systemic (that is, of course, if the West does not have a systemic desire 
to counter Russia under any circumstances). At this time, we will 
delineate the three major groups of differences – security, values, and 
the situation in the post-Soviet space – that are not insurmountable if 
their causes are correctly established.8 
Kosachev’s comments on differences in Russian–Western relations as 
culminating on questions of security, values and post-Soviet space also 
apply to the Russian–EU level. Let us first look at the question of values. 
Values are represented in common norms and rules. The ‘values gap’ 
originates in the weak normative framework of EU–Russian relations. The 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) is still the cornerstone of 
relations but it has lost much of its stature because both Russia and the EU 
have changed considerably since 1994. Indeed, the faith in and future of the 
Russian–EU PCA is also a central question for the future of the EU’s 
                                                      
7 Ibid. 
8 See K. Kosachev, “Russia and the West: Where the Differences Lie”, Russia in 
Global Affairs, Vol. 4, No. 4, 2007, pp. 37–48 (retrieved from http://eng.global 
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external relations with the East. Here, first of all, the EU needs to form a 
clear vision of how it wants to develop its external policy on its eastern 
borders. This is not only a matter of Russian–EU relations but also how the 
EU sees its relations with Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the states of the 
South Caucasus. Coordination between these two spheres is essential. After 
that can we think about what the EU wants from Russia and vice versa.  
For the Russian side, despite some contradictory statements, Europe 
and the EU are still the focal points with regard to Russia’s modernisation. 
A part of Russian identity is also distinctively European. Yet, it can be 
argued that Russia’s approach to Europe is still at a formative stage. When 
it comes to concrete issues, Russia would appear to have three main 
objectives towards the EU: a common economic area, a visa-free border and 
some possibility to participate in EU decision-making – along the lines of 
Russia’s ties with NATO, for example. The EU has shown a positive 
attitude towards the idea of a visa-free border and the formation of a 
common economic area. But giving even a limited possibility of 
participating in EU decision-making to Russia seems impossible. The EU is 
unique as an international organisation and it does not even have observer 
members. Therefore, when drafting the future normative framework for 
Russian–EU relations, whether a new PCA or something different, sectoral 
and regional normative frameworks might well be the right paths to follow. 
Some of the lessons and successful practices from reviving the Northern 
Dimension process could well be used in the negotiation process between 
Russia and the EU for a new PCA. 
Questions related to security and the post-Soviet space put a strain on 
Russian–EU relations. External actors and affairs have increased the 
stresses, most notably the US, which plays the leading role in several issues 
that also concern Russia and the EU: Kosovo, the former Soviet area, the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, missile defence and Iran. 
The US is a sensitive topic for the Russians. It is a reminder and the 
defining factor of Russia’s own great-power aspirations. The gap between 
Russia and the US is no longer ideological, which for a while led to the 
illusion that trouble-free cooperation could emerge. Russia is an odd 
mixture, however, of Western-style culture and norms as well as uniquely 
Russian qualities, and thus a country where things that are impossible 
anywhere else seem possible there. 
In many issues, Russia and the US are on opposite sides. Sometimes 
Russia is an enemy, sometimes an adversary, sometimes a competitor and 
sometimes a partner. This situation creates a challenge for the EU’s Russian 26 | HANNA SMITH 
policies, since both countries are important partners to the EU. A clear 
example of where the role of the US has put even more strain on Russian–
EU relations is the Georgian/Russian conflict in 2008. In fact, most of the 
hostile commentary towards the West coming out of Russia, whether from 
the president, prime minister, foreign minister or other officials, blamed the 
US for the situation, thereby putting the EU in the middle of a new 
battlefield of spheres of influence. For the US, Georgia has become what 
Cuba was for the Soviet Union during the cold war. The Russian 
Federation is not the same military force as the former Soviet Union was, 
but it still has the capacity to make the world a very dangerous place. 
During the cold war, small-scale cooperation was what kept hopes for a 
better future alive. There is also a place for a framework like the Northern 
Dimension to play a small but significant role in Russian–EU relations 
during difficult times. 
Sergei Ryabkov, a representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, stated in December 2007 that Russia is ready for cooperation and 
integration with the EU as intensively and at as fast a pace as the EU 
wishes.9 Yet, while Russia expresses a desire to integrate with the EU and 
Europe, it does not want to have rules dictated to it, and this also applies to 
Russia’s domestic arrangements. A common viewpoint of what human 
rights are, for example, has not yet been achieved. Moreover, Russia and 
the EU member states have very different ideas regarding state 
intervention in civil society and on issues relating to freedom of the press.  
Still, the principles that foreign minister Lavrov defined in his above-
mentioned article constitute the framework within which Russia is ready to 
work. Practical cooperation comes before integration. Russia and the EU 
should both accept their mutual differences but also ensure that commonly 
agreed decisions are kept and honoured. A positive starting point is that 
both sides genuinely seem to want to do business together. 
5.  North America and the Northern Dimension 
The US and Canada have observer status in the renewed Northern 
Dimension. The US is involved in the northern region through several 
                                                      
9 Refer to S. Ryabkov’s presentation at the Conference on “Russia and the 
European Union – Future of Cooperation”, organised by Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
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multilateral frameworks. In the Barents Euro-Arctic Council, the US and 
Canada are observers, and they are full members of the Arctic Council. 
Within these frameworks, Russia and the US can meet without the same 
kind of pressure that accompanies more high-profile encounters. In 
addition to the European Northern Dimension, there is a second, different, 
Northern Dimension that is a key element of Canadian foreign policy. The 
Canadian Northern Dimension has four priority areas: 
support for the work of the Arctic Council; participation in the 
expanding international support for northern Russia; realizing the full 
potential of the University of the Arctic, and enhancing a Canadian 
and circumpolar policy research network; and promoting sustainable 
development through the pursuit of economic and trade opportunities 
across the circumpolar region.10 
For Canada, the north equates to the circumpolar region and the 
Arctic, while the EU’s framework focuses more on Russia and the Baltic Sea 
states. This has given rise to conceptual tension with some practical 
implications. Nevertheless, within the renewed Northern Dimension 
framework the Arctic element is much stronger than in the old format. This 
outcome stems not only from the equal partnership of Norway, Iceland and 
Russia, but also from the geopolitical importance that the Arctic has been 
gaining. While the ‘north’ of North America, Europe and Russia all have 
their distinct features, the underlying issues are generally the same. 
Strengthening the trans-Atlantic link especially with regard to the Northern 
Dimension would support both regional and global cooperation.  
From the perspective of the US, the European north generally has not 
played a very important role. Yet, several reasons have prompted the US to 
pay more attention to the region. In September 1997, the US launched its 
Northern European Initiative (NEI). The official goal was to demonstrate 
that integration and cooperation in northern Europe would benefit Russia 
and its Baltic neighbours. The NEI articulated six specific priorities: trade 
and business promotion, law enforcement, energy, the environment, public 
health and efforts at building civil society. It included largely the same 
                                                      
10 See Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, “The Northern Dimension 
of Canada’s Foreign Policy”, Communications Bureau Department of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, 2008 (retrieved from 
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geographical area as the Northern Dimension.11 While the Northern 
Dimension targets north-western Russia on issues like cross-border health 
challenges and the environment, the NEI funded similar projects in the 
Baltic countries. The initiative was not particularly successful, however, 
because of reservations on the part of Russia and the EU. Today, the 
emergence of a stronger Russia with a more assertive energy policy has 
refocused the US interest in the northern European region, especially its 
Arctic parts.  
The latest vehicle for US policy targeting the Baltic Sea area is called 
the Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe (e-PINE) Programme, 
introduced in late 2003. The US State Department claims that this 
represents an updated US policy for the area in the light of the NEI’s 
successful implementation: “The [NEI] policy’s foremost goal, the 
integration of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia into the western European 
community of democracies, has been achieved, as symbolised by offers of 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and European Union (EU) 
membership for the three states.”12 The e-PINE organises US activity within 
and in cooperation with the eight Nordic and Baltic States (thus not 
including Russia) in three broad focal areas: cooperative security, healthy 
societies and vibrant economies. It also seeks to promote US business links 
in the region. Where the e-PINE differs significantly from the new 
Northern Dimension is in the area of political security. 
E-PINE includes cooperation in the fight against terrorism, something 
almost completely alien to the Northern Dimension. Still, at least from the 
US perspective, e-PINE should only support the EU’s Northern Dimension, 
not compete with it.13 The e-PINE programme has taken on new forms and 
directions since its initial launch in 2003. The Baltic countries no longer 
                                                      
11 See A. Sergounin, “The United States’ Northern Dimension? Prospects for a US–
Russian Cooperative Agenda in Northern Europe”, PONARS Policy Memo No. 
232, prepared for the PONARS Policy Conference in Washington, D.C., 25 January 
2002 (retrieved from www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pm_0232.pdf). 
12 For more information on the e-PINE Programme, see the e-PINE website at 
www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/epine/c10621.htm. 
13 See the testimony of Heather Conley, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European 
and Eurasian Affairs, “U.S., Northern Europe Working to Advance Democracy”, 
before the House Committee on International Relations, the Enhanced Partnership 
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wanted to be the focus of the programme, and consequently Belarus, 
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia were taken on board.14 E-PINE 
consultations have also taken place with an expanded agenda. In April 
2008, for example, discussions in Riga within the e-PINE format focused on 
the assessment of the situation in the neighbouring regions of the EU and 
developments in the Balkans, Afghanistan, the Middle East and Cuba.15 E-
PINE appears more political in nature than the Northern Dimension is or 
seeks to be, but both have regional cooperation as their basic starting point. 
The trans-Atlantic connection is extremely important for the north, 
and it is vital to explore the ways in which the US and Canada could be 
better connected to the new Northern Dimension framework. As major 
global powers, both Russia and the US set their political agendas 
differently from their northern neighbours. Big-power politics tends to play 
a key role, and as a rule global considerations overrule the purely regional 
ones. Therefore, engaging great powers in the regional context will depend 
on how the region fits into their global agendas. The Baltic and Barents Seas 
have assumed greater global strategic importance, and thus have attracted 
the interest of the US and Russia. In the future, the question of the Arctic 
areas and their exploitation will grow in importance, and with it the role of 
Norway and Iceland. 
6.  Nuclear safety cooperation 
Questions of nuclear safety are of global interest. Within the Northern 
Dimension framework, cooperation on nuclear safety takes place under the 
environmental partnership. Nonetheless, nuclear safety differs significantly 
from conventional environmental cooperation and is politically a more 
sensitive issue. It is also a subject that attracts interest beyond regional 
cooperation. Nuclear safety in the north is of interest to the US and Canada 
as well as to the European great powers – the United Kingdom, Germany, 
and France. For example, the support fund of the Northern Dimension 
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beyond the Baltics”, Keynote Address, University of Washington, 26 May 2005 
(retrieved from http://depts.washington.edu/baltic/lectures/evans_2005_05_26.htm). 
15 See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia, “Foreign Ministry 
Political Director in e-PINE Washington Consultations Discusses Current 
International Issues”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riga, 2008 (retrieved from 
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Environmental Partnership (NDEP) includes a funding window earmarked 
for nuclear safety issues. Since it became operational in 2003, France, 
Canada, the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium have contributed funding 
through this window (although not through the non-earmarked window 
covering conventional environmental cooperation). Also, the EU 
contributes more to the nuclear safety window than to conventional 
environmental cooperation – €40 million compared with €30 million (see 
chapter 5).  
The nuclear window of the NDEP was built on the Multilateral 
Nuclear Environmental Programme in Russia (MNEPR). This programme 
facilitated work in three main areas: radioactive waste management, spent 
nuclear fuel security and reactor safety. Signatories include Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Russia, 
Sweden and the UK, plus the European Commission and the European 
Atomic Energy Community. The US signed one part of the accord, but not 
the protocol on questions of liability structures.16 The MNEPR was also 
supported by the announcement of the G-8 initiative against the spread of 
weapons and materials of mass destruction (at the Kananaskis summit in 
Canada, 2002), which gave priority to the safe and secure decommissioning 
of Russian nuclear submarines.  
The NDEP’s nuclear safety window operates through two channels: 
the Strategic Master Plan (SMP) and the Strategic Environmental 
Assessment (SEA). The SMP is a top-level work programme that helps 
decision-makers to define and prioritise projects. The SMP has been 
developed as a document that can be continuously modified according to 
further experience gained. It enables critical actions to be launched in time 
without impairing the outcome of the whole plan. The same idea can also 
be found in the renewed Northern Dimension framework. The aim of the 
SEA, for its part, is to evaluate the potential environmental impact of the 
activities defined in the SMP for the decommissioning of nuclear-powered 
naval vessels and other radiologically dangerous facilities in north-western 
Russia.  
Four of the most recent projects in the nuclear safety window of the 
NDEP were signed in June 2008 between the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the newly established 
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Russian state corporation Rosatom. The largest of these is the 
decommissioning of the Lepse vessel currently moored at Atomflot in 
Murmansk. The project will involve moving the vessel into a shipyard at 
Nerpa before the spent fuel is removed from the ship, which will then be 
dismantled. Project costs are estimated at €43 million. Other projects are a 
€20 million grant to Andreeva Bay, where some 22,000 spent nuclear fuel 
assemblies need to be removed from deteriorating dry storage tanks, 
repacked and exported from the site for reprocessing; €5.6 million for de-
fuelling of the Papa-class nuclear submarine; and €5.1 million to help 
improve the radiation monitoring and emergency response system in the 
Arkhangelsk region. Vince Novak, Director of Nuclear Safety of the EBRD, 
termed these projects a milestone in NDEP nuclear safety cooperation, and 
a clear sign that implementation of the SMP is underway. He also noted the 
great commitment of the Russian side.17  
Nuclear safety cooperation has been slow to move forward in the 
Northern Dimension framework, but it is still a good example of how even 
more sensitive issues can be dealt with and moved forward, albeit slowly 
and through a lengthy process of negotiations. Although the international 
media increasingly refer to a ‘new cold war’ between the Russian 
Federation and the Western world, the gradual movement forward in 
regional cooperation and wide collaborative frameworks like the Northern 
Dimension ensure that the clock will not be turned back. 
7.  Conclusion 
The vulnerability of cooperative frameworks between Russia and the West 
has been demonstrated by the events of August 2008 in Georgia. Within the 
former Soviet space there is also tension in regional cooperation, given the 
usually undisguised aim of Russia to dominate and given its perceptions – 
rightly or wrongly – of the national interests of the US being far too often 
taken into account. While it remains to be seen whether the Northern 
Dimension will be affected by the sudden deterioration in overall relations, 
so far it has proven a more stable cooperation framework than many 
others. In part, this is because the Northern Dimension has mostly been 
concerned with ‘soft’ issues. The Northern Dimension is also unique in 
assigning equal status to each of its partners and operating according to 
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consensus around individual issues, but without any strict veto rights, in 
addition to being particularly flexible.  
The Northern Dimension remains a relatively unknown concept in 
Russian foreign policy. The same is true within the larger context of the EU. 
For those who are in touch with the concrete actions and practical 
cooperation within the Northern Dimension, especially in Finland and 
Norway, the benefits are relatively clear. Working with Russia on an equal 
footing is a fairly new experience both in the West and in Russia, and the 
Northern Dimension is often wrongly interpreted as a multilateral 
framework in which Russia has veto rights. It is true that most of the 
practical projects launched within the framework of the Northern 
Dimension have to involve consensus among all the partners. Yet, once this 
consensus has been achieved, the results have generally benefited all 
partners. 
The factor that makes the Russian side somewhat slow in responding 
to proposals is that the Northern Dimension should not contradict or 
duplicate actions at the strategic level. This means that the local and state 
levels should be on the same page, and that process – as is widely 
acknowledged – is still far from working smoothly in Russia. Both the local 
and federal levels see the Northern Dimension as an important tool, but 
there seem to be some significant differences, for example over whether 
cross-border cooperation is included in the Northern Dimension or not. 
Differences of opinion also prevail with regard to project prioritisation. The 
local level prefers practical local cooperation where knowledge and 
technology from the outside can be brought in, while the federal level 
prefers high-profile projects that attract attention.18  
In Russian–EU and Russian–US relationships, security issues have 
taken over the platform of cooperation and turned it into a conflict zone. 
The situation has started to favour such negative elements of Russian 
foreign policy as imperialistic thinking and ressentiment as well as realist 
thinking in great-power relations. The multilateralist element and 
sovereignty principle still exist, however, and the importance of 
regionalism will grow. These weak but persistent elements can act to 
provide a workable framework in Russian–EU relations and in Russian–US 
                                                      
18 Refer to the “The New Northern Dimension: Regional Co-operation, Business 
and Energy”, Expert seminar, Norwegian University Centre, St. Petersburg, 17 
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relations as well. Once dampening Russian–EU tensions allow PCA 
negotiations to advance seriously, the lessons learned from the Northern 
Dimension can prove valuable. Nuclear safety issues provide an example of 
how security-related matters can be dealt with under this framework, and 
have drawn the attention of the EU’s larger powers to the achievements of 
the Northern Dimension. Regional cooperation and sectoral agreements 
may well provide the working formula for the future of Russian–EU 
relations. 
Russia is not an easy partner for the West, but even during the cold 
war cooperation was possible. As talk of a ‘cold peace’ is starting to 
emerge, regionally based forms of cooperation are more important than 
ever. The US and Canada also have interests in the European north. 
Common ground on which the Northern Dimension and e-PINE 
programme could work together does exist. There is plenty of evidence that 
working constructively with Russia is possible and indeed the Northern 
Dimension framework provides an ideal setting for putting forward 
matters that are important for the West as well as for the future 
development of Russia. North-west Russia may well become an example 
for other Russian regions of how to develop their regions in collaboration 
with the central power and international actors. 
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COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF 
REGIONAL COLLABORATION IN THE NORTH 
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∗ 
1.  Introduction 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 presented Nordic decision-makers 
with a new set of challenges and opportunities in the ‘High North’: How 
can greater interaction with Russia be promoted, while at the same time 
avoiding a bilateralisation of relations? In 1992, Norwegian foreign minister 
Thorvald Stoltenberg launched the idea of setting up a multilateral 
framework for cooperation in the High North, and on 11 January 1993, the 
Barents cooperation was formally established with the adoption of the 
Kirkenes Declaration “to provide impetus to existing cooperation and 
consider new initiatives and proposals”.1 
Initial expectations of the Barents cooperation appear to have been 
rather unrealistic. For instance, official Norwegian statements at the time 
indicate a widespread belief that north-western Russians were ‘really just 
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like us’ and that any differences had to be the result of Soviet oppression.2 
All the same, and despite some setbacks that are discussed below, the 
Barents cooperation has now been going on for 15 years. The experience 
amassed from this collaboration is interesting not only for those focusing 
on cross-border interaction and regional cooperation in the High North, but 
also in the wider context of the Northern Dimension policy.  
How well has the Barents cooperation succeeded in achieving its 
stated goals? Any examination of this question is complicated by the 
relatively vague and open-ended objectives in the Kirkenes Declaration. 
Although the idea of “contributing substantially to stability and progress in 
the area and in Europe as a whole”3 is certainly a noble goal, measuring the 
relative success of such an endeavour is difficult, to say the least. Isolating 
the effects of the Barents cooperation from those of all the other rapid 
developments taking place in contemporary Russia is in itself a daunting 
task.  
Here we primarily examine of the evolution of the task structure and 
the organisational set-up. Drawing on documentary analysis and the 
experiences of those directly involved, we present some lessons learned 
from 15 years of cooperation. As regards the task structure, we look at the 
programmes and underlying projects carried out under the aegis of the 
Barents cooperation, and how these activities have developed over time. 
Concerning organisational evolution, the question is how the 
organisational structure has evolved in response to changes in needs and 
conditions.  
Let us begin with a brief overview of the background to the 
establishment of the Barents cooperation and the Kirkenes Declaration.  
2.  Background 
The official motivation for the establishment of the Barents cooperation 
emphasised the need to promote positive developments in post-
Communist Russia. These efforts, it was assumed, would in turn benefit 
Russia’s neighbours. Such developments were to be supported through 
                                                      
2 See G. Hønneland, Barentsbrytninger: norsk nordområdepolitikk etter den kalde krigen, 
Kristiansand, Høyskoleforlaget, 2005. 
3 See the 1993 “Declaration on Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region”, op. 
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improving bilateral relations and the establishment of ‘normal’ cross-
border interaction and cooperation in a region where the old East/West 
border had remained practically sealed during the cold war.  
In addition, it has been held that Norway launched the Barents 
cooperation to avoid becoming marginalised in northern Europe after the 
establishment of the Council of Baltic Sea States in 1992, in which Norway 
played only a peripheral role.4 Whatever Norway’s initial intentions were, 
the proposition was also supported by then Russian foreign minister 
Andrei Kozyrev, which made it easier to get the other Nordic countries on 
board quickly. Finland had already been toying with similar ideas. 
The region-builders cited close historical ties as an argument for the 
designation of the region. Jens Petter Nielsen points out that there was 
considerable cross-border trade and interaction within the region in the 
past, a tradition that continued even during long periods of border 
disputes, parallel taxation and other disagreements that tainted state-to-
state relations.5 Other scholars consider these claims about common history 
to be somewhat exaggerated by the region-builders. At the time of the 
establishment of the Barents cooperation, however, little was left of this 
joint heritage: there were significant cultural, linguistic, religious6 and 
economic differences, factors that have hampered the renewal of cross-
border cooperation in the region. 
Geography 
A central aspect of the cooperation has been to define the geographical 
scope of the ‘Barents Euro-Arctic region’ (commonly referred to simply as 
                                                      
4 See Hønneland (2005), op. cit. 
5 See J.-P. Nielsen, “Russian-Norwegian Relations in Arctic Europe: The History of 
the ‘Barents Euro-Arctic Region’”, East European Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2001, pp. 
163–81. 
6 While culture, language and religion are often considered separately for 
analytical purposes, they tend to form more of a ‘cultural complex’. For example, 
the belief that knowledge of the Russian language alone would be sufficient to 
overcome cultural barriers has often been criticised as a major flaw in early 
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the Barents region).7 From the very start, it was agreed to keep ocean 
territories and marine issues outside the cooperation, and to limit the 
region to land territories. Initially, the cooperation covered the seven 
northernmost counties of Norway, Sweden, Finland and north-west Russia, 
but it has since gradually been expanded to its current membership of 13 
counties (Figure 3.1).  
Figure 3.1 The Barents Euro-Arctic region 
 
Source: The Barents portal (retrieved from www.barentsinfo.fi/barentsmap.htm). 
Currently, the region covers an area of 1,755,800 km2, i.e. a territory 
approximately the size of France, Spain, Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands taken together. The total population, however, stands at just 
slightly less than 6 million, yielding a population density of only 3.5 
inhabitants per km2. 
The Barents region is considered to be among Europe’s richest in 
terms of natural resources, although it should be noted that exploiting 
these resources often requires considerable investment owing to the harsh 
                                                      
7 The addition of ‘Euro-Arctic’ to the name has often been interpreted as part of the 
domestic debate over Norwegian EU membership, and as essentially an attempt to 
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climate and remoteness of the region. On the Russian side, in particular 
there is already an extensive and highly profitable mining industry, 
extracting a wide range of minerals such as nickel, titanium and 
aluminium. There is also a substantial forestry industry across the region. 
Recently, the petroleum industry has received the greatest interest, 
after the discoveries of several significant deposits of oil and gas in the 
Barents Sea. The vast Shtokman field is estimated to hold reserves of 
approximately 3.8 trillion cubic metres of natural gas,8 more than twice the 
entire gas reserves of Canada. After years of indecision, in 2007 the Russian 
authorities decided to invite French Total and Norwegian StatoilHydro to 
participate in the development consortium led by Gazprom (the license and 
all marketing rights, however, will remain with the Gazprom subsidiary 
Sevmorneftegaz).9 
Hopes are high that Shtokman will finally bring about the cross-
border commercial ties and economic development that the Barents 
cooperation has, in the eyes of most observers, failed to create.10 Shtokman 
has certainly helped to draw greater attention to the region as a whole in 
recent years. On the other hand, it may also have contributed to a certain 
sidelining of the Barents cooperation, as offshore activities fall outside its 
geographical scope. The Barents cooperation has an Energy Working 
Group (see below), but little involvement in the development of the 
petroleum industry in the region. 
                                                      
8 This figure is Gazprom’s most recent estimate at the time of writing. 
9 See the article, “All Shtokman gas belongs to Gazprom”, BarentsObserver.com, 21 
November 2007 (retrieved from www.barentsobserver.com/index.php?id=563162 
&cat=91228&xforceredir=1&noredir=1). 
10 In the early 1990s, there were clearly unrealistic expectations in Norway, 
particularly in the northernmost counties, concerning the smooth introduction of 
capitalism in Russia and the potential for Norwegian companies in this new 
market. Geir Hønneland (2005, op. cit.) describes this period as gripped by 
“Barents Euphoria” and contrasts this with several examples of failed Norwegian 
business ventures from the same period. Hopes were dashed, however, upon 
encountering Russian bureaucracy and an unpredictable regulatory framework, as 
well as a tendency towards short-term profit-seeking among Norwegian actors; see 
E. Fløtten, Barentssamarbeidet – hva nå? En kortfattet evaluering som tar for seg 
utfordringer og videre veivalg, 2005 (retrieved from www.aksjonsprogrammet.no/ 
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Organisational structure 
Membership in the Barents cooperation is made up of six states: Denmark, 
Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia and Sweden, as well as the European 
Commission. Several other countries, including Canada, Germany, Japan, 
the UK and the US, participate as observers. The chair rotates every second 
year among Finland, Norway, Russia and Sweden, i.e. the countries 
considered physically part of the Barents region. 
Cooperation is organised on two levels: the Barents Euro-Arctic 
Council (BEAC) is the forum for intergovernmental cooperation on issues 
concerning the Barents region. Representation in the BEAC consists of each 
member state’s foreign minister or ministers responsible for the policy area 
to be discussed at a particular meeting. The BEAC meets at least once every 
two years, at the end of the term of office of the outgoing chair. 
In addition, the Barents cooperation takes place at the regional level, 
underlining the goal of creating a transnational Barents region. The 
regional level cooperation is organised under the Barents Regional Council 
(BRC). Initially, membership of the BRC was made up of the three 
northernmost Norwegian counties of Nordland, Troms and Finnmark, plus 
Norrbotten in Sweden, Lapland in Finland and the Murmansk and 
Arkhangelsk Oblasts in Russia. Almost immediately after the establishment 
of the BRC, the Republic of Karelia (Russia) was accepted as a member. 
Since then, the Nenets Autonomous Okrug (Russia),11 the Republic of Komi 
(Russia), and the counties of Oulu and Kainuu (Finland) and Västerbotten 
(Sweden) have become members. Furthermore, the indigenous peoples of 
the region have a representative on the BRC. 
Both levels have committees responsible for handling administrative 
tasks and continuing work on prioritised issues between council meetings. 
These are the Committee of Senior Officials on the international level and 
the Barents Regional Committee on the regional level. The committees are 
made up of officials from the participating states and regional entities, 
respectively.  
Moreover, in 2007, it was agreed to strengthen cooperation through 
setting up an international secretariat in Kirkenes. The secretariat will 
“provide technical support to the official bodies and working groups, as 
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well as participate in project implementation and information activities”.12 
Especially at the regional level, this step was warmly welcomed, as the lack 
of a permanent coordinating body has long been seen as one of the major 
flaws of the Barents cooperation.13  
Both councils have in addition established several working groups 
dedicated to specific issues. The actual, substantive work under the Barents 
cooperation is often carried out in these working groups. The most 
important are arguably the joint working groups. These are co-chaired by 
state level and regional representatives and they have tended to be 
established along the lines of priority issues. Currently, there are four such 
working groups: the Joint Working Group on Energy, the Joint Working 
Group on Culture,14 the Joint Working Group on Health and Related Social 
Issues, and the Joint Working Group on Education and Research. 
Particularly the latter two also represent areas in which the Barents 
cooperation has been relatively successful. In otherwise significant (but less 
successful) areas, economic cooperation in particular, there are no such 
joint working groups.  
3.  Assessing performance 
As stated at the outset, the aim of this chapter is to assess lessons learned 
from the Barents cooperation by reviewing the development of the 
cooperation along two dimensions: changes in programmes and projects 
and changes in organisational structure. In doing so, it is important to keep 
the changes that have taken place in the international and domestic 
political context in the region as a backdrop. 
The most fundamental change in recent years is undoubtedly the 
apparent revitalisation of Russia. Since the turn of the millennium, Russia’s 
economy has strengthened greatly, fuelled by petroleum exports and rising 
                                                      
12 See “Agreement on an International Barents Secretariat in Kirkenes”, Press 
Release No. 135/07, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 2007 (retrieved 
from www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Press_Contacts/News/2007/international 
_barents-secretariat.html?id=490271). 
13 See Fløtten (2005), op. cit. 
14 The Barents Regional Working Group on Culture became the Joint Working 
Group on Culture in late 2007. As it has thus only operated under its new mandate 
for a few months, we have opted to leave this joint working group out of the 
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oil prices. Today, Russia also appears more politically stable than during 
the years of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency. At the same time, economic growth 
during Vladimir Putin’s presidency has been translated into a far more 
assertive foreign policy.15 While the consequences for the Barents 
cooperation have not been as dramatic as for Russia’s relations with some 
other states and organisations, the new Russian assertiveness is likely to 
have some impact on the room for international cooperation, especially 
where such cooperation involves foreign activities on Russian soil. 
Political interest in the High North has been on the rise in recent 
years, notably in Norway. The potential for petroleum development also 
draws attention to the region in other national capitals. In 2007, Russian 
foreign ministry spokesperson Mikhail Kamynin commented on the 
potential for cooperation in the Barents region: “Energy is in the centre, and 
can function as a platform for joint action.”16 It is nonetheless still too early 
to say whether the focus on petroleum resources will ease or complicate 
cooperation in the region. With an apparent trend towards nationalisation 
of ‘strategic’ natural resources in Russia, the current dependency of the 
Russian economy on petroleum extraction, oil and gas might prove a 
source of conflict as much as cooperation. 
Since the establishment of the Barents cooperation, both Sweden and 
Finland have become EU member states. The expansion of the Northern 
Dimension introduces some ambiguity. On the one hand, EU instruments 
often contribute funding to Barents region projects. Indeed, a great many 
projects could never have been realised without this support. Within the 
health sector, there is even explicit coordination between the Barents 
Health and Social Programme and the Northern Dimension Partnership in 
Public Health and Social Well-being (NDPHS). At the same time, the 
Northern Dimension could potentially be a competitor for the Barents 
cooperation, in the sense that it can draw political and financial resources 
away from the region to the wider geographical context of the Northern 
Dimension. 
                                                      
15 See D. Averre, “‘Sovereign Democracy’ and Russia’s Relations with the 
European Union”, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 15, No. 3, 2007, pp. 173–90. 
16 See the article, “Russia in Charge of Barents Cooperation”, BarentsObserver.com, 
15 November 2007 (retrieved from www.barentsobserver.com/index.php?id 
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4.  Programmes and projects 
The Kirkenes Declaration specifies the prioritised areas of cooperation as 
follows: economy, trade, science and technology, tourism, the environment, 
infrastructure, cultural and educational exchange, and improvement of 
living conditions for the indigenous peoples of the region.17 As discussed 
later, priorities have changed over time, with some formerly prioritised 
areas being shoved to the background while others have moved to the 
forefront. 
The Regional Council seeks to operationalise the goals of the 
cooperation through the Barents Programme. The Programme is renewed 
at regular intervals, normally every three to four years, and serves as a 
framework and action plan for the cooperation, defining goals and 
priorities. 
Projects carried out under the Barents Programme are primarily 
initiated by non-governmental organisations, educational institutions, 
businesses and other private actors, who apply to the relevant national 
institutions for funding to realise their proposed projects. The projects 
range in scale from the relatively small (conferences, concerts and other 
one-time events) to more expansive projects (primarily long-term 
cooperation in education, culture, business or other areas that require 
considerable resources). In the majority of cases, Barents cooperation 
institutions will provide only a relatively limited share of the funding 
required. EU initiatives like Kolarctic and the Interreg Programme tend to 
be important sources of supplementary funding, illustrating the frequent 
interweaving and overlapping of these initiatives. Occasionally, actors 
involved in the Barents cooperation also initiate projects themselves, by 
presenting ideas to potential participants and encouraging them to apply 
for funding. 
Although the Barents Programme is multilateral, most projects have 
been implemented on a bilateral basis.18 For example, the Norwegian 
                                                      
17 See the 1993 “Declaration on Cooperation in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region”, op. 
cit. 
18 See O.S. Stokke, G. Hønneland and P.J. Schei, “Pollution and Conservation”, in 
O.S. Stokke and G. Hønneland (eds), International Cooperation and Arctic Governance: 
Regime Effectiveness and Northern Region Building, London: Routledge, 2007, pp. 78–
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Barents Secretariat in Kirkenes is responsible for processing Norwegian 
project applications. A look at the Barents Project Catalogue 2006 reveals that 
a majority of the projects that have received funding from the Barents 
Secretariat have solely involved Norwegian applicants and their Russian 
partners.19 
Besides the Barents Programme, there are also other programmes 
under the Barents cooperation: the Regional Youth Programme, the Health 
and Social Programme (which receives additional funding from the EU and 
WHO) and the HIV/AIDS Programme. The latter two programmes in 
particular have been developed in coordination with the Northern 
Dimension.  
The Health and Social Programme is by far the most extensive of 
these programmes. While most of the funding as well as the projects under 
the programme has come from Norway, the programme is nevertheless 
seen as one of the great successes of the Barents cooperation. Efforts have 
concentrated on halting the spread of communicable diseases, in particular 
tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS, which were spreading rapidly in north-west 
Russia in the late 1990s, and on the general improvement of the health 
infrastructure in north-west Russia.20 The programme itself serves a 
function similar to that of the Barents Programme, although limited to 
“health and related social issues”. The Working Group on Health and 
Related Social Issues is responsible for developing and following up on the 
programme, currently in its second period (2004–07) (it was preceded by 
the Barents Health Cooperation Programme 1999–2003).21 
The increased emphasis on health and social issues is perhaps the 
most prominent example of the dynamic character of the Barents 
cooperation, as health issues were not even mentioned in the Kirkenes 
Declaration. As has often been the case in the Barents cooperation, Norway 
                                                      
19 See the Norwegian Barents Secretariat, Project Catalogue 2006, Norwegian Barents 
Secretariat, Kirkenes, 2006 (retrieved from www.barents.no/getfile.php/ 
403095.900.eswstrbvqs/Prosjektkatalog+2006.doc). 
20 See Hønneland (2005), op. cit. 
21 For more information, see the Barents Euro-Artic Region website (retrieved from 
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has provided the major part of the funding.22 The establishment of a Task 
Force on Communicable Disease Control in the Baltic Sea region in 2000 by 
the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) may have served to divert some 
funds away from the Health Cooperation Programme. On the other hand, 
there is general agreement that the Barents cooperation programmes and 
the CBSS Task Force, as well as its successor, the NDPHS, have 
complemented each other in the successful effort to stem the tide of 
tuberculosis in north-eastern Europe. 
As noted earlier, the Health Cooperation Programme and the Health 
and Social Programme have often been singled out as the most successful 
initiatives under the Barents cooperation: participants on both sides have 
seemed satisfied with the collaboration, health cooperation involves 
relatively few controversies and the effects are easier to measure than in 
many of the other projects. The successful introduction of DOTS23 in north-
western Russia, the World Health Organisation’s recommended treatment 
programme for tuberculosis, has been hailed as one of the greatest, most 
visible successes of the efforts (an honour that has to be shared with the 
CBSS Task Force). 
The Barents cooperation can be said to develop according to a 
‘learning-by-doing’ approach. Because of limited experience in dealing 
with Russia (or perhaps more accurately, with Russians), there have been 
many failed projects. As a result, the member states have chosen to focus 
their efforts on areas where they see results: the health cooperation has 
been successful and thus receives greater attention, whereas the Regional 
Working Group on Investments and Economic Cooperation, which 
experienced limited success, has been disbanded. 
Another important aspect is the need for success stories to sell the 
Barents cooperation to the public. The Barents cooperation has received a 
great deal of negative press, especially in Norway. Particularly the projects 
related to business and industry have often been described in the media as 
disastrous failures, tarnishing the public image of the Barents cooperation.24 
                                                      
22 See L. Rowe and G. Hønneland, “Communicable Disease Control”, in O.S. 
Stokke and G. Hønneland, International Cooperation and Arctic Governance: Regime 
Effectiveness and Northern Region Building, London: Routledge, 2007, p. 54. 
23 DOTS refers to Directly Observed Therapy, Short-Course. 
24 This impression is also confirmed by some of the participants themselves in past 
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By contrast, the health cooperation has experienced its fair share of 
successes and is now largely unassailable – it is very difficult to criticise 
anyone for fighting disease – and makes for nice headlines. This might be 
the reason the Norwegian government, which has the most prestige 
invested in the Barents cooperation, has also been the prime contributor to 
the health programmes. 
5.  Organisational development 
The permanent structures of the Barents cooperation are the committees 
(the Committee of Senior Officials and the Regional Committee), the 
working groups and the secretariats. As the committees have remained 
largely unaltered except for the addition of new member regions to the 
Regional Committee, we focus on the working groups and secretariats, 
which have seen considerable changes in recent years. 
The working groups 
As regards the working groups, some of them have been around more or 
less from the beginning. These are the groups dedicated to economic 
cooperation, education, the environment, culture, transport and indigenous 
peoples.  
Significant additions have, however, been made over time.25 In 1998, 
for instance, the Barents Council established a Working Group on Energy – 
a step that reflected the growing interest in the energy resources of the 
Barents region. In practical terms, the working group has nevertheless 
served more as an auxiliary to the Working Group on the Environment. 
Most of the group’s own work and supported projects have centred on 
reducing energy consumption, increasing energy efficiency and 
introducing bioenergy in north-west Russia. Petroleum development has 
been not been included in the Barents cooperation, reflecting the 
significance of the oil and gas resources in the economies of some member 
countries. 
In 1999, an Exchange Programme for Higher Education and Research 
was established, and in 2003, the programme board was merged with the 
regional working group on education to form the Joint Working Group on 
Education and Research. The primary responsibilities of this group have 
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been related to promoting and facilitating cooperation in education and 
research, as well as the exchange of students and researchers within the 
Barents region. 
The same year, a Joint Working Group on Health and Related Social 
Issues was established in conjunction with the launch of the new Health 
and Social Programme. That the working group was only established after 
the original Health Cooperation Programme had proven successful 
perhaps reflects an initial unwillingness to invest too much in this new field 
of collaboration (indeed, there was no working group on health at either 
level until 2003). Since the launch of the new programme, the Joint 
Working Group on Health and Related Social Issues has nonetheless 
developed into perhaps the most active and well organised of the working 
groups, having come a long way in streamlining application procedures, 
providing information and facilitating communication among participants. 
Indeed, as mentioned above, health cooperation has become the new 
flagship of the Barents cooperation.  
The concept of joint working groups is in itself an innovation, dating 
back no further than to 2003. As previously noted, the joint working groups 
have shared chairmanship with one chair representing one of the capitals 
and the other representing a member region. Interestingly, the three 
existing joint working groups have come into being through different 
processes, and there does not seem to be any single criterion for the 
establishment of joint working groups: the Joint Working Group on 
Education and Research evolved from a merger of a programme board 
(which had completed its original task) and a regional working group. The 
Joint Working Group on Energy became ‘joint’ after Norway proposed to 
include the regions in an existing Barents Council working group. And 
finally, the Joint Working Group on Health and Related Social Issues was 
an entirely new creation. 
Three reasons spring to mind as the rationale for the creation of such 
joint working groups. An official reason, given as justification for the 
launch of the Joint Working Group on Energy, is the inclusion of both 
levels in the work of the Barents cooperation. There are both democratic 
and practical reasons for this; moreover, the inclusion of the regional level 
in international cooperation is one of the distinguishing features and 
underlying ideals of the Barents cooperation. A second reason for setting 
up joint working groups would be the cost aspect. By reducing the total 
number of working groups in this way, the associated costs can be 
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dissolved for cost reasons in 1999 and only re-established in 2001 thanks to 
EU funding.26 Finally, joint working groups eliminate the duplication and 
overlapping that unavoidably take place when parallel groups exist. 
Proposed organisational changes 
The Barents Regional Committee established an ad-hoc group on 
organisational changes in June 2005. So far, two of the group’s 
recommendations have been partly realised. At the 2007 meeting of the 
Barents Council in Rovaniemi, a decision was made to set up an 
International Barents Secretariat. Its primary responsibilities will be to 
provide administrative and organisational support to participants, 
maintain databases and other records, and assist the working groups in 
obtaining financial support. Geographically, the international secretariat 
will be co-located with the existing Norwegian Barents Secretariat in 
Kirkenes.  
A Finnish Barents Secretariat has also been founded recently to serve 
a similar function as the Norwegian one. With the creation of the 
international secretariat, it is hoped that the national and international 
secretariats will fill a network function, ensuring continuity and 
momentum within the Barents cooperation between meetings. The new 
secretariats are potentially the greatest organisational change in the history 
of the Barents cooperation, although i t  r e m a i n s  t o  b e  s e e n  w h a t  t h e  
practical consequences will be. 
Further changes to the organisational structure can be expected as a 
result of the completion of the Barents 2010 project. This was a large 
research project initiated by the Barents Council and partly funded by the 
Interreg IIIB Baltic Sea Programme to develop a strategy and action plan 
for future cooperation within the Barents region. Among its clearest 
recommendations was the creation of several sector programmes to 
facilitate economic cooperation. The sector programmes essentially consist 
of smaller packages of specific goals and projects, supervised by a single 
region throughout the programme period. As the Barents 2010 project itself 
was completed only a few months prior to the writing of this chapter, the 
extent to which the recommendations will be implemented is still unclear. 
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6.  Lessons learned 
What lessons can be drawn from 15 years of collaboration among the 
Nordic countries and Russia within the framework of the Barents 
cooperation? We have especially looked for those lessons along two 
dimensions: changes in the actual content of cooperation and 
organisational development. 
There is broad agreement that the Barents cooperation has been a 
mixed success: there are notable accomplishments in the realm of health 
and somewhat fewer in economic cooperation.  
An overall lesson seems to be that this kind of cooperation is not one 
that produces quick results – results are better measured over decades than 
years – especially since the overarching goals of the cooperation concern 
long-term positive development in the region rather than specific short-
term objectives. This outcome, of course, also requires long-term political 
commitment. 
As an example of such long-term positive development, several 
observers have pointed to the valuable but frequently overlooked effects of 
the emergence of professional networks across the national and regional 
borders. This point is for instance highlighted in a 2005 evaluation of the 
Barents cooperation. In particular, improved cross-border contacts among 
officials at the regional level were here described as a tremendous 
advantage when dealing with regional issues, both within and outside the 
framework of the Barents cooperation. From this perspective, the primary 
significance of the Barents cooperation is not so much in the immediate 
effects of the various projects, as in the creation of common fora for debate 
and improved relations with – and access to – officials in the participating 
counties. These contacts, in turn, improve conditions for collaboration on 
substantive issues of common interest. 
Cooperation partners have also frequently mentioned the importance 
of developing mutual trust and understanding in a region where cultural 
differences are significant, yet not always sufficiently recognised.27 In fact, 
the underestimation of cultural, structural and even legal differences has 
marred many Barents cooperation projects. Maintaining channels for 
communication and creating cross-border networks on the other hand 
reduces tensions and facilitates further cooperation.  
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The same lesson is highlighted in the area of health cooperation. 
While the Barents Health Programme certainly achieved many positive, 
concrete results, the improved communication and collaboration among 
health professionals within Russia as well as throughout the region is often 
considered one of its most important accomplishments – and indeed 
something of a requirement for further progress. 
Experiences from the health cooperation also suggest that well-
defined projects with clearly specified, short-term goals have been 
relatively effective (e.g. the introduction of the DOTS strategy in north-west 
Russian health care). It is important, however, to note several other factors 
that have contributed to success. First, the objectives have been mutually 
understood, and more crucially, shared by all participants, something that 
has often not been the case in other projects: objectives and methods have 
frequently been specified by the Western partners, and Russian agreement 
and understanding been taken for granted. Yet in reality, these objectives 
have not been shared or they have even seemed meaningless and 
incomprehensible to the Russian participants. Second, health cooperation 
has generally taken place among medical workers with relatively similar 
educational backgrounds and outlooks despite some differences in 
methodology and priorities. Cooperation among professionals is often 
easier to implement than among actors seeking political gains or economic 
profit from the collaboration. 
In short, it seems that the basic requirement of mutual trust, 
understanding and shared objectives has been essential for ensuring 
successes in the Barents cooperation. That this requirement has not been 
met in many projects is perhaps primarily a result of the novelty of East–
West cooperation at the time the Barents cooperation was established. It is 
to be hoped that this problem will become less prominent as Nordic–
Russian interaction develops further – and indeed, there are signs that this 
problem is less acute today. 
Moving on to the recent changes in organisational structure, these are 
intended to address lack of coordination – an issue that for a long time has 
been voiced by a number of Barents cooperation participants. With the 
exception of the Norwegian Barents Secretariat, the Barents cooperation has 
always lacked permanent coordinating institutions. Many have argued that 
this has hindered multilateral cooperation and made work between 
meetings more complicated than necessary. 
Another frequently mentioned problem is the lack of funds managed 
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unpredictable and occasionally less than enthusiastic national governments 
for funding has reduced the attraction of the Barents cooperation for many 
project entrepreneurs. 
The establishment of the joint working groups seems to be the result 
of a long period of uncertainty as to what the priorities of the Barents 
cooperation should be, and perhaps more significantly, to its ability to 
deliver on promises. Over time, areas in which cooperation appeared most 
successful have also tended to receive the most attention and funds. The 
economic cooperation, a cornerstone of the early days, has now been 
relegated to a secondary role. The most important lesson to be learned from 
these developments is perhaps, superficial though it may sound, that to 
retain public support for a large international cooperative arrangement like 
the Barents cooperation, it is necessary to have some safe bets.  
The health cooperation has a strong standing in the public; its effects 
are perceived as mutually advantageous, and almost indisputably so, 
whether this is true or not. In Norway, certainly, the impression that the 
government is acting to stop the spread of diseases that might otherwise 
cross borders, while at the same time showing solidarity with our Russian 
neighbours, has done much to improve the public image of the Barents 
cooperation. Organising the structure of the cooperation in ways that 
emphasise successes may thus be advantageous, even necessary, to 
maintain public support, which in turn is a requirement for large and long-
term investments in international collaboration. 
The Barents cooperation has been around for 15 years. Mistakes and 
miscalculations have been made, some of which have been corrected. There 
have also been successes. Both failures and successes provide valuable 
lessons for future cooperation in the northernmost reaches of Europe. It can 
only be hoped that these lessons will be taken to heart in the further 
development of the Barents cooperation, as well as in other cooperative 
efforts spanning the former East/West divide in the High North, such as 
the Northern Dimension. 
7.  References 
Averre, D. (2007), “‘Sovereign Democracy’ and Russia’s Relations with the 
European Union”, Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 15, No. 3, pp. 173–90. 
Fløtten, E. (2005), Barentssamarbeidet – hva nå? En kortfattet evaluering som tar 
for seg utfordringer og videre veivalg (retrieved from 
www.aksjonsprogrammet.no/vedlegg/barentssamarbeid.pdf). BARENTS COOPERATION & DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL COLLABORATION | 53 
Hønneland, G. (2005), Barentsbrytninger: norsk nordområdepolitikk etter den 
kalde krigen, Kristiansand, Høyskoleforlaget. 
Nielsen, J.-P. (2001), “Russian–Norwegian Relations in Arctic Europe: The 
History of the ‘Barents Euro-Arctic Region’”, East European Quarterly, 
Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 163–81. 
Norwegian Barents Secretariat (2006), Project Catalogue 2006, Norwegian 
Barents Secretariat, Kirkenes (retrieved from www.barents.no/ 
getfile.php/403095.900.eswstrbvqs/Prosjektkatalog+2006.doc). 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2007), “Agreement on an 
International Barents Secretariat in Kirkenes”, Press Release No. 
135/07, Oslo (retrieved from www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/ 
Press_Contacts/News/2007/international_barents-secretariat.html? 
id=490271). 
Rowe, L. and G. Hønneland (2007), “Communicable Disease Control”, in 
O.S. Stokke and G. Hønneland (eds), International Cooperation and 
Arctic Governance: Regime Effectiveness and Northern Region Building, 
London: Routledge, p. 54. 
Stokke, O.S., G. Hønneland and P.J. Schei (2007), “Pollution and 
Conservation”, in O.S. Stokke and G. Hønneland (eds), International 
Cooperation and Arctic Governance: Regime Effectiveness and Northern 
Region Building, London: Routledge, pp. 78–112. 
 54 | 
 
 
4.  BEST PRACTICES IN FISHERIES 
MANAGEMENT: EXPERIENCES FROM 
NORWEGIAN–RUSSIAN COOPERATION 
ALF HÅKON HOEL
∗ 
1.  Introduction 
To the north of Norway and north-west Russia lies the Barents Sea, an 
ocean area of some 1.4 million km2. Because of favourable climatic and 
oceanographic conditions, the Barents Sea sustains productive ecosystems 
and major commercial fisheries that are among the most important in the 
world. Each year, millions of tonnes of fish are taken here by vessels from 
Norway, Russia and several other countries. 
Since the mid-1970s, Norway and Russia have developed a joint 
management regime for these fisheries, entailing extensive bilateral 
cooperation on scientific as well as management-related issues. This 
cooperation has been able to function in the context of the security concerns 
of the cold war as well as in the post-cold war period. The joint 
management regime is considered relatively effective, in the sense that 
most major fisheries in the area are carried out at sustainable levels. 
This chapter reviews and discusses experiences from this 
cooperation, with a view to identifying potential best practices in 
cooperation on fisheries management. Such experiences may have interest 
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outside the realm of fisheries as well, as an example of bilateral cooperation 
on the management of joint problems and issues. In the context of the 
Northern Dimension, the experience and lessons learned from a successful 
bilateral cooperation over an extended period are certainly of relevance. 
2.  The fisheries and their context 
The Barents Sea is home to a number of major fish stocks that spend some 
or all of their life cycle there. Central here is north-east Arctic cod, which 
sustains a major fishery that in recent years has been in the range of 400–
500,000 tonnes annually. Other important fisheries include haddock, 
capelin, saithe, shrimp, red king crab and redfish.1 Of marine mammals, 
harp seals and minke whales are harvested. Also, Norwegian spring 
spawning herring, which sustains one of the world’s largest fisheries, 
spends its juvenile years here, although it is fished further south along the 
Norwegian coast and in the Norwegian Sea. Altogether, this makes the 
Barents Sea a fishing ground of global significance. 
The stocks of cod, haddock and capelin are shared between Norway 
and Russia, in the sense that these stocks have a geographical distribution 
spanning the waters of both countries. Other stocks are exclusive, in the 
sense that they are viewed as being under the jurisdiction of one of the two. 
Saithe, for example, is exclusively a Norwegian stock. 
In addition to vessels from Norway and Russia, vessels from several 
other countries, such as the EU member states, the Faroes and Iceland, 
enjoy fishing rights in the Barents Sea. Most of the catch, however, as well 
as the actual management of the fisheries, is done by the two coastal states.  
The management regime for the fisheries in the Barents Sea is 
premised on recent developments in international ocean law. Particularly 
important here is the extension of coastal state jurisdiction over waters off 
their coasts, codified in the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention (in 
force since 1994).2 The Convention states that coastal states have sovereign 
rights over the natural resources in their exclusive economic zones (EEZs), 
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miljø 2008: Fisken og havet 1, 2008. 
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2005. 56 | ALF HÅKON HOEL 
which extend seawards to 200 nautical miles (370 km). It also specifies that 
coastal states have obligations to conserve and utilise living marine 
resources optimally, as well as cooperate with other countries on their 
management where the resources are transboundary. This regime implies, 
on the one hand, an ownership of resources and a right to manage them; on 
the other, these rights are to be exercised in a sustainable manner and 
through international cooperation when necessary. 
Norway and Russia established EEZs in 1977 and 1978, respectively. 
In drawing the boundaries between the two EEZs in the Barents Sea, the 
two countries based their claimed boundary line on different principles, so 
there remains a large, wedge-shaped disputed area of 175,000 km2 for 
which the two states are still negotiating a final boundary line.3 In the 
middle of this area is a smaller area, which is beyond national jurisdiction 
and therefore has the status of international waters, known as ‘the 
Loophole’ (Figure 4.1). 
An additional jurisdictional complexity arises in the Svalbard 
archipelago. The 1920 Svalbard Treaty, which applies to the islands and the 
territorial waters, establishes that Norway has “full and absolute” 
sovereignty over Svalbard. Yet, the Treaty restricts the way Norway can 
exercise its sovereignty. Among other things, citizens of all Treaty parties 
are to be treated equally with regard to industrial activities. With the 
introduction of EEZs, Norway established a 200-mile non-discriminatory 
Fishery Protection Zone around the archipelago in 1977. This arrangement 
was contested by the then Soviet Union, and several countries have 
reserved their rights under the Treaty. The dispute today concerns how 
Norway can exercise its jurisdiction in the waters beyond the 12-mile 
territorial waters off Svalbard. 
                                                      
3 Norway claims that the boundary is to be based on an equidistance principle, 
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Figure 4.1 Barents Sea maritime zones 
 
Source: UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, 1999. 58 | ALF HÅKON HOEL 
 
3.  The organisation and evolution of cooperation 
Norwegian–Russian cooperation in the management of the fisheries in the 
north is based on several bilateral agreements: a 1975 agreement establishes 
the Joint Fisheries Commission, a 1976 agreement covers joint management 
of shared fish stocks as well as related issues and a 1978 agreement clarifies 
responsibilities in the enforcement of fisheries regulations in a ‘Grey Zone’ 
(see Figure 4.1), which covers some of the area where jurisdiction is 
contested. Prior to these arrangements, coastal state jurisdiction extended 
to only 12 nautical miles, and the area beyond was high seas. The fisheries 
in these areas were in principle managed by the Northeast Atlantic 
Fisheries Commission, although not very successfully. 
The Joint Fisheries Commission meets annually. Based on scientific 
advice from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) 
on catch levels and management strategies, it sets total allowable catches 
for the three shared stocks – cod, haddock and capelin. In addition, the 
Commission also provides for quota swaps of various other species, 
including seals.4 The actual management measures for implementing the 
catch limits set by the Commission are established by the two countries, 
each regulating fishing activities in the waters under its jurisdiction and 
enforcing regulations in its own waters. 
Scientific cooperation under the Commission is substantial, with 
several working groups addressing a range of issues. The cooperation 
between Norway and Russia in fisheries science goes back more than 50 
years. Following the establishment of the Joint Fisheries Commission, 
scientific cooperation has become a major undertaking, with annual joint 
surveys and workshops. This work feeds into the ICES process, and forms 
the basis for the scientific advice on management provided by that body. In 
recent years, a particular problem for the scientific cooperation has been 
that Norwegian research vessels have been denied access to Russian 
waters, as well as lack of funding for Russian marine science.5 Since 2007,  
 
                                                      
4 See G. Hønneland, Kvotekamp og kystsolidaritet: Norsk-russisk fiskeriforvaltning 
gjennom 30 år, Bergen: Fagbokforlaget, 2006. 
5 See Riksrevisjonen, Riksrevisjonens undersøkelse av forvaltningen og kontrollen av 
fiskeressursene i Barentshavet og Norskehavet – en parallel revisjon mellom norsk og 
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however, Norwegian research vessels have again been admitted to Russian 
waters; moreover, the growth of the Russian economy has also benefited 
Russian science.  
Increasingly, the Commission has also engaged in issues beyond 
science and the setting of total allowable catches (TACs). Following the 
growth in illegal fishing, for instance, the Commission has discussed 
enforcement measures in fisheries and has launched a separate committee 
to pursue cooperation in that regard (see below). 
When the cooperation was established in the 1970s, understanding of 
the need to manage fisheries by restricting access and catches was generally 
not very well developed. A notable change over time has been the greater 
recognition of the need for management to ensure that resources are used 
in a sustainable manner. A major issue has been overfishing. Until the 
1980s, this was mainly a Norwegian problem, since, by reference to a 
provision in the 1976 agreement, its coastal fleet was permitted to overfish 
the Norwegian share of the TAC. At the insistence of the then Soviet Union, 
this practice was discontinued by the mid-1980s. On the Soviet side, there 
was no incentive to overfish, as there were no gains to be had from taking 
more than the allotted quota. 
Following the fall of the Iron Curtain and the introduction of a 
market economy in Russia, the incentives of the Russian fishing industry 
changed. The cash flow rose with the quantity of fish caught. Incomes were 
significantly boosted when catches were landed in Norway, where 
payment was in the form of hard currency. An additional incentive to land 
fish abroad came from the cumbersome and expensive procedures for 
landing fish in Russia. Especially since 2000, the Russian fleet has been 
overfishing its share of the TAC substantially, although at declining rates 
for the past two years. A recent report from the Norwegian fisheries 
authorities indicates that overfishing halved from 2006 to 2007.6 The 
Russian side has contested the figures calculated by Norway, although 
agreeing that IUU (illegal, unregulated and unreported) fishing is going on. 
Another period of overfishing the TAC for cod took place in the 
Loophole in the central Barents Sea for some years in the 1990s. As 
mentioned above, the Loophole is beyond national jurisdiction, and was 
                                                      
6 See “Overfisket i Barentshavet halvert”, Fiskeridirektoratet, 2008 (retrieved from 
www.fiskeridir.no/fiskeridir/aktuelt/fiskets_gang/fiske/2008/0308/overfisket_i
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subject to substantial overfishing by third-country vessels. By the end of the 
1990s, cod had largely disappeared from the area, and since then very little 
fishing activity has taken place in the Loophole. Moreover, in 1999 Norway 
and Russia entered into an agreement with Iceland to make certain that in 
the future the Icelandic fishing fleet would refrain from fishing there.7 
Similar arrangements have been made with other countries as well. 
Following the increase in fishing on the high seas globally, the UN 
General Assembly in 1995 adopted an agreement that requires states to 
apply a precautionary approach to the management of their fisheries.8 In 
practice, this means that states are to develop management strategies for 
their fisheries that make sure that the reproductive capacity of fish stocks is 
not threatened. Following work by ICES to operationalise the concept, the 
Joint Fisheries Commission adopted a management strategy for cod in 
2002. The management strategy has a catch control rule that seeks to ensure 
that the quotas set are in accordance with the precautionary approach. Such 
management strategies have now been established for most fisheries. 
For the Barents Sea fisheries, in recent years the quotas have largely 
been set according to the adopted management strategies.9 But because of 
overfishing by the Russian fleet, the real catch has been substantially higher 
than the TAC. Over time, this increases the risk of depletion of stocks. 
The substantial overfishing notwithstanding, the management 
regime, together with serendipity in terms of nature – especially in relation 
to the cod stock as well as to other stocks (herring, saithe) – has produced 
fairly good results. The most important fish stocks are currently in 
reasonably good shape.10 An indicator of this is that the total spawning 
stock biomass of the major fish stocks in the north has been increasing over 
the last two decades, as shown in Figure 4.2. This tendency has continued 
in the years after 2006, with growing prognoses for spawning stock size. 
 
                                                      
7 See O.S. Stokke, ”The Loophole of the Barents Sea Fisheries Regime”, in O.S. 
Stokke (ed.), Governing High Seas Fisheries, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002. 
8 See the UN Fish Stocks Agreement (New York, September 1995) (retrieved from 
www.un.org/Depts/los/fish_stocks_conference/fish_stocks_conference.htm). 
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Figure 4.2 Spawning stock biomass for important groundfish species in the north 
 
Source: Fiskeridirektoratet, Nøkkeltall fiskeri 2007 (retrieved from www.fiskeridir.no/ 
fiskeridir/fiskeri/statistikk/noekkeltall). 
In the EEZs, the enforcement of fisheries regulations is the 
prerogative of coastal states. In Norwegian waters, Norwegian authorities 
enforce regulations against vessels from all states, as do the Russian 
authorities in Russian waters. On the high seas, beyond the areas under 
national jurisdiction, responsibility for enforcement resides with the flag 
state. Several issues that arise in the context of enforcement do benefit from 
inter-state cooperation, however; under the Joint Fisheries Commission 
cooperation on enforcement issues has gradually developed since 1992. A 
working group to address enforcement issues was established that year, 
later replaced with a permanent body. There is also regular direct contact 
between the enforcement authorities of the two countries. A Memorandum 
of Understanding on cooperation on control issues was adopted by the 
Commission in 2000, addressing among other things exchange of routine 
information relating to satellite data and landings of catches, exchange of 
information about control activities, operational measures such as meetings 
between control agencies and exchange of inspectors and observers, and 
exchange of experiences at regular seminars.11  
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In the last decade, the management of red king crab has emerged as a 
major issue in the bilateral cooperation. Introduced into the Barents Sea in 
the 1960s, the crab stock started to grow very rapidly during the 1990s and 
began appearing on the Norwegian side of the Barents Sea, where it 
interfered with coastal fisheries. A substantial crab fishery has developed in 
Finnmark, and it is now one of the most important in the north. King crab 
is managed separately by the two countries, each within their jurisdiction. 
Norway sets a quota of around 300,000 crabs for its fisheries (2007), while 
Russia sets its quota about 10 times higher.12 
A significant share of the total fisheries in the Barents Sea is in the 
Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard. While all fisheries in the Barents 
Sea are counted against the total quotas, Norway sets and enforces 
regulations for the Fisheries Protection Zone. The management regime here 
has become more comprehensive over time. In practice, most countries 
observe the fisheries regulations established by Norway, based on the 
recognition that the fisheries have to be managed.  
4.  Experiences and lessons: Towards best practices 
The ultimate test of any resource management regime is that it achieves the 
objective of resource conservation. Contrary to the situation in many other 
regions and fisheries management regimes, the bilateral cooperation in the 
Barents Sea has been essentially successful in this regard,13 and is therefore 
also particularly interesting from the point of view of ‘best practices’. A 
best practice can be understood as a “method, process, activity, incentive or 
reward that is more effective at delivering a particular outcome than any 
other technique, method, process, etc.”14  
What lessons, then, can be learned from the bilateral cooperation 
between Norway and Russia in fisheries management? There are at least 
five factors or best practices that stand out as important to the success of 
the cooperation: 
                                                      
12 See the Protocol, 35th Session in the Joint Norwegian–Russian Fisheries 
Commission, Ministry of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, Oslo, 2007 (retrieved from 
www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fkd/tema/Internasjonalt_samarbeid_om_fiskeri/Fi
skerisamarbeidet-med-Russland.html?id=376440). 
13 See Havforskningsinstituttet [Institute of Marine Research] (2008), op. cit., p. 10. 
14 Refer to the Wikipedia discussion on ”Best practice” (retrieved from 
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•  a robust but flexible legal basis, 
•  mutual learning over time, 
•  joint science to develop common frameworks of understanding, 
•  the isolation of particularly intractable problems from the rest of the 
cooperation, and  
•  the ability and willingness to modernise and expand the cooperation. 
Ultimately, the rationale for international cooperation is that 
countries gain benefits from cooperation that outweigh the costs.15 In 
fisheries, this logic manifests itself in the need for those who have access to 
the resource to agree on limits to exploitation. If the use of fish resources is 
not limited, a ‘tragedy of the commons’ logic may play out: the fisheries 
will be overexploited and may eventually collapse.16 Cooperation thus 
brings the potential mutual benefit of sustainable fisheries with associated 
economic outcomes for the cooperating parties. For such outcomes to 
materialise, a basic precondition is that access to resources is restricted. At 
the domestic level, this requires states to develop and implement legislation 
along with regulatory and enforcement measures that close access to 
fisheries and restrict participation to a delimited group. At the international 
level, this requires that states agree on regulatory measures for shared fish 
stocks and for fisheries on the high seas. 
As regards the management of fisheries in the Barents Sea, the 
cooperation is first based on a set of legal agreements specifying the rights and 
obligations of the two parties. The agreements of 1975, 1976 and 1977 
outlined objectives for the cooperation and addressed the need for joint 
management of joint resources. Each country is to regulate fisheries in its 
own zone, based on the recommendations of the Joint Fisheries 
Commission. And each party is to enforce these regulations in its own 
zone. The 1978 Grey Zone agreement resolves the issue of how 
enforcement of fisheries regulations is to be handled in the area where 
                                                      
15 See R. Hilborn, A.E. Punt and J. Orensanz, “Beyond Band-aids in Fisheries 
Management: Fixing World Fisheries”, Bulletin of Marine Science, Vol. 74, No. 3, 
2004, pp. 493–507. 
16 See G. Hardin, “The tragedy of the commons”, Science, Vol. 162, No. 3859, 1968, 
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jurisdiction has not been agreed.17 This framework has provided a robust 
basis for cooperation, while also proving sufficiently flexible to allow the 
cooperation to evolve to take account of relevant developments in 
international fisheries law and politics. A significant factor here is that the 
parties at a very early stage agreed on a fixed allocation key for the shared 
stocks (50–50 in the case of cod and haddock, and 60–40 in favour of 
Norway for capelin), and how to relate to third countries in this regard. 
Resolving distributional issues is critical to achieving sustainable 
management practices.18 
Moreover, the above-mentioned agreements are in turn grounded in 
international ocean law, to which both parties subscribe. The existence of 
the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and the 1995 UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement, and the two countries’ shared interpretation of these 
agreements in relation to fisheries management, has been important in 
fending off external threats like the substantial fishing in the Loophole in 
the Barents Sea in the 1990s.  
Second, the cooperation has been underway for a long time. Over the 
course of more than 30 years, activities under the Commission have been 
gradually expanded, and the cooperation has developed as a series of 
‘repeated games’, wherein mutual understanding has evolved of each 
other’s fisheries and the political context in which decisions on 
management are taken. This factor has undoubtedly been central in 
maintaining and developing cooperation in the face of difficult issues such 
as Russia’s overfishing of its quota in recent years and skirmishes over 
enforcement in the Fisheries Protection Zone around Svalbard.19  
An important step in the evolution of the bilateral cooperation has 
been the development and adoption of management strategies for the 
shared stocks. Such strategies essentially commit the parties to follow a 
                                                      
17 This arrangement was contested in Norway at the time of its negotiation, 
because it also covers substantial areas that are under undisputed Norwegian and 
Russian jurisdiction, and the area that is under undisputed Norwegian jurisdiction 
is larger than that under Russian. 
18 See A.H. Hoel and I. Kvalvik, “The Allocation of Scarce Natural Resources: The 
Case of Fisheries”, Marine Policy, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2006, pp. 347–56. 
19 Most of these concerns have involved issues relating to logbooks and so forth. A 
few larger incidents have involved arrests or attempts to arrest vessels operating in 
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precautionary course of action over time in the management of any given 
fish stock. Such a strategy was first adopted by the Commission for cod in 
2003, which has been evaluated by ICES as being in conformity with the 
precautionary approach. 
A milestone in the cooperation was the decision by the authorities of 
the two countries in 2005 to initiate a parallel audit of the performance of 
the bilateral cooperation. Spurred by the overfishing in the Barents Sea, the 
analyses were to be carried out by the auditors-general of the two 
countries, rather than by the fisheries authorities. The audit proved a very 
difficult exercise, involving fundamental disagreements over data and 
ways of interpreting them. On the other hand, it also brought important 
lessons for both countries in how the other party views central issues in the 
cooperation. The reports from the audit indicated a number of areas where 
management could be improved.20 It has been decided to follow up on the 
audit on both sides at regular intervals.  
A third factor in explaining the functioning of the regime is the 
scientific cooperation between Norwegian and Russian scientists. As 
mentioned, Norwegian and Russian scientists have cooperated regularly at 
least since the 1950s. Following the establishment of the Joint Fisheries 
Commission, scientific cooperation became more structured, with the 
adoption of research plans in which joint surveys and the development of 
assessment methods were central elements. Today, this scientific 
cooperation on fisheries management is a major undertaking involving a 
large number of scientists as well as a huge infrastructure of research 
vessels, the production of joint reports,21 etc.  
An important aspect of the scientific cooperation is also that it is 
embedded in the broader framework of ICES, in which scientists from all 
countries around the North Atlantic participate. This arrangement has 
contributed to the development of a joint frame of reference for Norwegian 
and Russian scientists. Their common perception of and agreement on 
                                                      
20 See Riksrevisjonen (2007), op. cit. 
21 See, for example J.E. Stiansen and A.A. Filin (eds), Joint PINRO/IMR Report on the 
State of the Barents Sea Ecosystem in 2006 with Expected Situation and Consideration for 
Management, IMR/PINRO Joint Report Series No. 7/2007, Bergen and Murmansk, 
2007 (retrieved from www.imr.no/__data/page/7709/Nr.2_2007_Joint_ 
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scientific advice through the ICES advisory committees has been central to 
the status of scientific advice in the Commission.  
Scientific agreement on issues relating to resource management is a 
major precondition for effective management,22 and in this case the 
agreement among scientists from the two countries has provided an 
important basis for the decision-making. This is not to say that scientists 
from the two countries agree on all issues all the time. There can be 
substantial and long-lasting disagreement, but in the broader picture and in 
relation to the major questions, comprehensive scientific cooperation is an 
important best practice. 
A fourth and significant factor is that the cooperation on fisheries 
management has largely been retained as a fundamentally sectoral issue. 
This means that most of the time it has been insulated from the more 
controversial issues relating to boundary delimitation and security politics. 
Talks on a boundary in the Barents Sea have been underway since 1974, 
and while some progress has been made, the issue remains essentially 
unresolved.23 Although the question of the 50–50 share of cod and haddock 
and the 60–40 share of capelin has been raised in the context of these talks, 
it has not been a major issue. In terms of security politics, the Barents Sea 
was a global hotspot during the cold war, but even then fisheries 
management was not significantly impacted by security concerns. For 
example, Norwegian fisheries research vessels were admitted to Soviet 
waters and the port of Murmansk. 
The one area where fisheries occasionally become entrenched in high 
politics is in relation to the issue of jurisdiction in the waters beyond the 
territorial waters around Svalbard. Here, Norway has gradually developed 
a regulatory regime that encompasses more fish species, and the 
enforcement of regulations has become stricter over time. The 2001 arrest of 
a Russian vessel at sea by the Norwegian Coast Guard for breaches of 
                                                      
22 See S. Andresen, T. Skodvin, A. Underdal and J. Wettestad, Science and Politics in 
International Environmental Regimes, Manchester: University of Manchester Press, 
2000. 
23 While the waters of the Barents Sea extend beyond the areas under national 
jurisdiction, thereby creating an area of international waters (the Loophole), all of 
the Barents Sea is continental shelf and therefore under the jurisdiction of the two 
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regulations resulted in a serious controversy with Russia, but it was quickly 
resolved.24  
An important reason for this relative calm and isolation from high 
politics is probably that both parties have a strong interest in keeping the 
cooperation in fisheries management going. The cost of a breakdown could 
be severe, as both countries would then have to set unilateral quotas that 
would probably be far higher than are those dictated by management 
strategies aimed at ensuring the long-term sustainability of the fisheries. 
Another important factor in keeping fisheries issues isolated from the 
question of boundary delimitation is the Grey Zone arrangement. By 
specifying rights and obligations as to which country can enforce 
regulations against which vessels in that area, disturbing episodes can be 
avoided. This is probably why the agreement has been renewed annually 
for 30 years.  
Finally, a factor not to be overlooked is that the bilateral Joint 
Fisheries Commission has been able to adapt to changing circumstances and 
adopt new and modern principles for management. In the context of global 
fisheries management, the Commission has been a forerunner in terms of 
establishing catch control rules and management strategies that seek to 
ensure compliance with the precautionary approach. This capacity to 
modernise and adapt to new principles and concerns is an important factor 
in explaining the relative success of the Commission in maintaining stocks 
at a healthy level. To a great extent, the past two years’ reduction in 
overfishing stems from the systematic work to extend the reach of the 
enforcement system to include port state controls, thereby blocking market 
outlets in Europe and Northern Africa for illegally caught fish. In these 
achievements, the work in the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission, in 
which both Norway and Russia participate, has been instrumental. 
5.  Conclusions regarding best practices 
The bilateral cooperation between Norway and Russia in fisheries 
management in the Barents Sea has evolved over more than 30 years, a 
period that has witnessed major changes in both the political context and 
the understanding of how to manage fisheries. Although difficult and at 
times controversial, the cooperation has been relatively successful in terms 
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of the status of important fish stocks, in particular when compared with the 
situation off north-east Canada or in the North Sea.  
We have pointed to some factors – best practices – that can help to 
explain this relative success. The grounding of the cooperation in a set of 
legal agreements that in turn are based on global agreements is certainly 
one important factor. Another is the long history of the cooperation, in 
which each of the parties has become acquainted with the other’s situation 
and policy contexts, thereby developing an understanding of what the 
other party’s issues are. A third is the joint scientific cooperation embedded 
in the broader framework of ICES. This helps to ensure that the parties 
have a common perception of the science underlying management. Fourth, 
it has generally been possible to isolate fisheries management from the high 
politics of the region. And finally, there is the capacity to adapt to changing 
circumstances and modernise management, extending its reach beyond 
conventional resource management to impact on trade as well.  
Do these observations have relevance beyond the Barents Sea and 
fisheries? They probably do. For the Northern Dimension cooperation, for 
instance, the lessons relating to the importance of basing cooperation on 
firm legal commitments and common scientific understandings are 
significant. Also, it is well known from the international literature on 
resource management that a firm legal basis is beneficial,25 and that 
agreement on scientific knowledge is important.26 Furthermore, isolating 
the substance of cooperation from high politics can prevent cooperation 
from being contaminated by controversies on other issues.  
Another question is how the fisheries regime will face up to new and 
emerging challenges – like the impact of climate change. Increasing ocean 
temperatures may well affect the geographical distribution of fish stocks in 
the ocean.27 This may bring questions of distributional keys in important 
fisheries to the table in a more forceful way than seen up to now. A major 
task facing the two parties is the introduction of ecosystems-based 
                                                      
25 See R.R. Churchill and A.W. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1999. 
26 See Andresen et al. (2000), op. cit. 
27 See Artic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA), The Arctic Climate Impact 
Assessment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005; see also A.H. Hoel, 
“Jurisdictional Issues in the Arctic – An Overview”, Oslo Files on Defence and 
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management of the marine ecosystems. In Norway, a management plan for 
the Norwegian part of the Barents Sea and the areas north of Lofoten is 
being implemented, basically as a response to the emergence of 
commercial-scale petroleum production in the region. If the Barents Sea 
ecosystem as a whole is to be covered, Russia will have to adopt a similar 
arrangement. As this step will necessarily have an impact on Russia’s main 
breadwinner – the petroleum industry – it will constitute an important test 
of the bilateral cooperation. 
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5.  EXPERIENCES OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE NORDIC 
COUNTRIES AND RUSSIA: LESSONS 
LEARNED AND THE WAY FORWARD 
NINA TYNKKYNEN 
1.  Introduction 
Northern Europe has a rich history of environmental cooperation. 
Multilateral environmental collaboration started back in the 1970s in the 
context of the Baltic Sea area, aided by scientific and other cooperation 
between Finland and the Soviet Union. Since the early 1990s, several other 
states and actors in the region have developed bilateral and regional 
environmental partnerships with Russia. The record of these initiatives 
includes both success stories and problematic ones. 
This chapter examines case studies of environmental cooperation 
between the Nordic countries and Russia. The aim is to analyse drivers of 
and barriers to success in these experiences with Russia to enable lessons to 
be drawn for future collaboration in this sphere under the new Northern 
Dimension. The new documents of the Northern Dimension policy, which 
were adopted in Helsinki in November 2006, underline that experience 
gained from existing forms of cooperation at the regional, sub-regional and 
local levels should be utilised in the development of the Northern 72 | NINA TYNKKYNEN 
Dimension.1 The focus of this chapter is therefore on existing forms of 
regional cooperation. The analysis centres on ‘conventional’ environmental 
initiatives rather than cooperation on issues of nuclear safety (see chapter 
2). The latter has only recently taken off on a larger scale; moreover, the 
conditions for nuclear safety cooperation also differ fairly significantly 
from those of more conventional environmental efforts. This has been taken 
into consideration in the policy’s main funding instrument for 
environmental collaboration, the Northern Dimension Environmental 
Partnership (NDEP), which is divided into nuclear and non-nuclear 
windows. The flagship NDEP project, the St. Petersburg water sector, is one 
of the concrete examples examined in this chapter. The other examples 
discussed are not, however, included in the NDEP project pipeline, as most 
projects in the pipeline are still in an initial phase or under construction, 
which makes assessment premature.  
In many of the cases covered in this chapter, there is a strong 
emphasis on Finnish–Russian collaboration. This partly stems from 
Finland’s longstanding record in this sphere, its eagerness to intensify the 
former Finnish–Soviet environmental cooperation with Russia in the early 
1990s and its present status as one of Russia’s main partners in 
environmental projects.2 The main criteria for Finnish assistance are that 
projects should help to control transboundary pollution in Finland and 
should promote the use of Finnish environmental technology. In addition, 
the assisted counterpart is to cover at least half of the expenses. These are 
not drastically different priorities from those of Russia’s other partners in 
regional environmental cooperation. The data used in the analysis consist 
of interviews,3 reports and other documents, along with previous research.4 
                                                      
1 See the “Political Declaration on the Northern Dimension Policy” (Helsinki, 24 
November 2006) (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ 
north_dim/doc/pol_dec_1106.pdf); see also the Northern Dimension Policy 
Framework Document (Helsinki, 24 November 2006) (retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/doc/frame_pol_1106.pdf). 
2 Since 1990, Finland has provided a total of €38 million for environmental 
investments in Russia and €17 million for technical assistance projects; see K. 
Eloheimo, Suomen alueelle Venäjältä kohdistuvat rajat ylittävät ympäristöuhat, 36/2007, 
Finnish Ministry of the Environment, Helsinki, 2007. 
3 The interviews were conducted with Russian and Finnish stakeholders as part of 
the author’s doctoral research; see N. Tynkkynen, Constructing the Environmental 
Regime between Russia and Europe: Conditions for Social Learning, Tampere: Acta 
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2.  The environment in the new Northern Dimension 
The environment is one of the key areas of collaboration between the EU 
and Russia. Activities are naturally concentrated in the European part of 
Russia and particularly Russia’s north-western territories, which have a 
long border with the EU. Owing to the historical legacies of the Soviet era, 
the lack of local resources and institutional capacity, and the fragile 
ecology, there is an urgent need for environmental investment in this 
region. Consequently, the NDEP was developed in 2001 to address 
environmental problems in north-west Russia. Now that the environmental 
dialogue between the EU and Russia is emerging as part of the work of 
establishing a ’common economic space’, the NDEP will be implementing 
some of its specified activities within the geographical boundaries of the 
Northern Dimension area.  
The NDEP support fund, as the main instrument of the NDEP, 
awards grants to environmental projects. As of spring 2007, several EU 
member states, the European Commission, the Russian Federation, Norway 
and Canada had contributed a total of €243.4 million to the fund (Table 5.1). 
Two-thirds of the total sum is tied to nuclear safety projects, with the 
remainder for other environmental projects.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                       
Universitatis Tamperensis, 2008(a). Information is also derived from interviews 
with a representative of the Finnish Ministry of the Environment and a 
representative of the Nordic Environment Finance Corporation (Nefco). In some of 
the interviews, as well as the study undertaken by Monica Tennberg from which 
the analysis draws, environmental cooperation between Finland/the Nordic 
countries and Russia was discussed at a more general level. See M. Tennberg, 
“Trust in International Environmental Cooperation in North-western Russia”, 
Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2007, pp. 321–35.  
4 See Tennberg (2007), op. cit.; G. Hønneland, Russia and the West: Environmental 
Cooperation and Conflict, London: Routledge, 2003; P. Nikula and V.-P. Tynkkynen, 
“Risks in Oil Transportation in the Gulf of Finland: Not a Question of If – But 
When”, in C. Pursiainen (ed.), Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, Stockholm: Nordregio, 2007, pp. 141–64. 74 | NINA TYNKKYNEN 
Table 5.1 Contributors to the NDEP support fund 
Contributor Non-earmarked 
(in € million) 
Nuclear window 
(in € million) 
Total 
(€ million) 
EU 20  40  60 
Denmark 10  1  11 
Finland 16  2  18 
Norway 0.4  10  10.4 
Sweden   16 + 1.3*  –  17.3 
Belgium –  0.5  0.5 
France –  40  40 
Germany 10  10  20 
Netherlands –  10  10 
United Kingdom  –  16.2  16.2 
Russia 20  –  20 
Canada –  20  20 
Total 93.7  149.7  243.4 
* New contributions received after the Assembly of Contributors in November 2007.  
Source: NDEP, “Pledges and Contributors to the NDEP Support Fund” (retrieved from 
www.ndep.org/partners.asp?type=nh&pageid=2).  
With conventional environmental projects, NDEP grants cover some 
of the total costs, while the majority of funding is provided through normal 
project finance from other sources. Accordingly, the main aim of the grants 
is to act as a catalyst, promoting further investments in environmental 
initiatives in the region. The list of non-nuclear projects approved by the 
Assembly of Contributors in November 2007 includes 12 projects altogether 
(see Table 5.2). Some have already been completed whereas others are still 
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Table 5.2 NDEP non-nuclear projects approved by the Assembly of Contributors 
(November 2007) 
No. Project  Lead  intl. 
financial 
institution 
Project 
cost 
(€ million) 
NDEP 
grant 
(€ million) 
Status  Completion 
date 
1)  St. Petersburg 
WTP 
NIB 194  5.8  Completed 2005 
2)   St. Petersburg 
Flood Protection 
Barrier 
EBRD 2,000  1  Under 
construction 
2010 
3)  St. Petersburg 
Northern 
Incinerator 
EBRD 90.4  6.35  Plant 
inaugurated 
2007 
4)  Leningrad Oblast 
Programme 
NIB 20.3  4  Under 
construction 
2009 
5)  Komi Syktyvar 
municipal services 
EBRD 29.5  6.04  Under 
construction 
2009 
6)  Kaliningrad 
district heating 
EBRD 21.8  7.3  Grant yet to 
be signed 
2012 
7)  Arkhangelsk 
municipal services 
EBRD 25.3  8.2  Under 
construction 
2012 
8)  Murmansk district 
heating 
NIB 29.6  5  Grant yet to 
be signed 
2012 
9)  Kaliningrad water 
services 
EBRD 106.8  10  Under 
construction 
2012 
10) Kaliningrad  PIU  EBRD  3.8  3  In operation  2012 
11)  Vologda water 
services 
EBRD 18.4  3.5  Under 
construction 
2012 
12) Novgorod  NIB  16.1  2  Under 
construction 
2012 
Total (€ million)  –  2,556  62.19  – – 
Notes:  EBRD refers to the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development; NIB refers to 
the Nordic Investment Bank. 
Source: NDEP, “Approved Projects in the NDEP Non Nuclear Window” (retrieved from 
www.ndep.org/projects.asp?type=nh&cont=prjh&pageid=4). 
We now move on to discuss six concrete cases of regional 
environmental cooperation to illustrate existing activities in this sphere of 
Northern Dimension and Nordic–Russian cooperation in greater detail. The 
survey of the six cases forms the basis for analysing barriers to and drivers 
of successful cooperation on a more general level. 76 | NINA TYNKKYNEN 
3.  Examples of cooperation 
1) The St. Petersburg water sector. The water sector of the city of St. 
Petersburg has been the focus of joint environmental activities between 
Russia and Finland since the early 1990s. Cooperation has centred on the 
technical improvement of the water supply and wastewater management 
system, and on the institutional development of the city’s water and 
sewage utility Vodokanal. For example, about 40 km of sewers in the city 
centre and wastewater pumping stations have been reconstructed as part of 
the joint efforts.5 Up until 2003, about one-fifth of the grant assistance given 
by Finland to the development of the St. Petersburg water sector was 
directed at ‘twinning activities’ between Helsinki Water and Vodokanal of 
St. Petersburg, initiated in 1995.6 The main idea of twinning is to become 
familiar with practices and functions of a twin utility abroad so that 
solutions might be replicated or modified for application at home. In 
addition, the Finnish Ministry of the Environment has been subsidising 
activities of a private Finnish foundation, the John Nurminen Foundation, 
which, through its Clean Sea project, seeks to use chemical phosphorous 
removal at one medium-sized and three small wastewater treatment plants 
in St. Petersburg.7 This project involves close coordination between 
Vodokanal, the city of St. Petersburg and the foundation to which private 
donors and companies have contributed.8 
 
                                                      
5 See the Finnish Ministry of the Environment, Evaluation and Strategy Study of the 
Cooperation Between the Ministry of the Environment, Finland, and Vodokanal of St. 
Petersburg, Russia, Ministry of the Environment, Helsinki, 2002. Altogether, Finland 
assisted almost 100 projects in the St. Petersburg water sector by providing €28 
million; see Finnish Ministry of the Environment, “St. Petersburg Wastewater 
Treatment Boosted: Cooperation to Improve the State of the Gulf of Finland 
Continues”, press release, Ministry of the Environment, Helsinki, 1 October 2007. 
6 See Finnish Ministry of the Environment, Cooperation Between Vodokanal of St. 
Petersburg and the Ministry of the Environment of Finland, Framework Programme 2004–
2007, WaterPro Partners Ltd., Helsinki, 2003.  
7 For more information on the project, see the Clean Baltic Sea website 
(www.cleanbalticsea.fi). 
8 See Finnish Ministry of the Environment, From Co-operation in Central and Eastern 
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Sweden, Denmark and the UK, as well as international financial 
institutions have also made an important contribution to the development 
of the St. Petersburg water sector. Nevertheless, the leading financier has 
been the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The 
largest single project has been the construction of the St. Petersburg 
Southwest Wastewater Treatment Plant, with total costs amounting to €200 
million. This project has also been included on the list of the NDEP support 
fund. The plant, which was completed in 2005, was financed through a 
combination of international loans, grant aid, venture capital and local 
investment.9  
With the help of these concerted efforts, the water sector of St. 
Petersburg has developed significantly, especially in institutional terms, 
over the past 10 years. In 2000, St. Petersburg Vodokanal was recognised as 
the leading water utility in Russia and the leading public utility in St. 
Petersburg. In 2005, it won the Swedish Baltic Sea Water Award.10 
Cooperation has also had an immediate impact on the state of the 
environment: the new wastewater treatment plant is able to process the 
sewage of 700,000 residents, thereby cutting the city’s discharges of 
untreated sewage to the Gulf of Finland by about one-third. Still, many 
problems remain, in both water supply and wastewater management. The 
next major investment will be the main sewer in the north of the city, the 
construction of which is estimated to cost nearly €500 million.11 
2)  Pechenganikel mining industry. The Nordic countries have been 
active in attempting to reduce mining-related pollution in the Murmansk 
                                                      
9 See N. Tynkkynen, “Environmental Cooperation and Learning: The St. 
Petersburg Water Sector”, in D. Lehrer and A. Korhonen (eds), Western Aid in Post-
communism: Effects and Side effects, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008(b), 
forthcoming. 
10 See Vodokanal St. Petersburg, Final Report of the Corporate Development Support 
Programme, St. Petersburg, 2001;  Helcom, “As Driving Forces Behind New 
Treatment Plan, St. Petersburg’s Water Authority and its Director Win the 2005 
Swedish Baltic Sea Water Award”, Helcom, Helsinki, 21 June 2005 (retrieved from 
www.helcom.fi/press_office/news_baltic/en_GB/StPetersburg). 
11 For a more detailed analysis of the cooperation, see Tynkkynen (2008b), op. cit.; 
O. Salmi and N. Tynkkynen, “Environmental Governance in Russia: Changing 
Conditions for International Environmental Cooperation in the Case of the 
Murmansk Region Mining Industry and the St. Petersburg Water Sector”, 
submitted draft article, 2008.  78 | NINA TYNKKYNEN 
region through collaborative work.12 The restructuring project of 
Pechenganikel, a subsidiary of Norilsk Nikel operating cupro-nickel 
smelters in the cities of Nikel and Zapolyarnyi, has been the largest single 
project in this respect. The project started in 1993 when a Scandinavian 
consortium consisting of Norwegian, Finnish and Swedish governments, 
private companies and intra-governmental agencies won a tender for the 
reconstruction of Pechenganikel with a budget of $300 million. The project 
was soon halted because of lack of funding from the Russian side and the 
process of privatisation of the company, which made the division of 
responsibilities unclear. In 1997, negotiations with Norilsk Nikel were 
resumed by the Nordic Investment Bank (NIB). In the course of the 
negotiations, the differing expectations of the NIB and the Norilsk Nikel 
management came up. Simply put, more environmentally-motivated 
Nordic expectations clashed with Russian expectations that emphasised the 
economic side.13 The Russian party did not consider the emissions of 
150,000 tonnes of sulphur dioxide as significant for the environment. 
Therefore, the company called for extensive restructuring at a cost of $300 
million that would double the production capacity and simultaneously 
reduce per-tonne environmental emissions.  
This conflict of goals and different motivations brought the 
restructuring project to a standstill on several occasions between 1997 and 
2003. By 2005, however, the project was again advancing smoothly. It 
appears that Pechenganikel is finally making progress in its environmental 
                                                      
12 Although lower than before, the level of sulphur dioxide and heavy metals 
emissions from smelting and enrichment of electrolytic and carbonyl nickel and 
electrolytic copper by Norilsk Nikel still exceeds the corresponding levels in 
Western Europe. In 2003, sulphur was emitted from the region’s cupro-nickel 
smelters in amounts exceeding the national sulphur emissions of the whole of 
Finland; see O. Salmi, “Eco-Efficiency and Industrial Symbiosis – A Counterfactual 
Analysis of a Mining Community”, Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 15, No. 17, 
2007, pp. 1696–05. The effects of sulphur dioxide on local ecosystems are 
significant, even though they do not travel very far from the source; see Artic 
Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP), AMAP Assessment Report: Arctic 
Pollution Issues, Arctic Council, Oslo, 1998. 
13 Derived from an interview with a representative of the Nordic Investment Bank, 
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profile, which is likely to improve the state of the environment of the entire 
Murmansk region.14 
3)  The hazardous waste facility Krasnyi Bor. The hazardous waste 
incinerator and storage facility Krasnyi Bor near St. Petersburg, built in 
1969, has been a source of concern for local politicians and environmental 
organisations.15 The facility contains over 1.5 million tonnes of hazardous 
waste. The site is in poor condition and poses a serious environmental risk 
to the region as well as to the Gulf of Finland. The capacity of the facility to 
store and process waste is limited, and in case of heavy flooding, 700,000 
tonnes of liquid toxic waste threaten to flow into the River Neva, poisoning 
the city’s main source of drinking water.  
Krasnyi Bor is managed by the Environmental Committee of the city 
of St. Petersburg. It has been included on the priority list of Finnish 
environmental cooperation with Russia. During the 1990s, the Finnish 
government financed several studies on possibilities for developing the 
facility. These studies did not lead to investments, however. During 1998–
2000, a French consulting company conducted a TACIS project, resulting in 
recommendations to build a semi-mobile incinerator to process hazardous 
waste at Krasnyi Bor. In 2000, the EBRD began preparing a new project, 
and the following year, the city of St. Petersburg and international financial 
organisations signed a funding agreement for $10 million for rehabilitation 
of the facility.16 In this rehabilitation programme, Finland and Denmark 
were to fund the construction of a chemico-biological treatment facility. But 
in 2007, the Environmental Committee of the city of St. Petersburg 
announced that the project would be halted and that Russia would make its 
own decisions on the problem of hazardous waste. Uncertainty concerning 
the future ownership of the facility, changes in the composition of project 
participants, a multitude of financiers, Russian suspicion towards the 
chemico-biological treatment process designed by the Danish partner, the 
                                                      
14 For a more detailed analysis of the cooperation, see Salmi and Tynkkynen (2008), 
op. cit. 
15 See Eloheimo (2007), op. cit. 
16 Derived from an interview with a representative of the EBRD, 2002, and an 
interview with a representative of the Finnish Ministry of the Environment in St. 
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lack of common understanding and an insufficient cost estimation, all 
hindered implementation of the project.17  
4) The Gulf of Finland Mandatory Ship Reporting System. Oil transport in 
the Baltic Sea is growing rapidly. The volume of oil transport in the Baltic 
Sea is at present seven times higher than it was 10 years ago, and the VTT 
Technical Research Centre of Finland estimates that it will increase to about 
250 million tonnes a year by 2015.18 Russia is currently building more port 
infrastructure in the Gulf of Finland, where navigation is challenging 
owing to the low water levels, narrow navigation routes and icy conditions 
in wintertime. 
The Gulf of Finland Mandatory Ship Reporting System (GOFREP), 
which was developed to improve the safety of the rapidly growing 
shipping traffic in the Gulf of Finland, went into operation in 2004. The 
GOFREP system gathers information on ships, their cargo and routes for 
the authorities responsible for vessel traffic control. One recent evaluation 
notes that the GOFREP system has improved risk management (oil 
transportation safety) by 80%.19 According to Piia Nikula and Veli-Pekka 
Tynkkynen, the core of the safety-enhancing system resulted from intense 
cooperation among the maritime authorities, although the adoption of the 
GOFREP system itself was mandated by the International Maritime 
Organisation (IMO). As the traffic is still growing and GOFREP has certain 
deficiencies, the Estonian, Finnish and Russian maritime authorities are 
currently trying to bolster the GOFREP system. There are high hopes, 
based on the very good experience of the previous joint work, that this 
upgrade could become operational in 2008.  
5) Energy-saving projects in north-west Russia. The Nordic Environment 
Finance Corporation (Nefco) has implemented more than 45 small-scale 
projects for saving energy in north-west Russian municipalities, through its 
Facility for Energy Saving. The projects have been targeted at the social 
infrastructure, such as schools, kindergartens, hospitals, sports facilities 
and street lighting. Repayment of the loans is directly tied to the savings 
resulting from the investment. Project activities have focused on renovating 
                                                      
17 See Eloheimo (2007), op. cit., pp. 19–21. 
18 See J. Rytkönen, “Latest Development of Oil and Chemical Transportation on the 
Baltic Sea”, presentation at the Conference on “Dangerous Goods Transportation” 
in St. Petersburg, 26 October 2006. 
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and glazing windows, upgrading heating sub-stations, insulating pipelines, 
optimising hot water supply systems and installing thermostatic radiator 
valves. For example, at several schools in Kirovsk, some 200 km south of 
Murmansk, the heating system was upgraded and energy consumption 
was reduced significantly after the installation of new equipment. In the 
city of Segezha in northern Karelia, 1,660 mercury lamps for street 
illumination were replaced with new energy-saving sodium lamps in 2008. 
The city of Onega in Arkhangelsk Oblast will move from coal to biomass in 
its heating production. The phasing-out of coal-fired boilers in the town 
will improve the air quality considerably. These projects have been 
proceeding smoothly, with the local stakeholders as active participants. 
Cooperation among the local authorities and with energy-efficiency centres 
has also been successful.20  
6) City twinning activities. The Environmental Committee of the city of 
St. Petersburg and the Finnish Ministry of the Environment are engaged in 
a programme that aims at reinforcing environmental management, 
improving management and control of hazardous waste, and increasing 
environmental awareness in St. Petersburg. In addition, it seeks to support 
city twinning for joint environmental efforts. Under the city twinning 
programme, a project carried out between Turku in Finland and St. 
Petersburg has compared environmental monitoring practices at industrial 
plants. The project has included study tours for supervisors from St. 
Petersburg to Turku to familiarise them with the practices and working 
methods of the Finnish partner and vice versa. These exchange visits have 
provided new perspectives for both parties, with a multiplier effect in 
terms of environmental awareness-raising and better management.21 In 
addition, St. Petersburg and Tampere in Finland are engaged in a project to 
improve air quality monitoring, which includes studying the air quality 
                                                      
20 See the Nefco Newsletter, November 2007 (retrieved from www.nefco.org/ 
documents/NEFCO.NEWS.NOV2007.pdf);  information also derived from a 
communication with a representative of Nefco, October 2007.  
21 See Finnish Ministry of the Environment (2006), op. cit.; information also derived 
from an interview with a representative of the St. Petersburg Environmental 
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systems in both cities, developing a monitoring network, finding locations 
for measuring stations and comparing modelling procedures (Table 5.3).22 
Table 5.3 Summary of the six cases of environmental cooperation with Russia 
Case Activities  Main  foreign 
partner 
Timeframe  Scope of funding 
St. Petersburg 
water sector  
Technical and 
institutional 
development  
Finland, 
EBRD, others 
1991–   Loans and grants  
Pechenganikel 
mining 
industry 
Emissions 
reduction, 
modernisation 
Norway, 
Finland, 
Sweden, NIB 
1993– 
(with 
interruptions) 
Loans and grants  
 
Hazardous 
waste facility 
at Krasnyi Bor 
Modernisation Finland, 
Denmark, 
TACIS, EBRD 
Plans, pilots and 
evaluations since 
the mid-1990s; 
halted in 2007 
Some evaluations 
funded, large-
scale loans and 
grants planned 
GOFREP Maritime 
safety 
improvement  
Maritime 
authorities of 
Russia, 
Estonia and 
Finland 
System put into 
use in 2004 
No special grants 
or loans 
Nefco energy-
saving projects 
Energy  saving  Nefco Ongoing Loans   
City twinning   Institutional 
development of 
environmental 
administration 
8 cities in 
Finland  
2003– Small  grants 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
4.  Drivers of and barriers to success in environmental 
cooperation 
Environmental cooperation is difficult to evaluate in terms of its 
effectiveness, not least because of the many intervening factors and time 
lags. Its success should instead be evaluated in terms of institutional 
development and changes in the meanings attached to the environment 
                                                      
22 See the St. Petersburg City Twinning Programme website (www3.turku.fi/ctw/ 
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rather than in terms of direct improvements in the state of the environment, 
which will often be problematic to measure and isolate from other events.23 
Successful cooperation is here defined mainly on the basis of the 
experience of the participants in and observers of the joint work in the six 
cases described above – whether the participants themselves have defined 
the process as successful or not. Based on these assessments and literature, 
the next section analyses the drivers of and barriers to successful 
cooperation. 
Drivers of success  
The recognition of a common interest – that is, a shared understanding of goals 
and means of cooperation – was identified as a key driver of success by the 
Nordic and Russian parties to regional environmental coordination. In the 
case of the St. Petersburg water sector, the partners – the management of 
the utility, foreign partners and the authorities – shared the central idea of 
the initiative. The partners were also allowed to negotiate and define its 
content without much steering from above. Relative financial and 
administrative independence from the Russian authorities has allowed the St. 
Petersburg water utility, at least in recent years, to act independently of 
federal, local and regional authorities and without having to think about 
subsidies. 
Furthermore, Russians in particular emphasise trust as an important 
driver of success in environmental cooperation. Trust is connected to other 
factors of success: the long association of partners and having the right 
persons in the right places with good and stable relationships.24 Personal 
relations that have time to evolve through long-term cooperation, as well as 
individual skills, are very important in working together with Russians. 
Nikula and Tynkkynen (2007) note that in the case of GOFREP, many 
potential barriers to collaboration have been avoided thanks to good and 
personal contacts with the Russian authorities.25 
Achieving relationships of trust presupposes negotiation and action 
on an equal intellectual and financial basis among the partners. The material 
basis of cooperation is a crucial element here. Russians widely share the 
                                                      
23 See Tynkkynen (2008a), op. cit.; cf. Tennberg (2007), op. cit., pp. 321–35. 
24 See Tennberg (2007), op. cit., p. 327; Tynkkynen (2008b), op. cit. 
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view that more Russian material resources should be used in joint 
activities. Equality is encouraged by applying partnership and learning-by-
doing  methods.  Russian partners in particular have emphasised the 
importance of a “long-term partnership that aims at concrete results”.26 In 
this respect, twinning activities seem a particularly fruitful form of 
collaboration.  
Russians notably praise cooperation that can proceed among experts, 
without much involvement from the authorities – as exemplified by the 
GOFREP work. The EU and the IMO set the legal framework, but the 
working procedures related to traffic surveillance and control adopted by 
marine safety authorities in all three countries have been developed 
through day-to-day cooperation at the level of professional practitioners – 
the maritime safety authorities of Estonia, Finland and Russia (Box 5.1). 
 
Box 5.1 Drivers of success in Nordic–Russian environmental cooperation 
•  Common interests 
•  Shared understanding of goals and means 
•  Independence/autonomy from the authorities 
•  Trust, personal relations and individual skills 
(long association of partners) 
•  Financial and intellectual equality of the partners 
•  Partnerships and a learning-by-doing approach 
•  Expert-level interaction 
Barriers to success  
When asked to list the various problems of environmental coordination in 
Russia, the following were stressed by project partners: intricate negotiation 
processes,  lack of commitment,  funding insecurity,  information problems and 
prolonged project schedules.27 These problems apply to political cooperation 
(‘environmental diplomacy’) in particular, but they have also been 
encountered at the level of joint practical work in projects. 
                                                      
26 See Tennberg (2007), op. cit., p. 327; Tynkkynen (2008b), op. cit.. 
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Most problems stem from the way in which environmental policy 
itself has evolved in the hierarchy of Russian political priorities.28 The 
unclear administrative status of environmental policy is reflected in 
continuous administrative and legal reforms and in insufficient domestic 
environmental expenditure, resulting in a loss of environmental expertise and 
awareness in the Russian administration. Confusion over the allocation of 
responsibilities, decision-making power and ineffective communication 
between the federal and regional authorities in Russia has formed barriers 
to cooperation. Administrative turbulence has caused constant replacement 
of Russian participants and a lack of active Russian participation in 
cooperative processes. In the Pechenganikel case, for example, the 
problems partly originated in the unclear status of the roles of the federal 
and regional governments. Moreover, the decentralisation of 
responsibilities in environmental administration has not been compensated 
by adequate financial resources, leading to difficulties in funding the 
Russian share of the project.  
In some cases, however, changes in environmental governance have 
actually enhanced the autonomy of local actors in solving practical 
problems and improved the possibilities for local stakeholders to 
participate in environmental projects. This has enabled direct cross-border 
contacts, but has also made the success of cooperation highly dependent on 
the interests and commitment of local actors.  
The lack of economic incentives for making environmentally sound 
investments in Russia, and the insecurities inherent in Russia’s economy in 
general and the property rights system in particular, are also listed among 
the barriers to success in environmental partnerships. These factors lead to 
situations characterised by diverging interests between the Russian and 
Nordic partners. As the Pechenganikel case demonstrates, there is often 
tension between environmental and other goals, such as industrial 
modernisation and greater profitability. The conflict of interests appears in 
diverging views over the goals and means of cooperation, which 
significantly reduces the potential for successful collaboration. The financial 
imbalance means that Russian participants often perceive the arrangements 
                                                      
28 See D.J. Peterson and E.K. Bielke, “The Reorganisation of Russia’s Environmental 
Bureaucracy: Implications and Prospects”, Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, Vol. 
42, No. 1, 2001, pp. 65–76; J. Oldfield, Russian Nature: Exploring the Environmental 
Consequences of Societal Change, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005. 86 | NINA TYNKKYNEN 
as ‘unequal’. The material imbalance may form barriers, mental ones not 
least, to open communication and interaction. This was, for instance, the 
case with the St. Petersburg water-sector projects, until the water and 
sewage utility Vodokanal, the Russian partner in the projects, became more 
viable in financial terms. In addition, many Russian project managers 
complain that their knowledge and expertise are not effectively put to use 
in such efforts, and that priority lists, evaluations and briefings are usually 
made by non-Russians. A related problem is that Russian participants often 
have financial difficulties in attending meetings and in obtaining clearance 
to travel.  
In some cases cultural disparities, such as differing conceptions 
concerning time and place, the role of authorities, the bureaucratic system 
and the hierarchy of problems add to the financial issues, causing 
misunderstandings and frustration. Geir Hønneland, who has studied 
Russian–Norwegian environmental cooperation, distinguishes between a 
Russian “techno-centric meta-discourse” and the Norwegian “eco-centric 
meta-discourse” – which effectively crystallises the basic differences 
produced by alternative cultural and historical contexts. The former 
discourse emphasises the positive effects of polluting industrial activities, 
viewed as contributing primarily to regional development and wealth, 
whereas the latter focuses on the degradation of the environment and 
health (Box 5.2).29 
 
Box 5.2 Barriers to success in Nordic–Russian environmental cooperation 
•  Intricate negotiation processes 
•  Lack of commitment 
•  Insecurity of funding 
•  Information problems 
•  Prolonged project schedules 
•  Instabilities in Russian environmental administration and funding 
•  Conflicting interests and goals 
•  Financial imbalances among partners (also leading to imbalances in the 
use of intellectual capacity) 
•  Cultural traits: differing hierarchies of problems, differing discourses 
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5.  Lessons and conclusions 
These cases of environmental cooperation between the Nordic countries 
and Russia show that the main barriers to success in such efforts chiefly 
stem from economic, political and administrative instabilities in Russia. 
That in turn should indicate that the barriers would be temporary in 
character. With the resurgence of the economy, more Russian intellectual 
and material resources should gradually become available for addressing 
environmental concerns and investing in joint environmental projects. The 
NDEP is a showcase of such positive developments. Russian interest in and 
commitment to the support fund has increased significantly since 2006.30 In 
the future, it is crucial to maintain this strong commitment at all levels of 
the administration to ensure a clear sense of ownership and to attract new 
funds from international partners.31  
One way to strengthen commitment and avoid misunderstandings is 
to make the intentions of Nordic and other Western partners as explicit as 
possible for the Russians, and to make motivations more transparent.32 This 
effort will require joint project preparation involving all partners. The long 
association of partners, in addition to a practical orientation, will help in 
this respect. Gradually, partners become familiar with each other’s views 
and learn to appreciate each other’s priorities. Contacts from regional 
cooperation are valuable and could be capitalised upon systematically in 
activities under the new Northern Dimension. 
In many instances, matters that may hinder cooperation at the highest 
political level – such as sovereignty questions or other political problems – 
do not interfere with cooperation at the practical level or the expert level in 
particular. Here it is easier to identify the relevant stakeholders, negotiate 
over the goals and means, and find stronger personal interest and 
commitment. Emerging forms of such partnerships, such as that of the John 
Nurminen Foundation and Vodokanal, represent a positive development 
and are worth encouraging. In project-level work, flexible, small-scale, 
                                                      
30 See Tennberg (2007), op. cit., p. 330; information also derived from an interview 
with a representative of the Finnish Ministry of the Environment, 2007. 
31 See J. Henttonen, “The New Northern Dimension. Case: Environment”’, 
presentation at the seminar on “The New Northern Dimension: Regional Co-
operation, Business and Energy”, St. Petersburg, 17 January 2008. 
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interactive and relatively informal forms of cooperation, such as twinning 
and other day-to-day joint activities, seem to drive success. On the whole, 
local stakeholders represent an underutilised resource. They are usually 
highly motivated to participate in environmental projects because they 
stand to benefit directly from the improved state of the environment. 
Seen from this perspective, small-scale projects and the long 
association of partners can also prove productive and may even have 
greater impact than large-scale projects determined on the basis of 
competitive bidding. At the moment, the NDEP support fund’s 
environmental window includes only large-scale projects, although there 
are many smaller sub-projects. Still, it might be a good idea to include more 
small-scale activities as well in the NDEP project pipeline. These can serve 
as important means of environmental capacity-building and may carry 
multiplier effects, possibly leading to more fundamental changes than 
direct investments.  
The environmental sphere is not the easiest context for cooperation. 
For one thing, environmental problems are highly heterogeneous and 
context-specific. In different economic and political settings, physically 
similar environmental changes may lead to quite different societal effects. 
Lessons learned affirm this and indicate that differentiation and 
specification of forms of cooperation is necessary, depending on the issue 
and circumstances. Accordingly, in environmental cooperation ‘form 
should follow function’: the best form of cooperation will depend on the 
situation at hand. Experience has shown that one size does not fit all – there 
is no general model of collaboration that would suit every case. Therefore, 
it is important to consider carefully the most suitable level and form of 
cooperation on a case-by-case basis, which also applies in the framework of 
the Northern Dimension. 
6.  References 
Artic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) (1998), AMAP 
Assessment Report: Arctic Pollution Issues, Arctic Council, Oslo. 
Eloheimo, K. (2007), Suomen alueelle Venäjältä kohdistuvat rajat ylittävät 
ympäristöuhat, Finnish Ministry of the Environment, Helsinki. 
Finnish Ministry of the Environment (2002), Evaluation and Strategy Study of 
the Cooperation Between the Ministry of the Environment, Finland, and 
Vodokanal of St. Petersburg, Russia, Ministry of the Environment, 
Helsinki. ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES AND RUSSIA | 89 
–––––––––  (2003),  Cooperation Between Vodokanal of St. Petersburg and the 
Ministry of the Environment of Finland, Framework Programme 2004–
2007, WaterPro Partners Ltd., Helsinki. 
––––––––– (2006), From Cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe to European 
Union Partnership, Ministry of the Environment, Helsinki. 
–––––––––  (2007), “St. Petersburg Wastewater Treatment Boosted: 
Cooperation to Improve the State of the Gulf of Finland Continues”, 
press release, Ministry of the Environment, Helsinki, 1 October. 
Helcom (2005), “As Driving Forces Behind New Treatment Plan, St. 
Petersburg’s Water Authority and its Director Win the 2005 Swedish 
Baltic Sea Water Award”, Helcom, Helsinki, 21 June (retrieved from 
www.helcom.fi/press_office/news_baltic/en_GB/StPetersburg). 
Henttonen, J. (2008), “The New Northern Dimension. Case: Environment”’, 
presentation at the seminar on “The New Northern Dimension: 
Regional Co-operation, Business and Energy”, St. Petersburg, 17 
January. 
Hønneland, G. (2003), Russia and the West: Environmental Cooperation and 
Conflict, London: Routledge. 
Nikula, P. and V.-P. Tynkkynen (2007), “Risks in Oil Transportation in the 
Gulf of Finland: Not a Question of If – But When”, in C. Pursiainen 
(ed.),  Towards a Baltic Sea Region Strategy in Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, Stockholm: Nordregio, pp. 141–64. 
Oldfield, J. (2005), Russian Nature: Exploring the Environmental Consequences 
of Societal Change, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Peterson, D.J. and E.K. Bielke (2001), “The Reorganisation of Russia’s 
Environmental Bureaucracy: Implications and Prospects”, Post-Soviet 
Geography and Economics, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 65–76. 
Rytkönen, J. (2006),  “Latest Development of Oil and Chemical 
Transportation on the Baltic Sea”, presentation at the Conference on 
“Dangerous Goods Transportation” in St. Petersburg, 26 October. 
Salmi, O. (2007), “Eco-Efficiency and Industrial Symbiosis – A 
Counterfactual Analysis of a Mining Community”, Journal of Cleaner 
Production, Vol. 15, No. 17, pp. 1696–05.  
Salmi, O. and N. Tynkkynen (2008), “Environmental Governance in Russia: 
Changing Conditions for International Environmental Cooperation in 
the Case of the Murmansk Region Mining Industry and the St. 
Petersburg Water Sector”, submitted draft article.  90 | NINA TYNKKYNEN 
Tennberg, M. (2007), “Trust in International Environmental Cooperation in 
North-western Russia”, Cooperation and Conflict, Vol. 42, No. 3, pp. 
321–35. 
Tynkkynen, N. (2008a), Constructing the Environmental Regime between 
Russia and Europe: Conditions for Social Learning, Tampere: Acta 
Universitatis Tamperensis. 
–––––––––  (2008b), “Environmental Cooperation and Learning: The St. 
Petersburg Water Sector”, in D. Lehrer and A. Korhonen (eds), 
Western Aid in Post-communism: Effects and Side effects, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming. 
Vodokanal of St. Petersburg (2001), Final Report of the Corporate Development 
Support Programme, St. Petersburg. 
Interviews and communications 
Communication with a representative of Nefco, October 2007 
Interview with a representative of the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, 2002 
Interview with a representative of the Finnish Ministry of the Environment 
in St. Petersburg, 2002 
Interview with a representative of the Finnish Ministry of the Environment, 
2007 
Interview with a representative of the Nordic Investment Bank, 2005 
Interview with a representative of the St. Petersburg Environmental 
Committee, 2003 
  
| 91  
 
 
6.  ASSESSING THE NORTHERN DIMENSION 
PARTNERSHIP IN PUBLIC HEALTH AND 
SOCIAL WELL-BEING 
AADNE AASLAND
∗ 
1.  Introduction 
The “Declaration concerning the establishment of a Northern Dimension 
Partnership in Public Health and Social Well-being” (NDPHS) was signed 
in Oslo on 27 October 2003.1 The idea of a social and health care 
partnership in the Northern Dimension had been put forward in 2000. A 
Working Group was then established to prepare a proposal on the focus, 
structures and procedures of the partnership, and this proposal was 
approved at the high-level meeting in Oslo. Since 2003, the structures have 
been set up, plans for collaboration agreed and concerted action initiated. 
The partnership represents an umbrella for activities on the regional, sub-
regional and local levels, serving as a forum for coordination and synergies 
among the various actors. Today, the partnership involves thirteen 
governments, the European Commission and eight international 
                                                      
∗ The author would like to thank Helge Blakkisrud, Jørn Holm-Hansen and Bernd 
Treichel for comments on a draft version of this chapter. 
1 See the Oslo Declaration, adopted at the ministerial meeting in Oslo on 27 
October 2003 (retrieved from www.ndphs.org/internalfiles/File/About_NDPHS/ 
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organisations.2 The inclusion of social welfare and health among the seven 
priority sectors of the Northern Dimension policy and the explicit mention 
of the NDPHS have established it as an important part of Northern 
Dimension cooperation.3 
After presenting the background of the NDPHS, its objectives and 
structure, this chapter discusses some potential challenges facing the 
partnership. A first challenge lies in the disparities in health and social 
problems in the Northern Dimension area and their implications for the 
geographical focus. A second one is the variation in the level of 
commitment among the partners and the implications for ensuring ‘fair’ 
and adequate funding. A third concerns dissemination of information 
about the partnership among key policy-makers and other stakeholders. In 
the Second Northern Dimension Action Plan for 2004–06,4 HIV/AIDS and 
tuberculosis were singled out as priority health issues in the Northern 
Dimension area. To illustrate NDPHS collaboration in one of its priority 
areas, the chapter examines how the issue of HIV/AIDS prevention and 
treatment has been addressed in the Northern Dimension context. 
Throughout the chapter, lessons learned from the collaboration are noted 
and suggestions made for issues on which continued political efforts are 
needed. 
2.  Background, objectives and structure 
When the NDPHS was launched, it could build on already well-established 
joint initiatives and structures in the Northern Dimension area within the 
health and social sphere. The NDPHS not only followed up the tasks and 
                                                      
2 Partner countries are Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden. Partner 
organisations are the Barents Euro-Artic Council (BEAC), Baltic Sea States Sub-
Regional Cooperation, the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), International 
Labour Organisation (ILO), International Organisation for Migration (IOM), 
Nordic Council of Ministers, Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) and 
World Health Organisation (WHO). 
3 See the list of priority sectors on the European Commission’s website, Northern 
Dimension Basic Documents (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/external_ 
relations/north_dim). 
4 The text of the Action Plan is available at the European Commission’s website 
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activities of the Task Force on Communicable Diseases in the Baltic Sea 
Region (henceforth, the Task Force),5 but was also intended to constitute a 
framework for many other collaborative activities in the field, e.g. under 
the auspices of the BEAC, the Nordic Council of Ministers and bilateral 
programmes. Thus, the initiative was set up in a context in which 
coordination had already become institutionalised, a network had been 
established and actors at the professional and policy levels had been 
working together since the mid-1990s. Their concerted efforts had many 
positive achievements to show, in areas such as the development of 
personnel, professional knowledge, networks and inter-institutional 
cooperation.6 
Why was the health and social sphere singled out as a priority area of 
Northern Dimension partnership? First, although motivations may have 
varied, all the countries involved share an interest in working together on 
health and social issues. The severity of the health situation in some of the 
Northern Dimension countries was seen as a hindrance to the general 
development of the region. In some countries, most notably Russia and the 
Baltic States, mortality rates were disturbingly high, and illnesses such as 
HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis were recognised as major threats to at least 
parts of the Northern Dimension area. The common understanding 
prevailed that these health and social problems would require joint action 
by the Northern Dimension partners.  
Second, as noted above, many actors had been engaged in bilateral 
and multilateral activities in the health and social sphere since the mid-
1990s. Establishing a formal partnership could improve the coordination of 
such activities by avoiding duplication, enabling the exchange of 
experiences, engaging policy-makers and increasing visibility. Also, the 
                                                      
5 The Task Force was launched by the CBSS in 2000 to combat the emerging threat 
to public health caused by the sharp increase in communicable diseases, and to 
elaborate a joint plan to enhance disease control throughout the region. See L. 
Rowe and B. Rechel, “Fighting tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS in Northeast Europe: 
Sustainable collaboration or political rhetoric?”, European Journal of Public Health, 
Vol. 16, 2006, pp. 609–14. 
6 See T. Bjørnkilde and A. Wynn, Social and Health Sector Projects in Russia: Final 
Report, Sida, Stockholm, 2004; G. Hønneland and A. Moe, Evaluation of the Barents 
Health Programme – Project Selection and Implementation, Fridtjof Nansen Institute, 
Oslo, 2004; J. Holm-Hansen, A. Aasland and L.S. Malik, Health and Social Affairs in 
Norway and Russia: The Cooperation Evaluated, NIBR, Oslo, 2007. 94 | AADNE AASLAND 
establishment of the partnership took place in a global setting in which 
health had gradually gained greater recognition as an issue in international 
relations. In their recent evaluation of the Task Force, Geir Hønneland and 
Lars Rowe stress the role of “health as international politics” by referring to 
communicable disease control as a “global public good”.7 
The overall efforts of the new partnership were directed towards 
achieving two major objectives: 
•  reducing major communicable diseases and preventing lifestyle-
related non-communicable diseases, and 
•  enhancing and promoting healthy and socially rewarding lifestyles. 
The NDPHS has largely concentrated on themes and issues that have 
ranked high on the agenda ever since the establishment of collaboration on 
health and social issues in the Northern Dimension area. More recently, it 
has begun to broaden its scope of activity, e.g. by introducing a new 
Partnership Strategy on Health at Work (2007)8 aimed at reducing non-
communicable diseases to benefit health and well-being in the work 
environment. 
Eligible partners of the NDPHS are EU member states and Northern 
Dimension partner countries, the European Commission and other EU 
institutions, regional cooperation bodies, international organisations and 
financing institutions. In addition, interested sub-national administrative 
entities in the Northern Dimension area are eligible participants in the 
partnership. 
The NDPHS has a rather complex organisational structure, which 
was put in place at the time of its establishment. The main decision-making 
body is the Partnership Annual Conference (PAC), which convenes once a 
year, with ministerial participation in alternating years. The PAC is 
                                                      
7 See G. Hønneland and L. Rowe, Health as International Politics, Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2004. 
8 The strategy can be found on the NDPHS website (retrieved from 
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responsible for formulating NDPHS policies, reviewing the progress of the 
partnership and providing high-level guidance.9 
The main coordinating body of the partnership is the Committee of 
Senior Representatives, consisting of senior-level representatives appointed 
by the partners. Its chief task is to make sure the decisions and 
recommendations of the PAC are followed up and implemented. 
In accordance with the Oslo Declaration, the Committee of Senior 
Representatives may also establish expert groups to serve in an advisory 
capacity, providing professional input into the preparation and 
implementation of joint activities within the framework of the partnership. 
T o  d a t e ,  f o u r  s u c h  e x p e r t  g r o u p s  have been established, covering the 
following topics: HIV/AIDS; prison health; primary health care; and on 
social inclusion, healthy lifestyles and work ability. In addition, there are 
two ‘associated expert groups’ working within the NDPHS framework: the 
CBSS Working Group for Cooperation on Children at Risk and the Baltic 
Sea Network on Occupational Health and Safety. All these expert groups 
consist of high-level experts from national ministries, research institutions, 
health institutions and other relevant bodies. 
The NDPHS has a permanent Secretariat with a staff of two, based in 
Stockholm. The main task of the Secretariat is to provide support to the 
Committee of Senior Representatives. The Secretariat has developed a 
comprehensive website10 with information not only about the partnership 
and its structure and tasks, but also about funding opportunities and the 
activities and projects underway concerning public health and social well-
being. The Secretariat is furthermore responsible for implementation of the 
NDPHS pipeline and database project, as presented below. 
3.  Disparities in health and social problems 
It is generally acknowledged that health problems and levels of welfare are 
far from evenly distributed in the Northern Dimension area. Indeed, the 
divide in life expectancy between Russia and its Nordic neighbours is 
                                                      
9 Lithuania chaired the partnership November 2005–November 2007, with Norway 
as a co-chair. Norway has since taken over the chairmanship, with Russia in the co-
chair position. The division of chair and co-chair between East and West appears to 
have been institutionalised. 
10 The NDPHS website address is www.ndphs.org. 96 | AADNE AASLAND 
larger than that of any other neighbouring countries of the world, which is 
a strong indication of health and social inequalities. While in 2005 life 
expectancy at birth for Russian men was only 59 years, the figures for 
Finland and Norway were 76 and 78 years respectively.11 Even if the 
Russian economy has improved significantly in recent years, the overall 
health status of the population can still be characterised as critical.  
Given the great disparities in health and social conditions among 
Northern Dimension countries, much of the focus of the NDPHS has 
centred on improving the situation in north-west Russia and (to a lesser 
degree) Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. The NDPHS database of 
collaboration projects in the Northern Dimension area shows that the vast 
majority of projects deal with health issues in one or more of the regions of 
north-west Russia. The minutes of meetings of the NDPHS expert groups 
(also accessible from the NDPHS website) show a corresponding emphasis 
on issues involving the situation in north-west Russia, which most 
probably reflects an objective assessment of where health and social 
problems are the most acute. 
The heavy emphasis of the NDPHS on social and health problems in 
north-west Russia may also cause some tension, however. A more self-
assertive Russia is not necessarily interested in spreading the impression of 
a country in need of special attention, as the weakest partner dependent on 
outside assistance to solve its health and social problems. Although not 
trying to hide the seriousness of the health situation, Russian policy-makers 
have stressed that they give priority to NDPHS initiatives that deal with 
cross-border activities and issues relevant to the entire Northern Dimension 
area instead of just the situation in Russia.12 For the future, it is likely that 
increased weight will be given to health challenges that are common to 
several or all the Northern Dimension countries. 
                                                      
11 These figures are derived from the Statistical Division Database of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (retrieved from www.unece.org/stats). 
For women, the differences are somewhat less dramatic but still notable, with a 
2005 life expectancy in the Russian Federation of 72 years, as against 82 in Finland 
and 83 in Norway.  
12 This point was stressed by the Russian participants during a series of expert 
seminars on the new Northern Dimension organised by the ministries of foreign 
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Health problems are unevenly spread not only among countries, but 
also within individual Northern Dimension countries. For example, in Oslo 
the difference in male life expectancy between the ‘inner east’ and ‘outer 
west’ is more than seven years.13 North-west Russia is characterised by 
marked regional variations in the spread of HIV, and some north-west 
Russian regions have lower HIV prevalence than the Nordic average, at 
least according to official statistics.14 I n  g e n e r a l ,  g a p s  i n  h e a l t h  a m o n g  
different social groups have been growing across the Northern Dimension 
area over the past decade. 
The Northern Dimension countries also share many challenges, 
although these vary in acuteness. All the countries are in the process of 
reforming their health care systems. Additionally, several or all NDPHS 
countries must deal with the prevalence of communicable (and other) 
diseases, alcohol and drug abuse, institutional capacity, differences 
between the centre and periphery, information to citizens, the needs of 
vulnerable groups and institutionalisation of changes, to mention some 
pressing issues. Thus, there is an abundance of fields in which all countries 
may benefit from increased collaboration and exchange of experiences and 
best practices. 
Nevertheless, Russia remains a special and separate case in the 
NDPHS collaboration – a point stressed in key NDPHS documents.15 It has 
been argued, also within the NDPHS context, that the Russian health care 
system is not so much a system as a collection of fragmented elements.16 
Soviet traditions remain more firmly entrenched in Russia than in the Baltic 
States, for instance. The low life expectancy, high mortality rate among 
                                                      
13 See K.E. Dybendal and H. Skiri, “Klare geografiske forskjeller i levealder mellom 
bydeler i Oslo”, Samfunnsspeilet, Vol. 6, No. 19, 2005, pp. 18–27. 
14 Still, statistics are likely to underestimate the actual figures on HIV incidence in 
Russia. See H. Blystad, Ø. Nilsen and S. Andresen, “Hivsituasjonen i våre 
nærområder”, Tidsskrift for Den norske Legeforening, Vol. 23, No. 106, 2006, pp. 3131–
34. 
15 See M. Maciejowski, B. Treichel and M. Nachtigall, “The Northern Dimension 
Partnership in Public Health and Social Well-being”, Barents, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2007, 
pp. 46–48. 
16 See for example the minutes of the first meeting of the NDPHS Primary Health 
Care Expert Group on 13 February 2005 (retrieved from www.ndphs.org/// 
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those of working age and the rate of the spread of communicable diseases 
are still serious challenges. Also, the difficulties in access to and the quality 
of health care services and social care represent a greater problem than is 
the case in other Northern Dimension countries. Therefore, improving 
health and welfare in north-west Russia is likely to remain high on the 
policy agenda of the NDPHS.  
The emphasis on Russia in terms of interventions makes the inclusion 
and input of relevant actors (policy-makers, bureaucrats, professionals) 
from Russia an essential factor for success. Much of the practical project 
collaboration with north-west Russia has taken place without involving 
policy-makers at the federal level. In fact, it is not always necessary to 
engage the actors at the federal level in coordination that is so regionally-
based and involves only a few of its federal subjects. The Russian health 
system is quite decentralised, and in many cases the federal districts, cities 
and municipalities are the pertinent levels of collaboration. It is, however, 
crucial to engage the Russian federal authorities when the issues relate to 
the overarching priorities of the partnership. For the partners, the federal 
level needs to be involved, for example, when large-scale multilateral 
projects are developed and implemented or when the area of joint work 
involves systemic reform. For visibility and dissemination of best practices 
among federal subjects, the coordination undertaken by federal authorities 
is also valuable. Although there is a Plenipotentiary Representative of the 
President of Russia in the Northwest Federal District with a head office in 
St. Petersburg, this office does not have a strong focus on health issues. 
Therefore, for NDPHS collaboration it is vital to involve also the federal 
Ministry of Health and Social Affairs and other federal agencies. 
4.  Commitment and funding issues 
Evaluations of projects under the NDPHS umbrella indicate a very high 
level of commitment of the professionals involved.17 A potential difficulty, 
however, are the substantial disparities in the involvement of different 
partners and partner countries at the policy level. There can be many, and 
well-founded, reasons why not all countries enter the partnership with the 
same degree of interest and priority, but the continued dominance of a few 
                                                      
17 See Bjørnkilde and Wynn (2004), op. cit.; Hønneland and Moe (2004), op. cit.; 
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(notably Norway and Finland) over others may in the longer run affect the 
partnership spirit.  
The Partnership Secretariat has established an NDPHS Project 
Pipeline that seeks to act as a multi-agency on-line tool for coordinating 
project funding. The idea is to provide assistance from the inception of a 
project initiative through project application to project financing. On the 
NDPHS website, the pipeline is presented as a ‘marketplace’ for project 
proponents (organisations and individuals) and project financing agencies 
working for public health and social well-being in northern Europe. 
Since the pipeline was launched in November 2007, two funding 
schemes have been announced through its website. First out was a funding 
scheme of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland for the period 2008–10, 
with €1.5 million to be allocated to health projects in north-west Russia. The 
second involves funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care 
Services for projects under the Barents Health and Social Programme. The 
latter is a funding scheme that has been in operation since 1999 and 
allocates approximately NOK 17 million (about €2.1 million) each year to 
projects aimed at preventing and combating communicable diseases; 
preventing lifestyle-related health and social problems, and promoting 
healthy lifestyles; and the development and integration of primary health 
care and social services. 
The Swedish agency Sida is currently phasing out its programme of 
support for social and health sector projects in north-west Russia. None of 
the international organisations that are partners of the NDPHS has yet 
announced funding opportunities through the new pipeline. It should be 
stressed, however, that the international organisations that are NDPHS 
partners are not donor organisations as such.18  
In the midst of Russian economic crises and needs for restructuring 
the health sector in the late 1990s, the other Northern Dimension countries 
did not object to paying the main bulk of the costs of the collaboration. 
With improvements in Russian living conditions and the national economy, 
the basis for Russian financial contributions to the collaboration on health 
and social issues has improved. Indeed, an increase in funding by Russian 
                                                      
18 This does not imply that the organisations are not active in the partnership. 
Examples of dynamic participation include the collaboration of the WHO Health in 
Prisons Project with the Prison Health Expert Group, and the efforts of the ILO in 
helping to develop the NDPHS Strategy on Health at Work. 100 | AADNE AASLAND 
authorities for health and social issues has been observed in recent years. 
For example, one of the four national priority projects announced by 
President Vladimir Putin in 2005 to solve the most crucial problems of 
national development (by accumulating funds and resources for priority 
tasks) deals directly with health issues.19 Considerable funding 
accompanies the project: the equivalent of €3.7 billion each year for the 
initial two years.20 Moreover, the priorities under this national project 
largely correspond with those of the NDPHS, such as strengthening 
primary health care and preventive efforts. 
The relatively strong diplomatic support for the NDPHS has not yet 
been accompanied by corresponding financial support from most partner 
countries or international organisations. There has not been a substantial 
rise in funding for collaborative activities in line with the establishment of 
the partnership. Previous experience from the Task Force revealed 
difficulties in raising additional funding for health-related cooperation in 
most donor countries, and it remains to be seen whether this will be the 
case with the NDPHS as well. On the other hand, the stronger inclination of 
the Russian side to allocate funding to health and social projects, together 
with the growing robustness of reform efforts, may boost Russian 
responsiveness to health and social projects under the NDPHS umbrella. In 
the long run, this will undoubtedly be much more important for improving 
the health and social conditions in north-west Russia than the necessarily 
limited financial support available from neighbouring countries. 
To truly strengthen the partnership, the partners will need to pool 
more resources into multilateral programmes and institutions. As yet, there 
have been no indications of such pooling of resources on a large scale: 
instead, the partner countries seem to prefer bilateral programmes that 
permit more control of the funding. Moreover, the Russian side tends to 
earmark its funding for specific prioritised projects, whether bilateral or 
multilateral. 
5.  Dissemination and evaluation 
Although the NDPHS enjoys high-level political support in all Northern 
Dimension countries, one may ask how familiar the key actors in the health 
                                                      
19 The other national priority projects are in the housing, education and 
agricultural sectors. 
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and social sphere are with the partnership and the NDPHS structure. 
Several stakeholders have indicated that awareness is rather weak in most 
partnership countries, and that many actors in the health and social sphere 
are not familiar with the partnership at all.21 Thus, one priority of the 
NDPHS has been to increase the visibility of its continuing collaboration 
and activities. 
In addition to a biannual e-newsletter issued by the NDPHS 
Secretariat, in November 2007 an NDPHS database was launched and 
integrated into the NDPHS website. The database features information 
about projects, organisations, persons and publications. This information 
has been gathered by manual input, from data gathered from the NDPHS 
Project Pipeline (see above) and from other databases available on the web. 
The intention is to make the NDPHS database the natural starting point for 
anyone wishing an overview of health-related project activities in the 
Northern Dimension area. At present, there is information on 500 projects, 
235 organisations, 192 persons and 19 papers accessible in the database.22 
The database is one example that shows the attention devoted to 
dissemination activities over the past few years. The partnership is also 
exemplary in its transparency concerning public access to meeting agendas, 
minutes of meetings, policy papers and other relevant information on the 
partnership website. 
The large number of actors, diversity of activities, ambitious goals 
and complex structure all speak for continuous monitoring of 
developments and directions in the partnership. At the time of writing, an 
evaluation of the NDPHS is underway that will address, inter alia, the 
political dimension of the partnership, its overall structure and the progress 
and commitment of partners. It will additionally assess visibility and 
opinions outside the partnership structure. Such an evaluation should 
provide useful feedback to stakeholders and suggestions for improvement, 
as well as indicate new directions of relevance to the various actors 
involved. Still, to allow for learning processes and adjustments throughout 
                                                      
21 Derived from the author’s interviews and conversations with professionals and 
policy-makers in Russia and the Nordic countries in connection with health-related 
project work. 
22 The database project is financed by the EU within the framework of the Public 
Health Programme, in addition to funding from 10 NDPHS partners. The figures 
were accessed from the NDPHS database website on 24 April 2008. 102 | AADNE AASLAND 
the cycle of the collaboration, one might question whether a formative 
(ongoing) approach should have been preferred to an outcome 
(summative) one. Furthermore, given the strong focus on health and social 
issues in north-west Russia, Russian involvement in the evaluation team 
could have yielded additional insights as to the position of the partnership 
in political and professional arenas in the Russian Federation. 
6.  HIV/AIDS and the NDPHS  
One of the priority areas of the NDPHS is HIV and AIDS. Whereas most 
Western European and Nordic countries have largely succeeded in 
stabilising the situation, the social and economic impacts of HIV are far 
more severe in the eastern Northern Dimension area, particularly in north-
west Russia, Estonia and Latvia. In north-west Russia, the number of 
reported cases rose rapidly from the mid-1990s until 2005, when there were 
more than 46,000 cases.23 Actual figures are likely to be significantly higher 
owing to underreporting. Particularly hard hit are the city of St. Petersburg, 
Leningrad Oblast and Kaliningrad. The epidemic is still driven by 
infections among injecting drug users (IDUs). Yet, infections are 
increasingly reported by those who have received the virus through 
heterosexual transmission, and women make up a growing share of the 
infected. Among the Baltic countries, Estonia has been hardest hit, and new 
cases are rapidly appearing. Although the rate is declining, the disease 
burden is among the highest in Europe. Also, Latvia has a heavy burden of 
infections, while the situation in Lithuania is less severe. With the 
predominance of new cases among IDUs in north-west Russia and the 
Baltic States, the newly infected tend to be younger than in the Northern 
Dimension countries of Western Europe. 
It was decided to establish an expert group on HIV/AIDS within the 
NDPHS partnership, consisting of professionals representing interested 
parties and other international experts. This expert group constitutes a 
direct continuation of the work initiated under the Task Force framework.  
Most Northern Dimension countries are members of the EU, which, 
through its financing and political instruments, is able to shape and direct 
HIV-related activities within member states. But, there are not yet any new 
financing instruments in the EU that cover the costs of projects involving 
countries both within and outside the EU. Many HIV/AIDS projects are 
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therefore covered by other financial sources, usually bilateral ones. The 
Barents Health and Social Programme is one such major source of funding 
for HIV/AIDS project collaboration involving north-west Russia. 
The Barents HIV/AIDS Programme under the larger Barents Health 
and Social Programme is a joint effort of north-west Russia, Norway, 
Sweden and Finland to halt and better control the spread of HIV in the 
Barents region and to reduce the social and economic costs of HIV and 
AIDS. At a meeting of the NDPHS Committee of Senior Representatives in 
October 2005, it was decided that the Barents HIV/AIDS Programme 
would be expanded to the Northern Dimension area. The geographical 
scope of the programme would also be broadened to cover adjoining areas 
in north-west Russia not included in the Barents region. Furthermore, the 
partnership would initiate the planning process of a new but similar 
programme for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland through the NDPHS 
Expert Group on HIV/AIDS.  
One may ask whether it makes sense to operate with two rather 
parallel and partly overlapping groups of experts working on similar 
issues. The Barents HIV/AIDS Programme works under the umbrella of 
the NDPHS and has close contacts with the NDPHS HIV/AIDS Expert 
Group.24 The international technical adviser of the NDPHS Expert Group is 
simultaneously the programme coordinator of the Barents HIV/AIDS 
Programme. Undoubtedly, as stated in a Barents HIV/AIDS Programme 
description, the initiative contributes to the NDPHS,25 e.g. experience from 
projects under the Programme can be used as input to the NDPHS. 
There have been discussions on merging the two groups. Some 
experts feel that the synergies between the two groups could have been 
stronger, and are calling for a clearer division of the roles of the two 
HIV/AIDS bodies. Other experts have expressed concern that the project-
oriented and practical approach of the Barents collaboration in the field 
would be at risk if it were to be merged with the larger and allegedly less 
flexible structure of the NDPHS. Thus, while a merger is favoured by some 
stakeholders, the issue does not yet seem to figure on the policy agenda – 
neither of the NDPHS nor the Barents HIV/AIDS Programme. 
                                                      
24 See O. Karvonen, “Barents HIV/AIDS Programme – Protection for Vulnerable 
Groups”, Barents, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2007, pp. 52–54. 
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In Russia, HIV/AIDS was for many years branded as a ‘Western’ 
disease, surrounded by rejection and negative attitudes, linked to immoral 
behaviour and associated with the most criticised social groups – first 
homosexuals, and later drug addicts and sex workers. Although 
considerable social stigma remains,26 in recent years the federal authorities 
have begun evincing a much higher commitment to combat the AIDS 
epidemic. In October 2006, a high-level, multi-sectoral governmental 
Commission on AIDS was established, tasked with coordinating general 
and regional authorities in implementation of the national AIDS policy. 
Federal funding of HIV/AIDS programmes increased twenty-fold in one 
year, from 2005 to 2006. 
Russia’s heightened focus on HIV and AIDS has facilitated the 
implementation of collaborative projects under the NDPHS umbrella in 
north-west Russian regions. Russian participants in the expert group have 
shown their commitment to the joint efforts from the very start. More 
recently, however, the greater emphasis on HIV/AIDS issues at the highest 
political level has made it easier to gain acceptance of projects among 
government structures where conservative attitudes, although still 
prevalent, have become less dominant. Some issues, such as drug 
substitution treatment among IDUs and other harm-reduction initiatives, 
remain controversial – but this is the case both within as well as between 
individual Northern Dimension countries. Despite differing views, such 
issues are discussed within the NDPHS context, and experiences from the 
various Northern Dimension countries are shared in relevant arenas. One 
example of an innovative project in Russia is the establishment of a low-
threshold centre in Murmansk, where risk groups have access to free 
needle exchange and free fast-track tests for HIV, Hepatitis B and C, along 
with pregnancy tests, condoms and other materials. Such projects would 
not be feasible without the support of local authorities. 
The literature and recommendations of organisations combating 
HIV/AIDS at every level around the world have stressed the importance of 
partnerships and multi-sectoral responses to the epidemic.27 In Russia, 
                                                      
26 See Y. Balabanova, R. Coker, R.A. Atun and F. Drobniewski, “Stigma and HIV 
infection in Russia”, AIDS Care, Vol. 18, No. 7, 2006, pp. 846–52. 
27 One of the “Three Ones” key principles affirmed by UNAIDS and other 
international agencies and applicable to all stakeholders in national-level HIV/AIDS 
responses reads: “[o]ne national AIDS coordinating authority with a broad-based 
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there appears to be a consensus that such multi-sectoral involvement has 
traditionally been weak.28 HIV/AIDS, however, represents one of the areas 
of NDPHS collaboration where cross-disciplinary and multi-sector action 
has been stimulated and strengthened. For instance, HIV/AIDS centres 
have been opened in all districts of the Russian Federation as part of 
government policy for combating HIV/AIDS. These centres are intended to 
coordinate with district and municipal health authorities, but there is great 
variation among regions in terms of the level and form of this 
collaboration.29 The stress on and positive experience of cross-sectoral 
collaboration in the NDPHS is likely one reason such practices have 
become further developed in HIV/AIDS centres in north-western Russian 
regions in comparison with much of the rest of the country. 
To what extent, then, are developments in the HIV/AIDS response in 
north-west Russia a result of NDPHS collaboration and activities? Domestic 
economic developments, political priorities, large-scale HIV/AIDS 
prevention and treatment projects supported by the Global Fund in recent 
years in Russia,30 and naturally enough, the activities of Russian NGOs and 
other civil society actors are likely to be far more decisive than the 
admittedly modest contributions of the partnership. Nevertheless, there 
can be no doubt that NDPHS activities have had a positive impact on the 
HIV/AIDS response, which goes far beyond the rhetorical value. Support 
for developing cross-sectoral collaboration, harm-reduction initiatives (as 
previously mentioned, still controversial in Russia) and other preventive 
measures that have been important aspects of the NDPHS involvement are 
necessary to halt a further rapid spread of the virus in the region. It is in 
these spheres that stakeholders consider the exchange of experience, 
                                                                                                                                       
multisectoral mandate”; see e.g. the related flyer on the UNAIDS website (retrieved 
from http://data.unaids.org/UNA-docs/three-ones_key principles-flyer_en.pdf). 
28 See E. Tkatchenko, M. McKee and A.D. Tsouros, “Public Health in Russia: The 
View from the Inside”, Health Policy and Planning, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2000, pp. 164–69. 
29 Derived from author’s interviews with representatives of Russian authorities, 
international and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Moscow, 1–
14 May 2008, as part of fieldwork on Russian HIV/AIDS policy. 
30 F o r  a n  o v e r v i e w  o f  p r o j e c t s  t h a t  a r e  s u p p o r t e d  b y  t h e  G l o b a l  F u n d  t o  F i g h t    
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in Russia, see the UNAIDS website 
(http://data.unaids.org/UNA-docs/three-ones_keyprinciples-flyer_en.pdf). 106 | AADNE AASLAND 
capacity building and learning from best practice through the NDPHS 
partnership activities to have been most beneficial.31 
7.  Conclusions: Instruments in place, but greater commitment 
needed 
Motivations for entering and playing an active role in the NDPHS may 
have been mixed. Naturally, working to improve health and social 
conditions in one’s own neighbourhood may be considered a sound 
political priority in itself. An underlying assumption is that many health 
challenges, such as infectious diseases, require joint efforts. Even so, it 
seems unlikely that the reasons for engaging in the partnership have been 
exclusively altruistic. An additional motivation may have been the 
perceived political benefits, both domestically and internationally. Working 
on health issues is regarded as uncontroversial, and a political commitment 
to improve health conditions is likely to find support among the general 
public at home. Internationally, collaboration on ‘soft’ issues may help to 
create a favourable climate for negotiations on ‘harder’ security issues. 
Stakeholders from both the Nordic countries and Russia, however, 
aver that while differences in motivations were quite common at earlier 
stages of the collaboration, the continuous meetings and discussions among 
the partners and actors – at policy as well as project levels – have fostered a 
stronger sense of unity of motivations and goals for future activities, 
notably among those directly involved in the partnership. As the partners 
have become more familiar with each other’s health systems, cultural codes 
and work methods, more efficient collaboration has developed. 
Today’s more self-assertive Russia is now in a position where it can 
be more openly critical of expertise offered by Western partners. Russia is 
mainly interested in supporting projects that are perceived as genuinely 
contributing to and supporting its national health priorities. The budget-
line increase following the Russian national priority project on health may 
create a window of opportunity for bolstering the NDPHS partnership, and 
synergies with the NDPHS should be actively sought by the relevant actors 
both within and outside Russia. 
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Russian federal and regional authorities, international and national NGOs, as part 
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There is no longer a demand for material support to Russia and 
projects for which such support is the main focus are being phased out. 
These are developments that, by and large, should be welcomed. Still, it 
may become harder for Western project partners who wish to strengthen 
alternative ways of thinking, new methods and new focal areas in Russia, 
as they may encounter more reluctant counterparts. It is relatively easy to 
agree on projects on themes like child health, compared with issues that are 
more controversial like prison conditions, substitution therapy in 
HIV/AIDS prevention among IDUs or domestic violence. 
The partners in the NDPHS have so far justified an emphasis on 
activities leading to tangible results. Scientific collaboration has therefore 
largely been written out by the NDPHS partners, and very few scientific 
projects have been initiated under the auspices of the partnership. Yet, in 
order to succeed, many of the objectives of the partnership depend on 
‘advocacy coalitions’ consisting of sufficiently large and influential groups 
from various walks of life (e.g. public administration, politics, the 
voluntary sector and science), and here the scientific element can be highly 
relevant. A firmer focus on involving the research communities in the 
Northern Dimension area in the collaborative work of the NDPHS would 
therefore be recommended. 
There is potential for the NDPHS to become the most important arena 
for collaboration on health and social issues in the Northern Dimension 
area, and to fulfil its ambition of serving as a framework for joint activities 
in the field. Many project-level actors who are involved in the field are still 
unaware of the NDPHS, however. As is also stressed in NDPHS strategic 
documents, the partners need to develop a stronger identity, not least 
through greater emphasis on disseminating information about the 
partnership to increase its visibility and impact. The possibilities for 
increased visibility are greater now than before thanks, inter alia, to the 
recently launched NDPHS Project Pipeline and database. 
Having the instruments in place is one thing; but most crucial for 
future visibility and impact will still be the level of commitment of the 
partners. Political declarations will have to be matched by corresponding 
levels of funding and the willingness of partners to pool resources into 
multilateral and joint activities, as well as reinforced links between key 
committees and expert groups of the NDPHS on the one hand, and national 
(and EU) policy-making institutions on the other. Thus far, the diversity in 
health and social conditions in the Northern Dimension area appears to be 
matched by diversity in the commitment levels of its partners.  108 | AADNE AASLAND 
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7.  EU–RUSSIAN COOPERATION ON 
TRANSPORT: PROSPECTS FOR 
THE NORTHERN DIMENSION 
TRANSPORT PARTNERSHIP 
KATRI PYNNÖNIEMI 
1.  Introduction  
The process that started with the collapse of the cold war order in Europe 
has led to the eastward enlargement of the EU, and eventually to the 
reorganisation of Europe’s economic and political space. Far from being 
unidirectional, this process has given rise to multiple politico-economic 
orders – sometimes overlapping or complementary, at times conflicting. 
The integration of national transport networks into trans-European 
transport networks (TENs) has been an important part of the 
rearrangement of Europe’s economic space. It is regarded as a means to 
“foster regional cooperation” within the EU and between the EU and its 
neighbours.1 The improvement of transport infrastructure networks is also 
considered “vital to competitiveness, economic growth and employment 
                                                      
1 See European Commission, Networks for Peace and Development: Extension of the 
Major Trans-European Transport Axes to the Neighbouring Countries and Regions, 
Report by the High-Level Group chaired by Loyola de Palacio, Directorate-General 
for Energy and Transport, European Commission, Brussels, November 2005 
(retrieved from www.osce.org/documents/eea/2006/01/17793_en.pdf). 110 | KATRI PYNNÖNIEMI 
throughout Europe”,2 that is, for improving global competitiveness within 
the EU’s economic space. The transport infrastructure provides, in a very 
concrete way, a common ground for an interface between Russia and the 
EU. But there is nothing self-evident in the way the integration of their 
respective transport infrastructures has been proceeding. 
Cooperation between the EU and Russia on transport issues has 
evolved along two separate but parallel tracks. In the broader European 
context, Russia is seen as part of the new neighbourhood, with the 
cooperation institutionalised along the lines of the 10 pan-European 
corridors, and later the 5 transnational axes. At the same time, the general 
lines for EU–Russian cooperation on transport were set out in the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement  (1997) and in subsequent 
declarations that are part of their evolving strategic partnership.3 The 
objective of creating four ’common spaces’, declared at the EU–Russia 
summit in St. Petersburg in May 2003, is the latest twist in a series of efforts 
to frame Russian–EU transport relations into a specific policy direction. 
Here reference is made to the “priority corridors of mutual interest” rather 
than “pan-European corridors” – a shift that reflects changes in the policies 
of both the EU and Russia on the development of transport infrastructures.4 
Several studies have addressed the importance of transport and 
infrastructure development for the further improvement and continuing 
expansion of trade relations between EU member states and Russia. Both 
the evolution of the TENs and the improvement of the links to the EU’s 
                                                      
2 See United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), Inland 
Transport Committee, “Evaluation of Inland Transport Infrastructure Projects: 
Transport Infrastructure Needs Assessment (TINA), Executive Summary and 
Conclusions”, TRANS/WP.5/2000/5, UNECE, Geneva, 2000, p. 3. 
3 See the Agreement on Partnership and Cooperation between the European 
Communities and the Russian Federation (Corfu, 24 June 1994, entered into force 1 
December 1997), Art. 70 (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ 
ceeca/pca/pca_russia.pdf); see also the Common Strategy of the European Union 
on Russia, 4 June 1999, Official Journal L157, pp. 7, 24. 
4 On the common economic space and EU–Russian relations, see e.g. P. Sutela, 
“EU, Russia, and the Common Economic Space”, BOFIT Online, p. 3, 2005 
(retrieved from www.bof.fi/bofit); M. Emerson, Four Common Spaces and the 
Proliferation of the Fuzzy, CEPS Policy Brief No. 71, Centre for European Policy 
Studies, Brussels, 2005; K. Barysch, “Is the Common Economic Space Doomed?”, 
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eastern neighbours have been subjects of continuous examination.5 In 
previous research, the redrawing of the communication networks within 
the EU, and between the EU and its neighbours, has been approached from 
the perspective of the economic competitiveness of a particular transport 
chain or country. Here it is suggested that the topic should also be studied 
as an important component of the emerging new politico-economic order 
in Europe. Consequently, the focus here is on cooperation between the EU 
and Russia on transport, and in particular the recent initiative to launch a 
Northern Dimension transport and logistics partnership.  
To assess these prospects, we must first ask how cooperation between 
the EU and Russia on transport has proceeded so far. Although Russia has 
been active in reconceptualising how the transport and infrastructure 
development is addressed at the all-European level (e.g. within the 
framework of cooperation under the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE)), cooperation in this field has been 
largely structured around Community initiatives. Therefore, it is useful to 
start the discussion by looking at relevant EU policies on transport network 
development and their evolution within the framework of the EU’s eastern 
enlargement. We then move on to assess how Russia has responded to the 
EU’s conceptualisation of EU–Russian cooperation on transport in terms of 
pan-European transport corridors (PECs). Scrutiny is directed towards the 
meaning of the concept of ’pan-European corridor’ (if any) in the context of 
Russian transport policy. In this way, the chapter seeks to clarify whether 
the policy vocabularies of the two parties entail complementary or 
conflicting policy agendas and guidelines for action. We conclude with a 
discussion of the lessons learned from previous experiences and an 
evaluation of the prospects for cooperation in the transport sphere under 
the new Northern Dimension policy. 
                                                      
5 See e.g. H. Hernesniemi, S. Auvinen and G. Dudarev, Suomen ja Venäjän logistinen 
kumppanuus, Liikenne- ja viestintäministeriön SVULO-projektin loppuraportti, 
ETLA, Helsinki, 2005; O.-P. Hilmola (ed.), Third Research Meeting held at Kouvola – 
Value Adding Role of Logistics in Northern Europe, Research Report 183, 
Lappeenranta University of Technology, Lappeenranta, 2005. 112 | KATRI PYNNÖNIEMI 
2.  Redrawing Europe’s economic borders: The trans-European 
transport network 
The first steps towards the institutionalisation of transport network 
development as a part of Europe-wide integration were taken in the early 
1980s in conjunction with the idea of a single market within the European 
Community (EC) and within the framework of the UNECE. Until then, the 
development of the transport infrastructure had remained the task of the 
EC member states. But after 1982, the Community started to allocate special 
subsidies for transport infrastructure development. The Maastricht Treaty 
introduced the concept of TENs and with that, the EU’s involvement in 
infrastructure policy evolved from an objective pursued through other 
activities to a responsibility conferred upon it.6  
A little earlier, the first pan-European transport conference held in 
Prague in October 1991 had marked a turning point. Here the need to 
formulate a common understanding on an all-European transport policy 
was promoted for the first time. The conference adopted a declaration 
calling for identification of “the most important major transport routes 
linking the European countries and regions” – a formal and concrete 
expression of the need to engage in building a transport infrastructure 
network for the new Europe.7  
The subsequent creation of PECs was not merely a symbolic gesture. 
It also included practical dimensions. The prioritisation of nine corridors in 
1994 was an act aimed at fostering a new spatial as well as temporal order 
for an enlarged Europe (a tenth corridor was added after the end of 
hostilities in former Yugoslavia). The PECs were the formal expression of a 
new order inasmuch as the set of road and rail connections, border-crossing 
points, seaports, airports and the like were in purposive relation to each 
other. PEC secretariats were created for policy implementation at the 
transnational level, but their role has varied considerably as a function of 
                                                      
6 See the “Special Report N1 on the Financing of Transport Infrastructure 
Accompanied by the Replies of the Commission”, Official Journal C069, 11 March 
1993; European Parliament, Financing of Trans-European Transport Networks, 
Working Document, Transport Series E4/5, Directorate-General for Research, 1997, 
pp. 9–12 (www.europarl.eu.int/dg4/wkdocs/tran/e4/en/fulltext.htm). 
7 See the “Prague Declaration on an All–European Transport Policy” (Prague, 31 
October 1991) (retrieved from www.internationaltransportforum.org/europe/ 
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the interests of the member states involved. As the former Director General 
for Transport, Robert Coleman, has emphasised,  
[t]he map [of the PECs] has no binding authority, much less any 
magic power. Its real value lies in it defining the priorities which are 
shared by the countries concerned so that they can focus their efforts, 
technical and financial, on the developments which are in their 
common interest.8  
During the subsequent 10-year period, the EU policy on eastern 
enlargement provided a frame through which the European Commission 
could commit the EU to financing the development of the PECs within the 
territory of the new member states. Thus, the PECs formed a backbone 
network for the development of the TENs on the territory of accession 
countries. In 1996, guidelines for the TENs were adopted.9 These outline 
plans for the land transport networks and criteria for network nodes such 
as airports or seaports.10  
The conceptualisation of the TENs was a declaration of intent to 
restructure national networks into a single market. It also provided an 
institutional framework for Community funding for transport 
infrastructure projects through the structural funds and PHARE in 
accession countries. Between 1996 and 2003, total investment in the TEN-T 
(Trans-European Network for Transport) programme was in the order of 
€225 billion. The bulk of investments in the TEN-T programme comes from 
national budgets and private sources.11 Yet, in the EU-15 only 3 of the 14 so-
called ‘Essen priority projects’ defined in 1994 have been completed.  
The accession of 10 new EU member states in 2004 led to a conceptual 
reshuffling of the overall framework. In June 2004, a High-Level Group 
headed by former Commission Vice President Loyola de Palacio was 
commissioned to redraw priorities for the development of transport 
connections between the enlarged EU and its neighbouring partner 
                                                      
8 See R. Coleman, “On Trans-European Networks and Transport Infrastructure”, 
presented at the “Third Pan-European Transport Conference”, Helsinki, June 1997. 
9 The TEN-T consists of 75,200 km of roads, 78,000 km of rail tracks, 330 airports, 
270 international sea ports, 210 inland ports and traffic management systems.  
10 See UNECE, Inland Transport Committee (2000), op. cit., p. 3. 
11 See M. Schwarz, “Developing the Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T) 
and the Role of the Corridors”, Vienna, 22 May 2007 (retrieved from 
www.ceinet.org/download/sdf_2007/MR%20MICHAEL%20SCHWARZ.pdf). 114 | KATRI PYNNÖNIEMI 
countries. Based on its work, five trans-European transport axes were 
identified as an extension of the concept of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy into the sphere of transport:12 
•  Motorways of the Seas, to connect the Baltic, Barents, Atlantic 
(including outermost regions),13 Mediterranean, Black and Caspian 
Sea areas as well as the littoral countries and with an extension 
through the Suez Canal towards the Red Sea; 
•  Northern Axis, to join the northern EU with Norway to the north and 
with Belarus and Russia to the east. A tie to the Barents region linking 
Norway through Sweden and Finland with Russia is foreseen; 
•  Central Axis, to link the centre of the EU to Ukraine and the Black Sea 
and via an inland waterway to the Caspian Sea. A direct connection 
from Ukraine to the Trans-Siberian railway and a link from the 
Don/Volga inland waterway to the Baltic Sea are also included;  
•  South-eastern Axis, to connect the EU with the Balkans and Turkey 
and further with the southern Caucasus and the Caspian Sea as well 
as with the Middle East up to Egypt and the Red Sea; and 
•  South-western Axis, to link the south-western EU with Switzerland 
and Morocco, including the trans-Maghrebin link that spans 
Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia and its extension to Egypt.14  
The geographical scope of the five transnational axes indicates the 
scale of the exercise. Although actualised as policy frameworks for funding 
by the Community and international financing institutions, the 
transnational axes also represent examples of ’mental mapping’ within the 
EU: possible, probable and planned conjunction points between the 
enlarged EU and its immediate neighbours. Of the five axes, the Northern 
Axis directly involves regions of Norway, Finland and Russia, while the 
Motorways of the Seas also pertain to the rest of northern Europe (see 
Figure 7.1). In EU spatial planning, the axes substituted the previous pan-
European transport corridors and areas. 
                                                      
12 See European Commission, Communication on the Extension of the Major Trans-
European Transport Axes to the Neighbouring Countries: Guidelines for Transport 
in Europe and Neighbouring Regions, COM(2007) 32 final, European Commission, 
Brussels, 31 January 2007(a). 
13 These include the Canary Islands, the Azores and Madeira.  
14 See European Commission (2007a), op. cit. EU–RUSSIAN COOPERATION ON TRANSPORT | 115 
 
Figure 7.1 The northern part of the Motorways of the Seas programme and the Northern Axis  
 
Note:  The thick, dark grey line running from Russia to the Baltic Sea region depicts the Northern Axis and the thick, lighter grey line straddling the sea 
areas shows the northern parts of the Motorway of the Seas programme.  
Source: Adapted from European Commission, “Communication: Guidelines for transport in Europe and the neighbouring countries” (presentation), 
European Commission, Brussels, November 2007(b) (retrieved from http://www.crpm.org/pub/agenda/483_jean_trestour_session_4.pdf). 116 | KATRI PYNNÖNIEMI 
 
3.  Russian responses towards the Northern Axis 
The map of transnational transport axes reflects the growing demand for 
improved communication linkages between EU member states and their 
eastern neighbours. Nevertheless, from the viewpoint of the Russian 
authorities, the current constellation of five transnational axes raises 
questions. Even if the problems associated with integrating transport 
networks are usually of a technical and administrative nature, the 
importance of undisturbed transportation of goods, especially energy 
products, adds an element of domestic and international politics to the 
picture. In Russia, the importance of transport infrastructure as a strategic 
asset and foreign policy resource has been recognised, and increasingly 
used  in the country’s relations with its neighbours – especially those in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus. At the same time, competing interests 
concerning Russia’s energy export routes influence and at times hamper its 
relations with neighbours in the Baltic Sea area. 
In terms of scope and situational context, Russia and the EU share the 
same problem: how to restructure the existing ‘intransigent 
infrastructures’15 to meet the requirements of their respective polities and 
the growing competition among major economic regions in the world. A 
glance at trade statistics shows the extent of the change. With the 
disintegration of the former Soviet bloc, the trade between the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) decreased considerably.16 At the same time, the pattern of trade 
between CEE countries and the EU (after 2004, the EU-25) changed both 
qualitatively and quantitatively. A recent study that scrutinised changes in 
the quantity, variety and quality of exports shows that, in general, CEE 
states have been more successful than CIS countries in changing the pattern 
of their trade flows (product differentiation and product quality).17  
                                                      
15 See S.J. Collier, “Pipes”, in S. Harrison, S. Pile and N. Thrift (eds), Patterned 
Ground: Entanglements of Nature and Culture, London: Reaktion Books, 2006, p. 52. 
16 See L. Ojala, T. Naula and C. Queiroz, “Transport Sector Restructuring in the 
Baltic States Toward EU Accession”, Turku School of Economics and Business 
Administration, 2004, pp. 70–71 and 148–49. 
17 Yener Kandogan concludes that this is partly a consequence of the liberalisation 
agreements that forced the CEE states to compete with market economies. These 
states have also received higher amounts of foreign direct investment accompanied 
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By the year 2020, however, trade between the EU-25 and the CIS countries 
is expected to almost triple.18  
A major part of the trade between Russia and Europe currently 
passes through Russian ports in the Gulf of Finland. Even if the current 
constellation of freight flows is not expected to change considerably in the 
foreseeable future, the estimated rapid increase of freight volumes between 
the EU, Russia and other major economic regions is one of the reasons for 
intensified talks between the EU and Russia on trade facilitation, including 
the development of efficient ’transport corridors’, and later, ’axes’. A closer 
study reveals that the vocabularies with which the integration of transport 
networks is addressed are complementary in the EU and Russia. 
Nonetheless, merely using the same words – such as transport corridor, 
competitiveness, hubs, logistics chains – does not on its own translate into 
similar policy actions. Former transport minister Sergei Frank summed up 
the Russian debate on corridors in 2003 by saying that it had evolved 
from an idea of enlarging the system of pan-European transport 
corridors into Russia to the development of our own system of 
international and domestic transport corridors, on the basis of which 
the main transport infrastructure projects will be realized.19 
                                                                                                                                       
by the technology transfers required to push through qualitative changes in their 
industries. The CIS customs union, however, lacks similar incentives since it does 
not encourage trade with market economies; see Y. Kandogan, “The Reorientation 
of Transition Countries’ Exports: Changes in Quantity, Quality and Variety”, 
Intereconomics, Vol. 4, 2006, pp. 216–29.  
18 See K. Lautso, K. Hietala, E. Jaakkola, H. Lehto, M. Miettinen, W. Segercrantz 
and P. Venäläinen, EU:n ja Venäjän välisten liikenneyhteyksien nykytila ja 
kehitysnäkymät, Liikenne- ja Viestintäministeriön julkaisuja 4, Helsinki: Edita, 2005, 
p. 41.  
19 See the speech by Sergei Frank at the scientific-practical Conference on “The 
Transport Strategy of Russia”, Novosibirsk, Russia, 13 May 2003 (retrieved from 
www.mintrans.ru/Pressa/Novosty_030516_1.htm). The same idea is expressed in 
the first official document that defines the priorities of the development of Russian 
international transport corridors; see Government of the Russian Federation, 
“Osnovnye napravleniia formirovaniia i razvitiia mezhdunarodnyh transportnyh 
koridorov na territorii RF”, press release N663, Moscow, 7 September   
2000 (retrieved from www.government.ru/data/news_text.html?he_id=103& 
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Frank thus suggests a shift from the idea of ’pan-European corridors’ 
to the notion of ’international transport corridors’ (Mezhdunarodnye 
transportnye koridory, MTK). Subsequently, this concept became the basis for 
reconceptualising the Russian policy on transport infrastructure 
modernisation. 
Over the past eight years, the concept of international transport 
corridors has been almost synonymous with Russia’s most important 
export article: energy. The majority of Russia’s exports to the EU are 
transported via pipelines crossing the countries in between, whereas 
imports to Russia mostly involve manufactured goods carried by trucks or 
by railway transport, also passing through transit countries.20 When it 
comes to imports, the share going to Russian ports is expected to increase, 
while transit through Finland is expected to decrease from the current 7% 
to 3%.21 
The negative expectations regarding Finland’s future share in 
Russian transit exemplifies the objective of the Russian policy of securing 
the export-oriented transport flows through the country’s own ports, 
thereby lessening Russia’s dependency on the infrastructures of 
neighbouring states. This policy has brought about a clear shift in Russian 
export flows. While in the 1990s, 46% of exports of oil and oil products 
were transported through Baltic and Ukrainian ports, in recent years their 
share of overall export volumes has decreased to 20%, and is expected to 
drop to a mere 5% by 2010. The announcement to build a new oil port at 
Ust-Luga, comparable in size to the Primorsk port, is a further sign of 
Russia’s determination to build facilities to support export flows through 
the country’s own ports. 
                                                      
20 In 2003, Russia’s energy exports to Europe amounted to 163 million tonnes and 
other exports to 74 million tonnes. More than half (54%) of other exports were 
transported via Russian ports in the Gulf of Finland (including Kaliningrad), 36% 
went through the Baltic ports, 5% through Finland and another 5% through 
Corridor 2 (from Russia via Belarus, Poland and Germany). In 2003, imports from 
Europe to Russia totalled 26 million tonnes distributed as follows: Russian ports 
(43%), Baltic ports (39%), Corridor 2 (11%) and Finland (7%).  
21 T h e  s c e n a r i o  i s  b a s e d  o n  t h e  T E N - S T A C  2 0 2 0  s c e n a r i o  a n d  o n  e s t i m a t e s  
formulated specifically to forecast changes in transit through Finland; see K. 
Lautso et al. (2005), op. cit., pp. 39–44; see also e.g. S.-E. Ollus and S. Heli, Russia in 
the Finnish Economy, Sitra Reports 66, Sitra, Helsinki, 2006 (retrieved from 
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Accordingly, investments in infrastructure development have been 
targeted at the development of oil terminals (especially by the Gulf of 
Finland and the Black Sea) and at linkages between ports and the main 
transport network. Emphasis is also on the development of pipeline 
infrastructure and the railway network. The recently approved 
development plan of the Russian Railways (until 2030) reflects this general 
trend. In the first phase (2008–15), the focus will be on modernising the 
existing network. Phase two (2016–30) foresees the construction of more 
than 20,000 km of strategically important lines.22 
Another equally important meaning of the term ’international 
transport corridor’ is the reference made to Russia as an important ’transit 
bridge’ between European consumers and Asian manufacturers. 
Investments are concentrated on the development of air transport hubs (St. 
Petersburg, Moscow and Krasnoyarsk) as well as port facilities and other 
infrastructure for general cargo and container transport in Russia. Still, 
investments in infrastructure will not bring the hoped-for results unless the 
reliability of transit through Russia can be improved at the same pace. 
Disagreements between the EU and Russia on Siberian over-flights and the 
queues of trucks at the EU–Russian border are recent examples of issues 
that need to be solved (see below). 
The third aspect of the notion of an international transport corridor is 
a reference to infrastructure investments in general. A widely accepted 
view in Russia is that the country’s transport infrastructure network is 
largely obsolete, hampering economic development and even the integrity 
of the state. Tellingly, during the 2008 presidential election campaign, when 
Dmitry Medvedev listed the key tasks of Russia’s long-term development, 
infrastructure was among the top three priorities. The other two were the 
diversification of the economy and the development of human capital – 
both closely linked to the improvement of the transport and infrastructure 
system.  
It will take more than campaign declarations to set things right, 
however. Without systemic improvement in the basic infrastructure, 
especially the roads, railways, inland waterways and domestic air 
transport, the Russian economy will be beset by serious problems. The 
country needs a better-integrated and more efficient transport system to 
                                                      
22 See S. Zhuravlev, “Obkhodia rify”, Ekspert, No. 2, 14–20 January 2008; V. Milov, 
“Uzkie mesta rossiiskoi ekonomiki”, Pro et Kontra, July–October 2007, pp. 135–46.  120 | KATRI PYNNÖNIEMI 
improve the competitiveness of manufactured products in international 
markets and ensure a stable flow of raw materials to its foreign customers.  
With improvements in the Russian economy, investments targeted at 
infrastructure modernisation have grown. In 2007, real investments in 
transport infrastructure amounted to 770 billion roubles (€21.4 billion), 
almost twice as much as in 2002. But the required investments in the 
transport and infrastructure system are enormous. For example, the 
investments necessary for the development of the rail system by 2030 will 
amount to 13 trillion roubles (€361 billion). Moreover, it has been estimated 
that developing the transport system up to 2015 alone would require up to 
21 trillion roubles (€583 billion). The latter figure is comparable with the 
estimated total cost of €600 billion for the TEN in the EU area.23 Yet, unlike 
the case during the past few years, the projected improvement in the 
investment capability of the Russian state is now taking place against the 
backdrop of rising inflation, global economic turmoil and lack of 
administrative improvement in the management of large-scale state 
projects.  
4.  The EU–Russian dialogue on transport and the north  
From the viewpoint of the EU, the five trans-European axes represent a 
spatial–functional expression of the Community commitment to improving 
communication linkages between the EU and its neighbouring areas. As 
shown above, Russia views the axes from a different perspective. 
Cooperation is further complicated by the current and prospective 
asymmetry of EU–Russian trade, and thus the structure of transport flows 
between the EU and Russia. Among the most visible symptoms of the latter 
are the problems with border crossings, which have led to the growing 
queues of lorries along the eastbound highways in countries neighbouring 
Russia. 
In the case of Finland, for example, the queue of lorries at the Finnish 
side of the border has gradually grown from a few kilometres in the mid-
1990s to almost a hundred in late 2007. Rapidly growing demand for 
manufactured goods and most recently the transport of imported cars 
through Finland is the simplest reason for these long queues. The use of 
                                                      
23 See V. Yakunin, “Tematicheskoe prilozhenie: Zheleznodorozhnyi transport: O 
strategii razvitiia zheleznodorozhnogo transporta RF do 2030 goda”, Izvestiia, 12 
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’grey schemes’ in trade with Russia, an inadequate infrastructure base, and 
perhaps most importantly, lack of compatibility in administrative and 
customs practices between the EU and Russia, add to the obstacles. 
Negotiations to improve the situation at the EU–Russian and multilateral 
levels have stepped up, however, along with the number of lorries waiting 
at the border.  
In the aftermath of the EU–Russia Partnership and Cooperation 
meeting in Lappeenranta, Finland, in September 2006, an ad hoc working 
group was formed to examine the situation at the borders of the EU and 
Russia. This has been one of the most active working groups within the 
framework of the transport dialogue between the EU and Russia (see 
below). In June 2007, the working group published its recommendations, 
which will be implemented by the permanent working groups under the 
dialogue.24  
At the same time, negotiations at the bilateral level have not 
succeeded in easing the border traffic. On the contrary, both Russia and 
Finland have sought to solve the problem by unilateral actions. Russia has 
limited certain types of heavy-transport traffic at the busiest border-
crossing point (Vaalimaa) and is also in the process of reorganising the 
customs and border administration into a single authority for border 
infrastructure (to be completed by the end of 2008). On the Finnish side, 
debate on the possibility of charging fees on Russian lorries intensified 
during spring 2008. Practical actions have focused on improving the 
existing road infrastructure, including parking spaces for queuing lorries, 
and efforts to streamline cooperation with the Russian customs authorities. 
The expanding role of consumption as an important component of 
economic growth in Russia should lead, at least in theory, to solving import 
flow problems. Improving storage facilities in the Moscow region, as well 
a s  s h i f t i n g  t h e  m o d e  o f  t r a n s p o r t  o f  t h e  i m p o r t e d  c a r s  f r o m  l o r r i e s  t o  
railways, are among the pragmatic solutions available. 
The initiative to establish a transport dialogue between Russia and 
the EU was made within the framework of the road maps for the four 
common spaces adopted at the Moscow summit in May 2005. The dialogue 
                                                      
24 See European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy and Transport and 
the Ministry of Transport of the Russian Federation (2007), Final Report of the Ad-hoc 
Working Group on EU–Russia Transport Logistics Problems: Joint Recommendations, 
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was launched in October 2005, institutionalising cooperation in the sphere 
of transport and infrastructure development. The dialogue consists of five 
working groups that deal, respectively, with transport strategies and 
infrastructure; transport security; air transport; maritime, sea, river and 
inland waterway transport; and road and rail transport. Parties in the 
dialogue have agreed to promote cooperation in areas such as maritime 
and aviation safety standards and interoperability in the rail sector.25 
Ideally, the transport dialogue – with its emphasis on “harmonisation and 
complementary evolution”26 of the strategies on transport and 
infrastructure development – should contribute to the work already 
undertaken within the framework of corridor cooperation, and help to 
address gaps in the existing collaborative framework.  
The main impact of EU policies in this sphere has been to provide 
dynamism and an institutional framework for joint action. In spring 2007, 
the Commission launched a new set of guidelines27 and initiated 
exploratory talks with the neighbouring countries to assess the current 
situation and to formulate a new format and content for the cooperation 
structure. As a result, a common understanding exists on the usefulness of 
the axis approach, on the need to bring transport corridor development and 
overall policy discussion closer together, and on the necessity of a strong 
and binding coordination framework based on the existing regional 
structures and technical secretariats.28  
Apart from official phraseology focusing on the revision of the 
institutional framework of cooperation, one major question on its 
cooperation agenda has been the row over Siberian over-flight fees for 
European aircraft. The EU regards the fees, amounting to €330 million in 
2005 alone, as violating the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil 
Aviation, and the EU has linked the issue to implementation of Russia’s 
WTO accession. Russia, on the other hand, holds that no such link exists, 
                                                      
25 See “Transport Dialogue 2005: Terms of Reference”, final consolidated draft 27 
September 2005. 
26 Ibid. 
27 See European Commission (2007a), op. cit. 
28 See European Commission, Communication concerning the Progress of 
Explanatory Talks regarding Cooperation in the Field of Transport with the 
Neighbouring Countries, COM(2008), European Commission, Brussels, 5 March 
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and has instead claimed that the EU demands are “exorbitant”.29 The row 
led to the cancellation of the aviation summit in November 2007 and the 
forcing of Lufthansa’s cargo services to move from the regional hub in 
Astana, Kazakhstan, to Krasnoyarsk in Russia.  
Differences in interests and objectives concerning cooperation are 
related to the structural imbalance of EU–Russian economic relations and 
to diverging expectations. The initiative to create a Northern Dimension 
Partnership on Transport and Logistics that emerged at the Northern 
Dimension summit in November 2006 has been suggested as a model for 
future cooperation at the regional level.  
5.  Prospects for the Northern Dimension transport and logistics 
partnership 
The new Northern Dimension has been launched against a background in 
which Russia and the EU are both rethinking their transport and 
infrastructure policies. In the EU, this has taken the form of the new ’axes 
of cooperation’ fashioned along the lines of the PECs. As the administrative 
structures for the corridors were rather weak, the new proposal made by 
the Commission to strengthen their institutional standing must be seen as a 
positive step.  
A challenge for the proposed partnership on transport and logistics is 
to find a way of collaborating that would incorporate the Northern 
Dimension area in its totality, rather than merely some of its regional 
components. This means that the Commission and other agencies involved 
in redrawing the policy framework for the Northern Axis cooperation 
should clarify the relations between the axis cooperation and the proposed 
new partnership – especially regarding the role of the proposed secretariat. 
What is the role of the partnership vis-à-vis the axis policy and the 
transport dialogue? Would it be primarily a managing structure for large 
international projects? And if so, how could one ensure adequate levels of 
public consultation on policies adopted at the multinational level as well as 
by particular countries?  
                                                      
29 Quotation derived from Dmitry Suslov, Director of Research at the Council on 
Foreign and Defence Policy, cited in T. Forsberg and A. Seppo, “Power Without 
Influence? The EU and Trade Disputes with Russia”, paper presented at the 
“Fourth Pan-European Conference of the ECPR Standing Group on the European 
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Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Transport and 
Communications of Finland, Harri Pursiainen, has emphasised the role of 
international financial institutions, particularly the Nordic Investment 
Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the 
European Investment Bank and the World Bank, as “the driving forces of 
the Partnership”.30 In his definition, the Transport and Logistics 
Partnership 
would be an innovative joint effort for coordinated and concerted 
action. Its aim would be to provide a strong international framework, 
backed by the financial resources of governments, financial 
institutions, the private sector and all other parties working for 
sustainable transport and logistics solutions and for the promotion of 
public–private partnership.31  
Pursiainen has noted that the main challenge involved in this 
innovative undertaking is to reach agreement on top priority projects that 
“clearly improve transport links and the effectiveness of logistics in the 
whole area”.32 Given the competing interests of participating countries in 
attracting transit transport to their territories and conflicting views on what 
is considered ’effective’ management of transport flows, we should, 
however, remain cautious about raising expectations of the new 
partnership model. 
The initial Russian reaction to reformulating the existing cooperation 
structure has been positive. At the practical policy-making level, Russia is 
more inclined to talk about specific infrastructure projects than ’horizontal 
measures’, i.e. harmonisation of customs administration and the long-term 
development strategies of both sides. This underlines Russia’s reluctance to 
see the proposed partnership and the Northern Axis cooperation in the 
wider perspective. Indeed, the concept of a ‘Northern Axis’ is not used in 
the Russian debate on infrastructure and transport modernisation, except 
in the immediate EU–Russian context. 
                                                      
30 See H. Pursiainen, “Transport and logistics, a possible new Northern Dimension 
partnership”, presentation at the Conference “The Renewed Northern Dimension: 
A Tool for Enhanced Regional and Cross-Border Cooperation”, Tallinn, 9 June 2006 
(retrieved from http://web-static.vm.ee/static/failid/037/Pursiainen.pdf).  
31 Ibid. 
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This focus on “projects rather than policies”, as it was formulated by 
a Russian representative at a seminar on Northern Dimension policies in 
2008, is in line with Russia’s objective of speeding up the restructuring of 
the infrastructure base in north-west Russia and in the Urals region. 
Investments are targeted at the development of port infrastructure in the 
Gulf of Finland and in the Murmansk region, and at new railway sections 
serving the ports and the regional economies in the Baltic Sea and in the 
Urals. For example, the Belkomur railway project, connecting the Komi 
Republic and the Archangelsk region, is listed among prioritised 
investment projects in the strategy of the Russian Railways until 2030. It is 
competing for financing from the newly created investment fund.33 The 
case of the Belkomur railway is a marker of the improving financial means 
of the Russian state and private actors to commence and complete major 
infrastructure projects in the region.34  
International financial institutions have been involved in the 
modernisation of Russia’s infrastructure. In the road sector, for example, 
the World Bank has provided loans for major federal road projects in north-
west Russia as well as in Siberia. Since the emphasis in the current plan for 
infrastructure modernisation is on the road sector, it can be expected that 
this previous experience can be used in formulating rules for the 
participation of foreign investors. Yet the Transport and Logistics 
Partnership is more ambitious than that. It is hoped it will provide a forum 
for establishing common guidelines for infrastructure investments in the 
area and identifying the most viable projects. The negotiations are driven 
mostly, although not solely, by the commercial interests of future investors 
and players in East–West-oriented transport markets.  
The debate about the partnership initiative reflects a more general 
dilemma that foreign investors face. Economic growth in Russia is expected 
to continue even in the midst of the present global economic crisis. 
Nevertheless, the economic and political risks of investing in Russia are 
                                                      
33 See V. Buldakov, “Magistral nad provalom”, Argumenti Nedeli, 6 March 2008, p. 
27. 
34 The building of the Belkomur (Beloe More–Komi–Ural) railway has been on the 
agenda of regional governments since the early 1990s. Negotiations on investments 
have been conducted mainly between regional governments and private 
businesses interested in extracting forest resources in the area. Until recently, the 
federal government has been reluctant to commit to the project.  126 | KATRI PYNNÖNIEMI 
increasing rather than decreasing. The political risk comes in the form of 
the state’s “strategic interest” (see chapter 11). Although the formulation of 
this interest in the transport and infrastructure sphere has a rather well-
defined conceptual basis, at the practical level it is often applied in an 
arbitrary and ad hoc manner. This remains the principal challenge for the 
EU and other agencies involved in cooperation with Russia. 
Finally, we should take note of the delicate balance between 
continuous economic growth and the stability of Russia’s current regime. 
To keep the wheels rolling, the Vladimir Putin/Dmitry Medvedev team 
will have to focus more attention on tough structural reforms – from 
pensions to health care and education – at a time when this has become 
politically much more challenging. The challenge does not stem from a 
well-organised political opposition, but rather from the expectations for 
inching the country onto the path of ’innovative development’. Few 
Russians would set much store by politicians’ declarations of a ’brighter 
future’, but there is simply less and less room for the government to fail in 
modernising the country. 
Real investments in infrastructure are among the key objectives of the 
government’s development strategy until 2020. The costs of infrastructure 
investments are already high and are expected to increase owing to the 
volatile situation in the world markets and inefficient management of 
investments within the country. Given this background, Russia can be 
expected to be more open to calls for cooperation in this sphere. Despite the 
strong rhetoric emphasising the country’s independence from others, 
Russia is still likely to be inclined to cooperate, especially in concrete 
development projects. 
What is required now is an open and critical debate on the principles 
guiding infrastructure investments in the Northern Dimension area. If the 
proposed Northern Dimension Transport and Logistics Partnership can 
become a forum for such discussions, and eventually decision-making, then 
it can be considered a success. 
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8.  NATURAL GAS PROJECTS IN THE RUSSIAN 
NORTH: IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTHERN 
EUROPEAN COOPERATION 
INDRA ØVERLAND 
1.  Introduction 
Europe has a pressing need to develop new sources of natural gas to 
respond to concerns about supply shortages. Natural gas production in the 
traditional major sites in the North Sea and in Russia’s western Siberia is 
set to decline. At the same time, the demand for gas is increasing, in many 
EU member states and in Russia. These developments are giving a 
northward push to the Russian gas giant Gazprom and many of its partner 
and competitor companies, as well as their patron states and other 
interested parties.  
Two key Arctic projects could become the new mainstays for 
Gazprom and Russia, as well as for their European and other Western 
partners and customers: the Shtokman and Yamal gas fields. Yet, realistic 
timescales, cost frames and sources of financing for these two projects 
remain deeply unclear. It is also unclear whether the projects will be 
developed in parallel or sequentially. So far, there has been much more 
organisational stir surrounding the Shtokman field. It is located close to the 
Norwegian border in the Barents Sea, and the Norwegian oil major 
StatoilHydro and the French firm Total have been selected as the two main 
foreign partners for the project. The development of Shtokman and Yamal 
will have wide-ranging implications for cooperation between Russia and 
Norway, and for the character of overall European cooperation – both 
within the geographical scope of the Northern Dimension and beyond. 132 | INDRA ØVERLAND 
2.  Russian gas production and the Eurasian energy balance 
Events in Ukraine in January 2006 and Belarus in January 2007 fuelled 
worries (largely unfounded) in some circles about Russia’s reliability as a 
supplier to European markets. More recently, fears have shifted to the more 
serious concern of whether Russia will be physically and organisationally 
able to supply its customers, even if it wants to. The supply crunch is 
envisaged as occurring sometime between 2010 and 2012. These fears 
revolve around western Siberia’s Nadym Pur Taz region and its three 
super-giant fields: Medvezhe, Urengoy and Yamburg. Over 90% of Russia’s 
natural gas is extracted from Nadym Pur Taz, but production in the region 
is falling fast. The fields have all been producing for over 20 years (37 in the 
case of Medvezhe), and injection techniques applied during the Soviet 
period to boost output have shortened their lifespan and steepened the 
production decline.1 At the same time, the Russian economy is expanding, 
while natural gas remains massively under-prized. As a consequence, 
domestic consumption is increasing. Foreign customers and Russian 
pundits are left wondering where the gas is going to come from in the 
future, and the simplest answer is Shtokman or Yamal (or both). 
In a widely cited US Geological Survey, it is estimated that up to 25% 
of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas may be located in the Arctic.2 What 
is less often noted is that a large proportion of these resources are located in 
the Russian part of the Arctic. This is not just because almost half of the 
Arctic littoral is Russian, but also because the seabed along Russia’s Arctic 
coast includes some of the largest finds ever in the Arctic, some of the most 
promising areas and some of the least explored ones.  
Thus, Shtokman and Yamal are the gateways to an Arctic Russian 
adventure that could satisfy a substantial share of the world’s future oil 
and gas demand, and provide business opportunities for European 
companies for many decades. In the Northern Dimension area, they will be 
important not only because of their capacity to provide the region with 
hydrocarbons, but also to generate economic activity, bolster employment 
                                                      
1 See J. Stern, The Future of Russian Gas and Gazprom, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005.  
2 See US Geological Survey (USGS) World Assessment Team, US Geological Survey 
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and potentially promote regional cooperation. The scale of these projects 
will also shape the way in which external actors relate to the region.  
3.  Shtokman versus Yamal 
The Shtokman field is located in the Barents Sea, off the coast of north-
western Russia in the relative proximity of the Nordic countries. Yamal, by 
contrast, is a peninsula located further east in the Yamal-Nenets 
Autonomous District in the northern Urals (see Figure 8.1). Choosing 
between the two projects will have implications not only for Russia’s 
internal economic geography, but also for the linkages to be developed 
with the Nordic countries and with the EU more widely, as well as for 
overseas markets (through exports of liquefied natural gas (LNG)). 
Figure 8.1 Shtokman and Yamal 
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A commonly held perception of the Russian natural gas industry is 
that it is relatively well equipped to build pipelines and carry out other 
operations onshore, which were the main tasks of its predecessor during 
the Soviet period. It is also thought that, whether Russian actors admit it or 
not, the industry is woefully inexperienced and incompetent when it comes 
to offshore operations. This shortcoming has occasionally been cited as a 
reason why Russian industrial actors would prefer the onshore resources of 
Yamal to be given priority over the offshore Shtokman. 
Arild Moe casts the choice between Shtokman and Yamal as a battle 
between different groups within Russia’s petroleum sector and within 
Gazprom. A couple of years ago, it appeared that the western Siberian 
lobby had won in pushing for Yamal, and that it was unlikely that any 
Western companies would be invited to participate in the project at all.3 
Shtokman’s current advantage over Yamal, however tenuous, probably 
does not indicate that the western Siberian lobby has been defeated 
irrevocably, nor does it reflect a particular urge to cooperate with Nordic or 
Western European countries in general. Rather, it could be an implicit 
recognition that it is better to go for a project where the capital, technology 
and (not least) organisational skills of Western companies can play a central 
role. Bringing in Western partners may help the project move forward – 
and if it does not, there will be more companies to share the blame. 
Yamal 
The Yamal Peninsula, along with the Kara Sea, into which the peninsula 
juts, probably holds over 30 trillion cubic metres of gas, enough to supply 
the whole world for a decade. Like Shtokman, however, Yamal involves 
daunting challenges. Railways and proper roads are non-existent. The 
melting and refreezing of the ground on the peninsula pose even greater 
challenges, since these changes may literally undermine the transport 
infrastructure, gas extraction and treatment facilities, as well as living 
quarters built for workers. Any onshore gas extraction would also infringe 
on the large-scale reindeer herding operations of the indigenous peoples of 
the region. Finally, the cost of fully developing the Yamal fields would be 
in the order of hundreds of billions of dollars and could take up to 50 years. 
                                                      
3 See A. Moe, “Sjtokman-beslutningen: Forklaringer og implikasjoner”, Nordisk 
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On the other hand, Yamal is relatively conveniently located in 
relation to Russia’s existing pipelines from Nadym Pur Taz to its domestic 
and foreign markets. The accelerated ice melting currently observed in the 
Arctic Ocean, which far outpaces the estimates of the relatively 
conservative International Panel on Climate Change, also opens interesting 
opportunities for LNG/marine transportation and for the offshore fields. 
It has been estimated that developing Yamal will require 50,000 
workers, many of whom will be foreigners. There are already more than 
19,900 non-Russian workers in Yamal, mostly engaged in the construction 
sector.4 One possibility that has been aired by Gazprom is to carry out the 
Yamal project along the same lines as Shtokman, with a shortlist of foreign 
companies competing for minority shares in the project.5  
Gazprom officially plans that the largest field in Yamal, Bovanenko, 
will be in production by 2011.6 That is optimistic. A decision has not been 
made on how to move gas from Yamal to consumers – by pipeline or LNG. 
If pipelines are chosen, this will entail an expansion of Russia’s existent 
pipeline grid and most probably not involve significant new international 
cooperation. If LNG is chosen, this will presumably necessitate the large-
scale involvement of foreign companies, making Yamal a driver for 
international cooperation. It is not unlikely that the pipeline and LNG 
solutions will be pursued simultaneously.  
While Yamal is more extensive and in many ways more attractive to 
Russian actors than Shtokman, it is the latter that seems to be progressing 
fastest at the moment – however unpredictable that progress is – and that 
holds the greatest promise for northern European and wider cooperation in 
the energy sector. The rest of this chapter therefore focuses on Shtokman 
and on Russian–Norwegian cooperation in particular, since this will be by 
far the most substantial Nordic–Russian joint project in the coming decade 
and the largest collaborative energy project in northern Europe overall.  
                                                      
4 See “Neftyanye novosti Murmana”, Murmanchanin.ru [OffshoreSeis News] 
(retrieved from www.murmanchanin.ru). 
5 See the RIA Novosti website  (retrieved from www.rian.ru/economy/ 
20080618/111051855). 
6 See the article, “Gazprom upgrades production estimates”, Barents Observer.com, 
16 June 2008 (retrieved from www.barentsobserver.com/index.php?id=4492380 
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Shtokman 
The Shtokman gas and condensate field was discovered in 1988. It was 
recently re-estimated by Gazprom to contain 3.8 trillion cubic metres of gas 
and 31 million tonnes of condensate (previous estimates had usually been 
in the order of 3.2 trillion cubic metres of gas). It is located 555 km north of 
the Kola Peninsula, in the Russian part of the Barents Sea. It is commonly 
referred to as the world’s largest offshore gas field, but is in fact less than a 
tenth of the size of the South Pars/Northern Dome field shared by Iran and 
Qatar. Although Shtokman is not the world’s largest offshore gas field and 
is smaller than the Yamal deposits, it contains more than twice as much 
natural gas as Canada’s total known reserves and it will play a major role 
in European energy supplies.7 
For several years, the US oil companies Chevron and ConocoPhillips, 
Norway’s Hydro and Statoil and France’s Total, all on a Gazprom shortlist, 
vied to acquire ownership stakes in the Shtokman field. In Norway, where 
the project received considerable attention, the result was a rollercoaster of 
rising expectations and subsequent disappointment as uncoordinated 
statements and accidental signals from the Russian side fuelled rumours 
and media speculation on the Norwegian side. There were variously 
expectations that a decision was imminent, that one or both of the 
Norwegian companies might be awarded a significant stake or that the 
game was over and no foreign companies would be included. In their 
endeavour to join the project, the two Norwegian companies had extensive 
support from the Norwegian government and diplomatic apparatus.  
In July 2007, it was announced that Total had been awarded a 25% 
stake in the joint company that is to develop the first phase of Shtokman. 
The Russians have not given a clear explanation for why Total was selected 
first. Total’s prowess in cold-climate offshore technology must have played 
an important role. In addition, this decision could be interpreted as a 
Russian attempt to enhance the relatively good relations with France. 
Germany obtained the Nord Stream pipeline (to be built from Russia’s 
Vyborg across the Baltic Sea to the German port of Greifswald), whereas 
France’s Total got a role in Shtokman.  
                                                      
7 See A. Kramer, “French Oil Giant Agree s  t o  W o r k  o n  R u s s i a n  N a t u r a l  G a s  
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It had long been apparent that Gazprom would retain 51% 
ownership, so the final competition for the remaining 24% was between 
StatoilHydro and ConocoPhillips. To some extent, this was a competition 
between Norwegian technology and good-neighbourly relations in the 
north on the one hand, and US markets and big-power partnership on the 
other. Finally, on 24 October 2007, StatoilHydro was granted the final 24% 
of the field (see also chapters 9 and 10). 
It is widely believed that the merger between Statoil and Hydro in 
October 2007 facilitated Norway’s relative success in the Shtokman 
competition. Russian actors had several times noted that it was complicated 
to not only have to choose between Norwegian, French and US companies, 
but to also have to deal with two separate but rather similar Norwegian 
firms: Statoil and Hydro. And the main reason cited for the merger was 
precisely the aim of strengthening the position of Norway’s petroleum 
sector in foreign arenas, including the Russian one. In the case of Shtokman 
this seems to have succeeded. 
It is important to understand the nature of the legal solution chosen 
for the inclusion of foreign companies in the Shtokman project. Total and 
StatoilHydro have not been awarded ownership of the field itself, but of 
parts of the company that is to develop the field. This has resulted in a 
discussion about whether the two companies can count Shtokman as part 
of their reserves. The difficulties of replacing reserves is the main driver for 
Western companies to become involved in the Russian petroleum sector – 
despite the difficulties already experienced by foreign companies in 
projects such as Sakhalin II in the Far East, Kovykta in Siberia and 
Kharyaga in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous District. Therefore, Total and 
StatoilHydro are fighting hard to get Shtokman fully recognised as part of 
their reserves by international financial markets and on international stock 
exchanges. 
Another important aspect of the deals made so far is that they are 
more like options than ownership stakes. During the coming year or two, 
Gazprom and the two foreign companies will attempt to hammer out the 
technical and financial details of the Shtokman project, which are far from 
clear at the moment. In 2009, Total and StatoilHydro are to decide whether 
they want to make use of their right to a quarter each of the project under 
conditions still to be negotiated with Gazprom. Despite the symbolic and 
political weight of the project and its significance for international 
cooperation and European energy security, this will ultimately have to be a 
business decision. It is worth remembering that perhaps the most 138 | INDRA ØVERLAND 
disruptive point in the bumpy negotiations leading up to the decision to 
allow Total and StatoilHydro to participate was the distribution of the 
financial burden and risks between the Russian and Western sides. In the 
autumn of 2006, Gazprom announced that no foreign companies would be 
involved in the Shtokman project after all, causing major disappointment in 
Norway. At the time, the main reason cited was lack of financially 
interesting offers from the Western suitors. Although Gazprom reversed 
this decision shortly after, there is no guarantee that Total and StatoilHydro 
will find the terms offered sufficiently attractive when a decision is to be 
made in 2009. 
4.  The importance of the Shtokman field 
The Shtokman field is now officially slated for production in 2013, although 
few believe it will be possible to stay within this timeframe or even near it. 
Should the project nonetheless develop according to schedule, it would be 
the biggest energy-related event and the chief international cooperation 
project in northern Europe in the decade 2010–20. There are several reasons 
for its importance: 
1) In theory, the Shtokman field contains enough gas to satisfy the 
entire consumption of the EU for seven years.8 In addition to Shtokman’s 
direct significance for European energy supplies and security, it is valuable 
for Europe because it includes the French oil company Total, and because it 
involves cooperation between the EU’s two largest external suppliers of 
natural gas – Russia and Norway (which jointly supply 65% of EU 
imports). Russia and Norway are also two of the world’s largest oil and gas 
exporters, and from this perspective, the cooperation represents an 
interesting development in the global petroleum sector. It should not, 
however, be interpreted as a precursor to a Russian–Norwegian-led gas 
cartel, as all of Norway’s main political parties seem firmly committed to 
avoiding any politicisation of Norwegian energy exports. 
2) Shtokman has widely been seen as a driver of Russian–Norwegian 
cooperation across the border and of a joint Russian–Norwegian regional 
industrial boom in the ‘High North’, including northern Sweden and 
Finland. Expectations have run particularly high in northern Norway, 
where hopes for a petroleum boom centred on Shtokman have injected 
dynamism and optimism after decades of cold war confrontation and 
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unemployment in fisheries. One of the most optimistic visions for the 
development of the region includes the ‘Pomor Zone’, a joint Norwegian–
Russian industrial and economic cooperation zone straddling the border 
near Kirkenes.9 
3) Norwegian–Russian cooperation in the development of the 
Shtokman field has occasionally been cast as a possible precursor to a 
solution of the Norwegian–Russian border dispute in the Barents Sea. It is 
widely held that the disputed area may include large petroleum resources, 
although the two parties have agreed to place a moratorium on exploration 
in the area. Owing to the sensitivity of the topic, it is not possible to acquire 
reliable official information about the border negotiations, but several 
possible solutions have been discussed outside the negotiation process. 
One of these assumes that successful Norwegian–Russian cooperation on 
Shtokman could provide a precedent for a solution to the border dispute 
involving extensive collaboration in the formerly disputed area. According 
to this view, the parties would first have to agree on a new borderline in 
the disputed area. Once the border has been decided upon, the resources in 
the Norwegian part of the formerly disputed area could be owned 51% by 
Norway and 49% by Russia, whereas those in the Russian part of the 
formerly disputed area could be owned 51% by Russia and 49% by 
Norway. Obviously, such a solution would require a high degree of 
cooperation and coordination between the two countries, which could – it 
is thought – be demonstrated through successful partnership on Shtokman.  
4) Developing the Shtokman field also involves making difficult 
choices about the marketing and transportation solution for the gas. The 
three main options are to a) build a liquefaction plant on the coast of the 
Kola Peninsula (most likely at the derelict fishing village of Teriberka) and 
export the gas as LNG by ship; b) build a pipeline from Murmansk to the 
St. Petersburg area and connect it to the Nord Stream pipeline going to 
Germany; or c) lay a pipeline southwards through the Norwegian part of 
the Barents Sea and halfway down the Norwegian coast, to connect with 
the Norwegian pipeline network.10 To some extent, decision-making about 
Shtokman is thus also decision-making about whom Russia is going to 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Oslo, 2006, p. 19. 
10 See J.P. Barlindhaug, Petroleumsvirksomhet i Barentshavet: Utbyggingsperspektiver og 
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trade and cooperate with internationally. Option (a) – exporting the 
Shtokman gas as LNG – is often thought of as synonymous with exporting 
it to the US, but the LNG could also be shipped to Europe. One advantage 
of an LNG solution is thus that it would give some flexibility as far as the 
export market is concerned, although buyers would obviously need 
appropriate terminals for receiving the LNG. Currently, such facilities are 
in short supply in northern Europe. So far, the preferred solution seems to 
be (a) LNG, later to be combined with (b) a pipeline connection with Nord 
Stream. Solution (c), connecting Shtokman with the Norwegian pipeline 
network, may mostly be wishful Norwegian thinking. This solution might 
make sense in some practical respects, but it is hardly a politically or 
economically attractive option for Russia. 
5.  Lessons learned from the Shtokman experience 
Above all, the many phases of hope, ambition and disappointment in 
Western attempts to become involved in Shtokman illustrate the broader 
phenomenon of Western actors intensively debating cooperation with 
Russia on the basis of all kinds of assumptions and expectations – without 
engaging properly with significant Russian actors or being in touch with 
realities on the Russian side. In this regard, it is relevant to compare 
Shtokman with Norway’s integrated management plan for the Barents Sea, 
which also involves great ambitions for involving Russian actors in 
environmental processes and solutions that rest on uniquely Norwegian 
perspectives and assumptions.11 Clearly, climate change has not been 
viewed at all the same way in Russia as it has in the Western European 
countries participating in the Northern Dimension, and other 
environmental issues have ranked lower on the agenda in Russia than in 
the other states. Yet, the situation is not static and Russia’s stance may 
change. It is important to continue the dialogue and to try to link energy 
and environmental issues, but also to be realistic about where the most 
influential Russian actors currently stand and to be aware of the difference 
between polite diplomacy and genuine dialogue.  
As mentioned above, the official reason most often cited by Russian 
actors for the initial decision to exclude all foreign actors from the 
                                                      
11 See the Ministry of the Environment of Norway, Integrated Management of the 
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Shtokman project was that none of the suitors had made offers that were 
attractive enough. That could indicate that, ultimately, financial 
considerations and profit may be the main driver for Russia in its energy 
cooperation with Western countries.  
On the other hand, the politicisation of the Shtokman negotiations, 
with multiple meetings between Russian and foreign politicians along with 
high-level state functionaries, indicates that while business is important for 
the Russian side, business is controlled by politics. Western actors who 
want to be involved will need the backing of sufficiently influential 
politicians on the Russian side. 
The development of the Shtokman field provides yet another 
illustration of the importance and sensitivity of strategic resources to the 
Kremlin (cf. chapter 11). These Kremlin priorities are also mirrored in other 
developments in Russian–Western energy cooperation, in which Russia has 
been taking back control from Western companies that bought into Russian 
fields in the 1990s. That being stated, because the legal–institutional 
infrastructure for the Shtokman field is being developed under the full 
control of a sober Kremlin from the outset, cooperative relations may prove 
more stable. Hence, it will be more difficult for the Russian authorities 
unilaterally to shift the blame for problems towards Western partners, 
although the pain of industrial delays and cost overruns may provide 
strong incentives to try to do so. 
All discussion about Shtokman and other major petroleum 
developments in the north is generally disconnected from the Northern 
Dimension, the Barents cooperation, the Arctic Council and other 
multilateral frameworks for collaboration. One could get the impression 
that cuddly multilateral cooperation is acceptable – as long as it does not 
deal with the really big issues, which are to be handled in bilateral or 
narrow, ad hoc multilateral settings. This situation may in part stem from 
Russian preferences and Russia’s image of itself on the international stage 
(not as one country among others, but as an exceptional case), or it may 
derive from hardcore Russian realism in international relations. If so, it is 
questionable whether the West in the short run can really lull Russia into 
full-hearted participation in a multilateral framework such as the Northern 
Dimension, the EU–Russia energy dialogue or the other available 
multilateral options, while buying its resources at bargain prices. At least a 
more innovative and realistic approach may be needed. 
The acceptance of StatoilHydro as a partner in the Shtokman project 
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the importance of presenting Russian actors with a reasonably coherent set 
of interlocutors on the Western side. Indeed, trying to deal with the EU and 
its many member states and sub-components has often given rise to 
Russian complaints in this respect. 
One aspect that remains to be exploited is the potential that follows 
from Gazprom’s decision to include Total in the Shtokman project for 
mustering French support for the Northern Dimension within the EU. 
Indeed, the only potentially real connection between the EU and Shtokman 
is Total’s involvement in the project, but again this seems to have more to 
do with markets (business) and bilateral relations with France than it does 
with anything politically multilateral. 
On a pessimistic note, the Shtokman experience has shown that 
engaging Russia in serious cooperation, including large-scale investment 
from the Russian side, is a cumbersome and unpredictable endeavour, and 
that working through a multilateral channel can be difficult. On a more 
positive note, it shows that it is possible to engage Russia in serious 
cooperation on even the most significant issues, as long as it is of mutual 
benefit. 
6.  Shtokman and the Northern Dimension: Mutual irrelevance 
Energy has received relatively little attention in the Northern Dimension, 
despite early attempts to outline broad efforts in the energy sector since 
1998 (see chapter 9).12 The lack of a more elaborate energy focus is not 
solely the fault of the Northern Dimension. When it was initially launched 
in the 1990s, energy was not such a hot topic in Europe or in EU–Russian 
relations. To some extent, therefore, the Northern Dimension has simply 
been overtaken by events. 
In the revamped version of the Northern Dimension launched in 
2006, energy continued to be downplayed relative to its increasing 
significance in northern Europe’s international politics in general. Efforts to 
improve energy efficiency and nuclear safety, mostly in north-western 
Russia, have been part of the policy, but hotter topics such as gas supplies, 
pipelines and the development of Arctic offshore petroleum are virgin 
territory for the Northern Dimension. More than a year after the new 
                                                      
12 See also European Commission, Communication on Strengthening the Northern 
Dimension of European Energy Policy, European Commission, Brussels, 1999 
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Northern Dimension was launched, the EU’s official website for the 
Northern Dimension still does not give any particular emphasis to energy. 
The website mentions seven priority sectors, one of which is “economic 
cooperation”, which includes another 10 sub-topics, the very last of which 
is energy: “trade, investments, customs, SMEs, business, innovation, well-
functioning labour markets, financial services, infrastructure and energy”.13 
There is discussion of launching a Northern Dimension energy partnership 
covering energy efficiency, energy savings and renewable energy, but at 
least in terms of timing it is clear that this has either not been seen as urgent 
or feasible enough to be realised at this stage or to merit highlighting in the 
existing documents.  
The absence of the big issues related to hydrocarbons in the Northern 
Dimension is striking given that  
•  Russia and Norway, which are both part of the Northern Dimension 
area, are respectively the largest and second-largest exporters of gas 
to the EU; 
•  almost all the EU’s own oil and gas production is located in the 
northern part of the Union (the UK, Denmark and the Netherlands); 
and  
•  discussions about the supply of natural gas and selection of pipeline 
routes have been a critical issue in EU–Russian relations for several 
years now.  
Part of the reason may be that such topics are already covered by the 
EU–Russia energy dialogue, but it still seems odd that the Northern 
Dimension with its grand ambitions for cooperation and integration across 
the north of Europe has failed to deal with the most important energy 
issues. One possibility would be to include the regional elements of the 
energy dialogue as an integral part of the Northern Dimension in the same 
spirit as the new policy is to function as a regional manifestation of the EU–
Russia ‘common spaces’. This step could increase coordination and 
coherence. At the same time, it might also make it possible to boost the 
issues of energy efficiency and renewable energy within the energy 
                                                      
13 See European Commission, “Overview”, Directorate-General for External 
Relations, European Commission, Brussels, October 2007 (retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/#Objectives) (emphasis 
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dialogue, since these are two areas where the Northern Dimension does 
enjoy some clout, whereas so far they have mainly been window dressing 
in the energy dialogue.  
For the moment, however, just as Shtokman has no place in the 
Northern Dimension, the Northern Dimension is not a topic that crops up 
when Shtokman is discussed. The result is a degree of somewhat surprising 
and unfortunate mutual irrelevance.  
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9.  RUSSIA’S ENERGY STRATEGY AND 
PROSPECTS FOR A NORTHERN 
DIMENSION ENERGY PARTNERSHIP 
JAKUB M. GODZIMIRSKI 
1.  Introduction 
This chapter explores Russia’s energy strategy and the impact of its 
implementation on energy sector cooperation in Northern Europe. Energy 
cooperation in this region is currently being pursued within several 
bilateral and multilateral contexts. One possible, further context is the new 
Northern Dimension: indeed, the founding documents of the new Northern 
Dimension mention the option of considering an energy partnership. In 
assessing the prospects for developing such a partnership, however, we 
must first examine the energy situation in northern Europe and the central 
role played by Russia. 
Russia is by far the most important energy supplier in the Northern 
Dimension area. Of the other Northern Dimension countries, Finland and 
the Baltic republics receive all their gas supplies from Russia. Sweden buys 
oil from Russia but also receives small amounts of gas from Denmark. As 
for Germany, the high volumes of gas imported from Russia place 
Germany in a league of its own, even though Russian gas only accounts for 
a third of German consumption. Poland’s import volumes from Russia are 
also sizable, although considerably smaller than Germany’s. Nevertheless, 
Poland plays a crucial role as a transit country for Russian oil and gas. 
Denmark is self-sufficient because of its oil and gas fields in the North Sea. 
Norway is a major global exporter of oil and gas just like Russia, but within 
the Northern Dimension area it exports significant volumes only to 
Germany. The energy intensity of the economies in the region also varies 146 | JAKUB M. GODZIMIRSKI 
considerably, with the post-Communist side being the least energy-
efficient. The highest shares of renewable energy are found in the energy 
mix of the Nordic countries, and German and Danish companies are 
particularly strong in renewable energy technology. 
Thus, we see that the countries of the region have very different 
energy relationships with Russia. Some have energy sectors that do not 
depend on Russian supplies at all, but instead compete with Russia for 
market shares (Norway and to an extent Denmark), whereas others have 
important energy ties with Russia (the Baltic States, Finland, Poland and 
Germany). Similar heterogeneity vis-à-vis Russia also prevails in the wider 
EU area. Overall, the situation in the energy-importing northern European 
states is similar to the average in the EU-27 (Table 9.1). 
Table 9.1 Energy features in the Northern Dimension context  
 Energy 
intensity 
(toe/€ mn  
2000)† 
Energy 
import 
dependency 
(%) 
Oil import 
dependency 
(%) 
Gas import 
dependency 
(%) 
Import of gas 
from Russia 
(bcm/share of 
Russia in 
imports) †† 
EU-27   180  50.1  82.2  57.7  148/42 
Denmark 111  –51.6  –104.8  –113.9  – 
Finland 263  54.4  98.8  100  4.52/100 
Germany 160  61.6  97.1  81.3  36.54/34 
Iceland 314  28.8  102  –  – 
Norway 142  –609.1  –854.3  –1,378.3  – 
Sweden 186  37.2  103.8  100  – 
Estonia 723  25.8  71.8  100  0.9/100 
Latvia   404  56  101.8  105.6  1.7/100 
Lithuania 549  58.4  92.7  100.6  2.9/100 
Poland 444  18  96  69.7  7/70 
Russia 2,552  –  –  –  – 
† Tonnes of oil equivalent 
†† Billion cubic metres 
Source: European Commission, “EU Energy in Figures 2007/2008”, Directorate-General for 
Energy and Transport, Brussels, June 2008 (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/ 
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Russia’s dominant position in the regional energy market has led 
some actors to fear that Russia may use their energy dependence for 
political leverage. Others are worried that the energy intensity of the 
Russian economy may cause future supply problems – i.e. that Russia will 
not be able to supply Europe with the agreed volumes of gas and oil. Such 
approaches to Russia add to the complexity of the energy picture in the 
region. To understand the potential for energy cooperation in the region, 
we therefore have to take into account not only statistical data, but also 
how mutual trust and mistrust may contribute to shaping energy sector 
cooperation: the less the field is politicised or securitised by the actors 
involved, the greater the potential for cooperation. 
As Russia’s energy policy choices will be the most critical single 
factor influencing development of transborder energy cooperation in the 
region, we need to understand the driving forces that mould Russian 
energy policy. We proceed by taking a closer look at the country’s energy 
strategy and then assessing its potential impact on Europe in general and 
the Northern Dimension area in particular. In this analysis, Russia’s energy 
strategy will be taken as an amalgam of policies expressing the country’s 
new strategic thinking. 
2.  Russia’s energy strategy  
One of the most striking features of Russian foreign policy under President 
Vladimir Putin (2000–08) was the use of energy resources as a political tool. 
Russia started labelling itself an ‘energy superpower’. And as Putin started 
pursuing his short- to long-term objectives in the international arena in a 
much more coordinated and goal-oriented manner than his predecessor 
Boris Yeltsin ever did, Russia’s energy resources became one of its most 
important strategic assets. 
Putin recognised that Russia was vulnerable to shifts in energy prices 
on the international markets. For example, Russia’s 1998 economic crisis 
had been prompted by a sharp drop in oil prices caused by the financial 
turmoil in Asia. Since the turn of the millennium, however, energy prices 
have skyrocketed. High international prices for energy have been a central 
factor underlying Russia’s economic revival, and the crucial role of the 148 | JAKUB M. GODZIMIRSKI 
energy sector has prompted the Kremlin to take a new approach to it, more 
in line with the views Putin himself expressed in his thesis.1  
In 2003, Russia’s official energy strategy until 2020 was adopted.2 The 
document identifies the main challenges and measures to be taken to make 
the country a reliable and sustainable provider of energy on the domestic 
and international markets. To develop a full picture of how Russia’s energy 
policy priorities and behaviour affect the Northern Dimension area, we also 
examine other policies and concepts of relevance for the energy strategy. 
Furthermore, the energy strategy (both the formal document and other 
strategy-relevant policies) must be understood as part of Russia’s grand 
strategy of integrating its overall political, economic and military objectives 
to preserve the country’s long-term interests.3 Several important elements 
of Russia’s overall energy strategy and its reflections in a Northern 
Dimension context can be identified. 
1)  Consolidation of the state’s role in the energy sector. By 2007, the 
Russian state controlled approximately 30% of oil and 87% of natural gas 
production.4 In the Northern Dimension context, one clear manifestation of 
the accent on state ownership is Gazprom’s October 2006 decision to start 
developing the Shtokman gas field in the Barents Sea on its own. Even 
though it later was decided to include the French Total and Norwegian 
StatoilHydro firms in the Shtokman developing company (see chapters 8 
and 10), Gazprom remains in charge. Although the Shtokman set-up is 
quite different from the old production sharing agreements, there is 
nevertheless a certain risk that the Western partners may be squeezed out 
once they have provided Gazprom with the needed technological solutions 
                                                      
1 For more, see H. Balzer, “The Putin Thesis and Russian Energy Policy”, Post-
Soviet Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2005, pp. 210–25; H. Balzer, “Vladimir Putin’s 
Academic Writings and Russian Natural Resource Policy”, Problems of Post-
Communism, Vol. 55, No. 1, 2006, pp. 48–54. 
2 See “Energeticheskaia strategiia Rossii na period do 2020 goda”, adopted by the 
Russian government on 28 August 2003 (retrieved from www.mte.gov.ru/ 
docs/32/103.html). 
3 See P. Kennedy (ed.), Grand Strategies in War and Peace, New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1991, p. ix. 
4 See Y. Pozzo di Borgo, Union européenne – Russie: quelles relations?, Rapport 
d’information 307 (2006–2007), Sénat, Paris, 2007 (retrieved from 
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and expertise. What seems certain is that the Russian state will retain 
complete control of the project in the foreseeable future and take a lion’s 
share of the revenues generated by the field. 
2) Limiting the role of Western companies. Several foreign companies – 
among them Shell, Mitsui, Mitsubishi and TNK-BP – have recently faced 
problems in the Russian energy sector. At the same time, there are few 
recent examples of the Russian state opening up the energy sector to 
Western companies. A litmus test in this regard will be the future of the 
cooperation between E.On, BASF and Gazprom in the development of the 
Yuzhno-russkoye gas field in western Siberia. Importantly, this cooperation 
is planned to provide gas to the Nord Stream pipeline, at least until the 
Shtokman field becomes operational (see chapter 8). 
3) Strengthening the link between the country’s political and economic elite. 
Putin has strengthened the links between the political and economic elite 
by placing his close aides and allies in key positions in the Russian energy 
sector. Aleksei Miller and Dmitry Medvedev were given key positions in 
Gazprom, Igor Sechin and Sergei Naryshkin in Rosneft, and Sergei 
Vainshtokh and Viktor Khristenko in Transneft. According to some 
sources, by the end of 2004, Putin’s team controlled two-fifths of the 
country’s GDP.5 On the international scene, Putin also embarked on a 
policy of co-opting political decision-makers into the energy sector. The 
most notable example is former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, 
who became honorary chairman of the Nord Stream company. Schröder 
thereafter became one of the most vociferous advocates of closer energy 
cooperation between Russia and Germany, as well as Russia and the EU. 
Also, former Finnish Prime Minister Paavo Lipponen has been co-opted 
into the Nord Stream project, becoming a consultant for Nord Stream in the 
summer of 2008. Lipponen is to facilitate the company’s contacts with 
decision-makers preparing the Finnish assessment of the project.  
Putin’s endorsement of Dmitry Medvedev, head of Gazprom’s Board 
of Directors, as his successor is likely to make the link between the energy 
                                                      
5 See M. Bruggman, “Uspeshnyi god AO Kreml”, Inosmi.ru, 17 August 2005 
(retrieved from www.inosmi.ru/translation/221590.html); N. Gevorkian, 
“Korporatsiia Rossiia”, Gazeta.ru, 15 December 2005 (retrieved from 
www.gazeta.ru/column/gevorkyan/498063.shtml); P. Orekhin and E. Samedova, 
“Korporatsiia Kreml uspeshno porabotala”, Nezavisimaia gazeta, 26 July 2005 
(retrieved from www.ng.ru/economics/2005-07-26/1_corporation.html). 150 | JAKUB M. GODZIMIRSKI 
and political elites even stronger. Medvedev’s experience from Gazprom 
will be an important element in his political toolbox. Moreover, the 
Medvedev–Putin tandem will ensure the continuation of Putin’s line in the 
energy sector. 
4)  Using energy as a political tool. Russia has recently displayed a 
growing willingness to use energy as a political tool. This tendency has 
been seen in its relations with former Soviet republics, with new and old 
EU member states, and even with Norway, which, given its own energy 
resources, might have been expected to be more resistant.6 This has given 
many Europeans second thoughts about Russia’s reliability as a strategic 
energy partner. At the same time, there is a deep understanding that, 
because of its large reserves and geographical proximity, Russia cannot be 
replaced by any other actor as a long-term supplier of energy to Europe. 
What can be called Europe’s main ‘energy challenge’ with regard to 
Russia can hence be formulated as how to secure Russian supplies of 
energy to Europe without making Europe more exposed to Russia’s 
political use of energy resources. Is there a way of getting Russia to pursue 
a depoliticised energy policy based on purely economic cost/benefit 
calculations? Although Russia – like the former Soviet Union – has a good 
track record as far as reliability of energy supplies is concerned, its recent 
politicisation of energy makes forecasting difficult. The treatment of 
energy-related issues as having strategic importance by both the EU and 
Russia raises the political stakes, mov i n g  t h e m  f r o m  t h e  s p h e r e  o f  l o w  
politics to the strategic level of high politics. 
The current situation may turn into a vicious circle of politicisation 
and securitisation, which may also cause considerable harm to energy 
cooperation in the Northern Dimension context. 
                                                      
6 For example, both Ukraine and Belarus were exposed to Russian energy pressure 
in 2006 and 2007 when Russia decided to raise prices, and Moldova experienced a 
full stop in gas supplies in 2006 when it refused to agree to a higher price for 
Russian gas. Among the new EU member states, Lithuania experienced a cut in oil 
supplies to its Mazeikiu refinery when the facility was sold to a Polish and not to a 
Russian company in 2006, and Latvia lost its role as an important transit area for 
Russian oil owing to the Russian strategy of transit avoidance. As for old EU 
member states, Russia’s political relations with Germany, France and Italy are 
largely driven by economic interests in the field of energy. Finally, Russia has 
treated Norway’s interest in entering into partnership in the Shtokman 
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5) State control of the export routes and transit avoidance. Clear examples 
of these core features of Russia’s energy strategy are the fate of the 
proposed private oil pipeline to the Murmansk region and the current 
construction of the Nord Stream pipeline. The former project was planned 
in 2003 by a private consortium. Once realised, the Murmansk pipeline 
would have eased shipments of oil to global markets and transformed 
Murmansk into an international oil hub. The project was interpreted, 
however, as a challenge to the state’s monopoly on the transport of oil. The 
subsequent dismantling of Yukos, a key actor behind the project, led to the 
project being abandoned.  
Regardless of the different fates of the state-controlled Nord Stream 
and the private Murmansk pipeline project, they both represent the 
strategy of transit avoidance, which will also guide the realisation of 
similar strategic energy projects in the region. This means that Russia will 
probably choose to ship gas and oil to customers directly from the 
Murmansk area – thereby dramatically increasing maritime traffic along 
the Norwegian coast – or through a system of pipelines going exclusively 
through Russian territory, to avoid the political and economic risks linked 
with transit. This preference for transit avoidance will also most likely 
preclude the option of shipping Russian gas and oil through the existing 
Norwegian pipeline networks. 
6) Preventing other suppliers’ access to markets. Russia has frequently 
sought to prevent other energy suppliers’ access to profitable markets 
where they would compete with Russian suppliers. The extent to which 
this policy will be applied in the Northern Dimension area remains to be 
seen. Yet, bearing in mind Russia’s capacity to export three to four times 
more gas to the Finnish market through the Finnish connector than what is 
piped today, any additional gas supplies to Finland  – for instance from 
Norway – would probably be viewed as a strategic challenge. Also, gas 
deliveries to other countries traditionally seen as exclusive Russian markets 
in the gas trade will be interpreted by Gazprom as contradicting Russia’s 
long-term interests. All such projects may therefore have negative 
consequences for Russia’s willingness to cooperate on energy issues. Above 
all this concerns Norway, which is the sole, viable alternative source of 
energy imports for the Northern Dimension area. 
7)  Downstream investments. Russia has shown increasing interest in 
downstream investments in the energy sector. In the EU, however, there is 
currently a debate on adopting measures that would limit Russian access to 
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up its own energy sector, particularly that for natural gas, to foreign 
investments. This EU reluctance towards Russian downstream investments 
is partly a result of Gazprom’s market influence. More importantly, 
Gazprom is seen as an economic instrument of the Russian state whose 
long-term political intentions remain unclear. As Russian energy policy has 
become not only politicised but also securitised in many European 
countries, Gazprom’s interest in downstream investments is interpreted as 
being driven by more than purely economic motives, and at least partly by 
political ones. Additionally, Gazprom’s investment policy, and the lack of 
sufficient investments in existing and future fields as well as transport 
infrastructure, is seen as increasing the potential for a gas supply crunch.7 
At the same time, Russian actors complain about being discriminated 
against.  
Both Russia and the EU thus wait for the other side to take the first 
step regarding market access. This standoff raises tensions and sours 
energy relations between Russia and Europe. Even though the main 
elements of Russia’s energy strategy paint a somewhat bleak picture of the 
prospects for a possible energy partnership within the Northern 
Dimension, we must nevertheless bear in mind that the European direction 
is still the most important one for Russia. Its significance stems not least 
from the fact that Russia exports 50% of its oil and 63% of its gas to the EU,8 
and that energy represents 65% of all Russian exports to the EU. According 
to varying estimates, Russia covers 20–32% of the oil import and 40–50% of 
the gas import needs of the EU.9 By 2020, the enlarged EU is expected to 
                                                      
7 For more on this pessimistic approach to energy cooperation with Russia, see 
C.A. Paillard, Gazprom, the Fastest Way to Energy Suicide, Russie.Nei.Visions No. 17, 
Institut français des relations internationals, Paris, 2007. On Russia’s problems with 
maintaining the level of gas production, see A. Riley, The Coming of the Russian Gas 
Deficit: Consequences and Solutions, CEPS Policy Brief No. 116, Centre for European 
Policy Studies, Brussels, 2006. 
8 See the website of the European Commission’s Delegation to Russia 
(www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_217.htm). 
9 For the lower figures, see Y. Pozzo di Borgo (2007), op. cit. and J.H. Keppler, 
International Relations and Security of Energy Supply: Risks to Continuity and 
Geopolitical Risks, Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, European 
Commission, Brussels, 2007 (retrieved from www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/ 
2004_2009/documents/dv/studykeppl/studykeppler.pdf); for the higher figures, 
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have increased its gas consumption by 50%. According to Russian 
estimates, by then Russia will cover 70% of the EU’s gas imports. 
3.  The EU and energy within the Northern Dimension context  
The EU and Russia have institutionalised their energy relations by means 
of the ‘energy dialogue’, which is a key aspect of the EU–Russia ‘common 
spaces’, especially the common economic space. Since the new Northern 
Dimension functions as the regional expression of the common spaces, it is 
useful to assess the extent to which energy cooperation can be pursued 
within the Northern Dimension’s agenda. Here it is also essential to draw 
some lessons from the failures of the policy’s old format, with its mismatch 
between hopes and reality and its over-focus on EU-defined priorities (see 
chapter 1). 
In 1998, the European Commission described the Northern 
Dimension area as having a huge “long-term potential for the exploitation 
of oil, gas and non-energy raw materials”. Russia’s hydrocarbon resources 
in particular were said to represent a potential strategic reserve for 
Europe’s energy demands.10 The European Council, for its part, defined 
cooperation on energy as a key area within the Northern Dimension 
framework.11 In November 1999, the Commission identified several trends 
that would shape the future energy market in the region: 
•  the general movement towards globalisation and especially 
liberalisation, including competition among fuels; 
•  the continuing transition within Central and Eastern European 
countries, and also Russia, to restructure the market with the 
introduction of competition between energy markets and 
privatisation; 
•  the requirement for increased environmental protection; and 
                                                      
10 See European Commission, Communication on a Northern Dimension for the 
Policies of the Union, European Commission, Brussels, 25 November 
1998 (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/doc/ 
com1998_0589en.pdf), p. 3. 
11 See European Council, Conclusions adopted by the Council on 31 May 1999, 
9034/99, Brussels, 7 June 1999 (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/ 
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•  the emerging debate about fuel choices (more specifically, the role of 
gas, nuclear, coal and renewables). 
The Commission additionally acknowledged the region’s significance 
for realising the EU’s energy strategy: “The Northern Dimension represents 
one essential frontier for security of supply due to the importance of 
Russian and Norwegian energy supplies.”12 Transit issues were described 
as a crucial element of regional energy policy to be addressed jointly, and 
energy cooperation with Russia was to be based on “the principles of the 
market economy and the European Energy Charter Treaty against a 
background of progressive integration of energy markets in Europe”. 
The first Northern Dimension action plan (2000–03) provided only a 
list of energy-related projects, with the focus on energy efficiency in north-
west Russia and nuclear safety in Lithuania.13 The second action plan 
(2003–06) was more ambitious. It promised attention on the development of 
infrastructure to provide more effective, safer and environmentally sound 
energy supplies. It called for closer collaboration on the further 
development and integration of energy markets, the strengthening of EU–
Russia and Norway–Russia dialogues on energy, and cooperation with the 
Baltic Sea Regional Energy Cooperation. Finally, the action plan sought to 
promote energy efficiency and saving. A specific aim was to improve 
investment conditions in Russia’s energy sector in order to upgrade the 
infrastructure, promote energy efficient and environmentally friendly 
technologies, and enhance energy conservation. Moreover, the 
implementation of what today is known as the Nord Stream pipeline was 
mentioned as part of the EU–Russia energy dialogue and the EU’s trans-
European energy network (TEN-E) priority transport axes (see also chapter 
7).14 
                                                      
12 See European Commission, Communication on Strengthening the Northern 
Dimension of European Energy Policy, European Commission, Brussels, 1999 
(retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/doc/energy.pdf), 
p. 11.  
13 See European Commission, “The Implementation of the Northern Dimension 
Action Plan”, European Commission, Brussels (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/ 
external_relations/north_dim/ndap/index.htm#impl). 
14 See European Commission, The Second Northern Dimension Action Plan, 2004–
2006, European Commission, Brussels, 2003 (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/ 
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In 2006, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) 
encouraged closer coordination of regional cooperation and the EU–Russia 
energy dialogue to improve energy security and availability. The EESC also 
called for the establishment of a Northern Dimension partnership in 
energy, to promote the sustainable use of existing natural resources, energy 
efficiency and renewable energy resources, and the safety and 
environmental aspects of energy transport.15 That same year, the “Political 
Declaration on the Northern Dimension Policy” invited development of 
energy-related projects by requesting “ND senior officials to examine the 
desirability of a Northern Dimension Partnership on Transport and 
Logistics, and to examine enhanced cooperation in the field of energy 
efficiency and renewable energy”.16 Yet, both the Political Declaration and 
the associated Northern Dimension Policy Framework Document failed to 
provide any details on the form or content of the envisaged regional energy 
collaboration.17 
The official EU and Northern Dimension documents thus outline the 
scope and areas for regional energy cooperation and define the top 
priorities. These ambitious declarations notwithstanding, collaboration in 
the field of energy is still limping, owing to several factors, most notably 
the increasing politicisation of energy issues in both Russia and the EU. 
Furthermore, given that Russia and the EU are unable to reach agreement 
on how to proceed in their mutual relations at the grand level (i.e. the 
stalled negotiations on a new partnership and cooperation agreement) it is 
unrealistic to expect that cooperation in such a sensitive domain will work 
smoothly in the more narrowly defined Northern Dimension area.  
                                                      
15 See European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), Opinion of the European 
Economic and Social Committee of 1 June 2006 on the Future of the Northern 
Dimension Policy, Official Journal C 309/91, 16.12.2006 (retrieved from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/c_309/c_30920061216en00910095.pdf). 
16 See the “Political Declaration on the Northern Dimension Policy” (Helsinki, 24 
November 2006) (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ 
north_dim/doc/pol_dec_1106.pdf). 
17 See the Northern Dimension Policy Framework Document (Helsinki, 24 
November 2006) (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ 
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4.  Russia’s energy strategy and the new Northern Dimension 
The Northern Dimension area seems set to play an increasingly important 
role in Russia’s energy strategy in the years to come. Over the past five 
years, several Russian energy actors have signalled their interest in the 
region. Mention has already been made of the aborted plan to transform 
Murmansk into a global oil hub. Another plan is to transform the 
Murmansk region – and the Barents Sea – into a new European and even 
globally important energy province through developing the huge 
Shtokman gas field as well as other offshore fields. The Murmansk region is 
also a principal strategic asset for the Russian military. The recent increase 
in Russian military activity in parts of the Northern Dimension area 
(regular sorties of strategic bombers, naval exercises, etc.) also testifies to 
Russia’s strategic ambitions in the north. Making the north an area of ‘soft’ 
confrontation is, however, hardly conducive to creating conditions for 
mutually beneficial collaboration in the economic and energy sectors. 
Depending on which approach the Kremlin chooses to take to the 
region and to its role in the overall Russian energy and political strategy, 
the Northern Dimension area may develop in various directions. At 
present, it is difficult to say which way the wind is blowing. President 
Medvedev himself, as well as Igor Shuvalov, first deputy prime minister 
responsible for economic policy, has repeatedly underlined the need for 
liberalisation and diversification: “Traditional state capitalism is a dead end 
for developing the economy.”18 In real terms, however, there is little 
evidence of concrete steps being taken.19 This may mean that ‘a liberal 
breakthrough’ is unlikely. Moreover, the strategic terms through which 
Russian authorities view both oil and gas resources as well as military 
presence makes regional cooperation a matter to be dealt with by the 
presidential administration and the government rather than by regional-
level decision-makers. 
                                                      
18 See D. Medvedev, “We really do need to preserve this vast state – A state that 
has a great many problems, but also enormous potential”, Expert Magazine, No. 13, 
2005 (retrieved from www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/publications/2005/04/86313.shtml). 
19 To the contrary, Medvedev has for instance reassured Gazprom that he is not 
going to split up the company – see the article, “Gosudarstvo ne budet delit 
Gazprom, Medvedev”, RIA Novosti, 17 January 2008 (retrieved from 
http://rian.ru/economy/20080117/97193267.html). RUSSIA’S ENERGY STRATEGY & PROSPECTS FOR AN ENERGY PARTNERSHIP |157 
On the EU/European Economic Area side, in recent years energy 
collaboration has been lifted from a purely economic activity to the 
strategic and political domains, although the EU is still struggling to put 
together a comprehensive approach to energy cooperation with the outside 
world, including Russia. In the national discourses in some EU member 
states, especially those most dependent on energy supplies from Russia, the 
question of secure energy supplies is progressively being securitised. There 
is evidence of greater securitisation at the supranational level as well. 
If energy cooperation is defined as a strategic matter by both Russia 
and the EU, then it will have to be dealt with not at the regional level and 
by low- and mid-level officials, but at the central decision-making level, in 
Brussels and Moscow.  
5.  Energy, the Northern Dimension and Russia: Some 
conclusions  
The analysis above has shown that Russia and the EU approach energy 
cooperation from different angles: Russia is most interested in extending its 
market shares, securing its dominant position on the ‘traditional markets’, 
countering Europe’s plans for diversification of supply, and increasing 
production capacity by attracting Western investments and know-how, 
without relinquishing control of its energy assets. By contrast, the EU is 
interested in ensuring continued energy supplies based on the principles of 
the Energy Charter Treaty, liberalisation of the energy market (including in 
Russia) and ensuring favourable conditions for European investments in 
the Russian energy sector.20 
In addition, the growing political tensions between Russia and the 
West affect the prospects for energy cooperation and the possible 
development of an energy partnership within the Northern Dimension 
framework. After an initial pro-Western turn in the wake of the 9/11 
terrorist attacks on the US, Putin’s Russia gradually distanced itself from 
the West. Dmitri Trenin has described the new divide as Russia’s decision 
to leave the Western orbit and instead embark on building its own ‘solar 
                                                      
20 See M. Menkiszak, Russia vs. the European Union: A ‘Strategic Partnership’ Crisis, 
CES Studies No. 22, OSW [Centre for Eastern Studies], Warsaw, 2006, p. 60; for a 
similar view, see D. Lynch, Russia Faces Europe, Chaillot Paper No. 60, European 
Union Institute for International Studies, Paris, 2006, p. 65. 158 | JAKUB M. GODZIMIRSKI 
system’ based on the nation’s own norms and values.21 This shift has 
apparently also influenced Russia’s strategic calculations with regard to 
energy collaboration with its Western partners. 
In contrast to this securitised and oppositional image at the grand 
level, however, there is some room for framing energy sector cooperation at 
the regional level as a win–win game. One promising area is developing 
the energy efficiency of Russia’s economy and focusing on renewable 
sources of energy. Both Russia and the EU have an interest in these issues, 
which could free up additional supplies to Russian and international 
customers. Energy efficiency and renewable resources could therefore form 
a suitable non-politicised platform for energy cooperation.  
Concentrating on non-securitised aspects of energy collaboration may 
prove especially fruitful in the Northern Dimension context, where there is 
already considerable expertise as well as political and social interest in 
these issues. Importantly, both the local authorities and the Russian 
population have an interest in energy efficiency in the face of higher energy 
prices resulting from the gradual liberalisation of domestic energy 
markets.22 
State actors interested in renewable sources of energy and in 
improving the energy efficiency of their economies always have both 
economic and environmental motivations. In the Russian case, such 
thinking stems from the understanding of the challenges that lie ahead. 
Russia’s energy strategy until 2020 defines energy efficiency as one of four 
strategic directions. It proposes a systemic approach to energy efficiency, 
defines energy efficiency as being of strategic importance, and calls for a 
new legal and normative framework to implement it. The strategy also calls 
for cooperation between private and state actors.  
There is a strong regional dimension to the Russian approach to 
energy efficiency. Most of Russia’s federal subjects have signed regional 
laws on energy savings, and the regions together with the state are to 
                                                      
21 See D. Trenin, “Russia Leaves the West”, Foreign Affairs, July–August, 2006 
(retrieved from www.foreignaffairs.org/20060701faessay85407/dmitri-trenin/ 
russia-leaves-the-west.html). 
22 For more details on the issue of energy efficiency in Russia, see Energy Charter 
Secretariat, Russian Federation: Regular Review of Energy Efficiency Policies 2007, 
Energy Charter Secretariat, Brussels, 2007 (retrieved from www.encharter.org/ 
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finance the federal strategic programme on “Improving Energy Efficiency”. 
Between 2008 and 2015, a total of 71.1 billion roubles is to be spent on 
energy efficiency with 30.9 billion roubles coming from the federal budget, 
18.5 billion from regional budgets and the remaining 21.7 billion roubles 
from non-budgetary actors.23  
So far, official policies and economic realities have helped the Russian 
economy to become more energy efficient. Indeed, between 2000 and 2006, 
the energy efficiency of the economy improved by 23.5%, a figure much 
higher than what had been anticipated in the official energy strategy.24 
Nonetheless, Russia still lags behind other economies in the Northern 
Dimension area. Given that energy efficiency appears not to have been 
politicised, it seems possible that decision-making can be decentralised to 
the immediate stakeholders – the regional authorities. This would mean a 
huge potential for collaboration with Russia in promoting energy efficiency 
– and there is a chance that this type of cooperation may become a success 
story in the Northern Dimension context. 
As regards renewable sources of energy, Russia includes these as one 
of its seven top energy priorities (the other six being gas, oil, coal, power 
generation, heat generation and nuclear energy). Even so, owing to its vast 
hydrocarbon resources and contrary to most other countries in the 
Northern Dimension area, Russia does not feel the same pressure to 
develop renewable sources of energy. This is also reflected in the energy 
mix, where hydropower stands for 6% of energy consumption and other 
renewables play a marginal part, whereas hydrocarbons – gas, oil and coal 
– cover almost 90% of the country’s energy needs.25 
According to the official energy strategy, renewable sources of energy 
are important as they may replace non-renewable sources of energy, limit 
                                                      
23 For more information about the “Improving Energy Efficiency” programme, see 
website www.raexpert.ru/conference/2007/expert400/present/gordukalov.ppt. 
24 For more details, see A. Gordukalov, “O deiatelnosti Minsitersva 
promyshlennosti i energetiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii v sfere energoeffektivnosti”, 
presentation, 2007 (retrieved from www.dena.de/fileadmin/user_upload/ 
Download/Veranstaltungen/2007/12/Presentation_Michailov_Gordukalov_Minp
romenergo.pdf). 
25 See the Energy Information Administration (EIA), “Russia”, Country Analysis 
Briefs, EIA, Washington, D.C., 2008  (retrieved from www.eia.doe.gov/ 
emeu/cabs/Russia/Full.html). 160 | JAKUB M. GODZIMIRSKI 
the negative ecological effects of the use of non-renewable sources, secure 
energy to customers living far away from the existing non-renewable 
sources of energy and limit the cost of transport of energy to remote areas. 
Peat and firewood have been identified as the primary sources of 
renewable energy to be exploited on a large scale. In the strategy, it is 
emphasised that Russia has both the resources and the expertise needed in 
this area, the only exception being expertise in windmills with production 
capacity higher than 30 kW. Still, bearing in mind the Swedish emphasis on 
biomass and the Finnish experience with peat,26 along with the state-of-the-
art expertise Denmark and Germany have in large-scale windmill farms, 
there seem to be good chances of making collaboration on renewable 
sources of energy a cornerstone of energy cooperation in the Northern 
Dimension area. 
The rationale for paying more attention to renewable sources of 
energy seems to be the same all over the region, although the stress on 
specific issues may have a more local accent. Some actors, such as Sweden 
and Finland, have embarked on a strategy of strengthening their energy 
independence by putting an emphasis on renewable energy resources that 
are locally available. Such an approach towards helping to solve local 
energy dilemmas may also be applicable to Russia, and could be promoted 
without being seen as a strategic challenge by the central authorities in 
Moscow. In fact, Moscow’s interest in taking measures to alleviate the 
country’s energy security dilemma seems to be on the rise. The reason for 
such interest lies in the continuing boom of the Russian economy, which 
leads to increasing demand for energy at the same time as there are 
structural and infrastructural problems in the energy sector stemming from 
a long period of underinvestment. Local solutions to local problems may 
thus be welcomed. 
Another factor concerns developments in oil and gas extraction. After 
a period of rapid growth during Putin’s presidency, oil and gas production 
now seems to be stagnating. This will force Russia to look for other sources 
of energy (including renewables), which may boost the potential for 
cooperation with foreign partners facing similar energy dilemmas. Both 
Russia and other Northern Dimension countries have to survive in similar 
climatic and geographical conditions, amidst the growing shortage and 
rising costs of traditional fossil-fuel commodities. Cooperation on 
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developing renewable sources of energy and energy efficiency would also 
be in line with the EU’s overall energy strategy, in which raising the share 
of renewable sources of energy substantially by 2020 is an important goal.  
Cooperation among the Northern Dimension partners on these issues 
will depend not only on how they see their energy needs, but also on how 
they see each other and how they read the other Northern Dimension 
partners’ intentions, including in a broader political context. For example, 
the sharpening of the tone between the EU and Russia in the wake of the 
conflict in Georgia in August 2008 may have a negative spillover in the 
Northern Dimension area. Nevertheless, mutual incentives for energy 
sector cooperation are strong. Indeed, this chapter has indicated that even 
though the EU may reconsider its energy collaboration with Russia, it is 
difficult to imagine a complete halt of relations in this sphere. If strategic 
interests are not threatened, the prospects for mutually beneficial energy 
cooperation in the Northern Dimension area are good. From this 
viewpoint, energy efficiency and renewables are the most promising fields 
for energy cooperation in the Northern Dimension area. 
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10. FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN THE RUSSIAN 
ENERGY SECTOR: LESSONS LEARNED AND 
DRIVERS OF CHANGE FOR THE  
NORTHERN DIMENSION 
MORTEN ANKER & BJØRN BRUNSTAD 
1.  Introduction 
Business activity in Russia has been hailed as lucrative, in view of the 
country’s strong economic growth and attractive assets. It has also been 
seen as risky, given the uncertain property rights, widespread corruption, 
cultural differences and generally high political risk. This two-sided picture 
applies to the energy sector as well. As energy is likely to be the most 
important business cluster in north-western Russia in the medium term,1 
the idea of facilitating cross-border cooperation in the energy sector has re-
emerged in debates on the future course of the Northern Dimension (see 
chapter 9). In particular, this shift in the debate has been motivated by 
observations of the Northern Dimension’s current relatively minor role in 
the major energy-sector projects that are set to shape the economic, 
environmental and transport development in the region (see chapter 8). 
Perspectives on business opportunities in Russia have changed in 
exaggerated boom and bust cycles, at least partly owing to myopic 
assessments of the investment climate, which are far too coloured by vivid 
events at present and too little based on concrete evidence. In this chapter, 
                                                      
1 See G. Dudarev, S. Boltramovich, P. Filippov and H. Hernesniemi, Advantage 
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we seek a deeper understanding of more long-term patterns and trends 
underlying the development of Russia as an arena for energy sector 
investment and activity. We first examine the experiences of Norwegian 
companies operating in the Russian energy sector, drawing on interviews 
with representatives of these companies. Their experiences are used to 
elucidate the role of foreign companies in this sector. We then move on to 
discuss trends and drivers of change for the future development of Russia. 
These analyses form the basis for identifying areas where the Northern 
Dimension can play a constructive role in engaging businesses. 
Our aim is not to tell the complete story of what business has done 
and can do in Russia, nor to present a recipe for instant success. Instead, we 
discuss some of the main uncertainties in Russia’s future development and 
indicate how these uncertainties may affect long-term investment decisions 
and strategies, with implications for business-to-business cooperation and 
for how the public–private partnerships such as those planned within the 
Northern Dimension could be of help. 
2.  The Norwegian case: Some success but modest activity 
From a Norwegian perspective, the energy sector in the ‘High North’ is 
alluring. Norwegian oil companies have long chased the big prize in this 
game – participation in the huge Shtokman gas field in the Barents Sea – at 
last seemingly with success, as we return to below. But there are also other, 
less spectacular stories from which to learn. Norwegian supply companies 
thrive in Russia and a few smaller oil companies have successfully acquired 
stakes in the lesser oil fields. And although not yet setting a firm footprint 
in Russia, the experience of Norwegian power companies and consultancy 
firms in energy and energy efficiency may provide useful insights into 
other, less explored segments of the energy sector. 
With some notable exceptions, Norwegian companies have been 
cautious about engaging in Russia in general, and in north-western Russia 
in particular. According to a report by Rambøll Storvik, in 2006 there were 
approximately 80 cases of Norwegian business involvement in north-
western Russia.2 Most of these were small-scale enterprises with fewer than 
10 employees. Of the 80 companies, only 8 were involved in the oil and gas 
sector. A few were involved in energy efficiency projects and 
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Russland, Rambøll Storvik, Kirkenes, 2006. 166 | MORTEN ANKER & BJØRN BRUNSTAD 
environmental projects related to the energy sector. Despite the small scale, 
we nevertheless consider the Norwegian experience in this field as relevant 
for the wider business community. 
1)  Big oil: StatoilHydro’s long way to something. StatoilHydro’s 
experience in Russia has been limited to two major projects. In the 
Kharyaga oil field located in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug, Hydro has 
had a 40% stake through a production sharing agreement (PSA) since 1996. 
And in the Shtokman gas and condensate field, StatoilHydro was approved 
for a 24% stake in the Shtokman phase 1 development company in October 
2007.  
Russian authorities are generally unhappy with PSAs of the 
Kharyaga type, regarding such deals as far too lucrative for the 
development companies and ‘unworthy of a developed nation’. In 
consequence, the authorities have obstructed the Kharyaga PSA and 
criticised the operating company Total for low environmental standards 
and a sluggish development pace. Unlike the Sakhalin II PSA, however, in 
which Shell and the other consortium partners were forced to sell a 
controlling share to Gazprom, it seems that the Kharyaga license is not 
directly threatened, at least for now. 
The Shtokman saga shows how unpredictable the Russian side may 
appear for international oil companies. After a long beauty contest, in 
which Gazprom postponed the partnership decision several times, there 
was a widespread feeling among international oil companies of being 
duped when in 2006 the Russians declared they would develop the field on 
their own. Then came a sudden turn of the tide, when Gazprom announced 
it had picked the French Total as its partner for the Shtokman development 
in July 2007. This move ignited suspicions of high-level political horse-
trading. When President Vladimir Putin announced that StatoilHydro was 
to be given access to the project in an October 2007 telephone conference 
with Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, this failed to dampen 
these suspicions. Although StatoilHydro certainly did receive high-level 
political backing, any questions of political horse-trading nonetheless 
remain pure speculation (see also chapters 8 and 9). 
It is worth noting that the two non-Russian Shtokman partners are 
the same as the foreign stakeholders in the Kharyaga PSA. This could be 
mere coincidence, or it could reflect the Russian authorities’ perception of 
the good track records of these companies in Russia. The actual content of 
the Shtokman partnership agreement is not to be revealed until 2009, so the 
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2) Big oil: Aker Solutions and others gaining a foothold. Aker Solutions 
(formerly Aker Kvaerner) has been selling world-class engineering 
expertise to international and Russian consortia operating in the Russian 
offshore sector in the Far East and in the High North (Sakhalin II and 
Prirazlomnoye). The company aims high, and plans to establish itself as the 
leading contractor in the entire Russian oil and gas market.3 After the 
acquisition of a majority share in the Astrakhan Korabl shipyard in 2005, 
Aker Solutions experienced negative pressure from the Russian authorities, 
including having their office raided by the police and having fines 
imposed. Aker Solutions finally decided to sell its share in Astrakhan 
Korabl in February 2008. The company has nevertheless amassed expertise 
and experience in operating in Russia and with Russian counterparts, and 
is clearly well positioned for further contracts.  
Other Norwegian-based supply companies (among them Acergy, 
Reinertsen, Hydramarine, Øglænd and Havyard Leirvik) are also gaining a 
foothold in Russia.4 In the construction work on the Prirazlomnoye offshore 
platform, Norwegian-based supply companies have provided some 25% of 
the total technology deliveries.5 These companies tell differing stories about 
their experiences in doing business in Russia. Some report challenges 
regarding negotiation tactics, differences in business culture and 
bureaucratic foot-dragging, but regard those simply as additional hurdles, 
not major threats to business. Others have found it best to avoid relying on 
a Russian partner altogether.6 Several of the companies have long-term 
strategies for working in Russia. Reinertsen is well established in   
 
                                                      
3 See Aker Solutions, “Sakhalin – Concrete Advance in Russia”, Aker Solutions, 
Oslo, 2003 (retrieved from www.akerkvaerner.com/Internet/MediaCentre/ 
Featurestories/OilandGas/Sakhalin.htm). 
4 Here we refer to companies in the Norwegian oil and gas cluster, which includes 
Norwegian companies with headquarters in Norway as well as companies with 
substantial Norwegian ownership that operate on the Norwegian continental shelf 
but are based abroad (like Acergy). 
5 See the Nortrade.com article, “Norwegian Companies Attractive for Russian 
Partnerships”, Nortrade.com, the Official Norwegian Trade Portal, Oslo, 2007 
(retrieved from www.nortrade.com/index.php?cmd=show_article&id=255). 
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Murmansk, Acergy established a Moscow office in 2007 and Norwegian 
supply companies are now queuing up to take part in the development of 
the Shtokman field. 
3) Small oil: The adventures of Saga and Aladdin. There are only a few 
smaller Norwegian oil companies that have invested in upstream assets in 
Russia. Saga Petrol and Aladdin have acquired licenses for small-scale 
onshore oil and gas fields through acquisitions of Russian license holders. 
Both companies were established quite recently and their experience with 
business in Russia is limited to two or three years. So far, the companies are 
very optimistic about their acquisition strategies. They have not met 
opposition from federal or local government, but on the contrary have been 
welcomed and received support from local authorities. Yet, it would be 
premature to draw substantial conclusions about a possible formula for 
success here. 
4) Big power: Scoping and waiting. Unlike their Finnish and French 
counterparts (see chapter 11), Norwegian companies have not been very 
active in the power and heating sector in Russia. Statkraft has been scoping 
for opportunities, but has not made any decisive moves. One reason could 
be that the sector is currently in the midst of a massive transformation 
process with pressures for unbundling production, distribution and end 
sales of electricity, as well as the privatisation of the formerly dominant 
RAO UES. This situation makes it difficult to make long-term or even 
short-term risk assessments. Another challenge is the strategic element of 
the sector and the reluctance of Russian authorities to cede control. In that 
respect, this field resembles the oil and gas sector. Our interviewees 
confirm that there have been problems with the authorities changing the 
rules of the game and with informal players making decisions. 
5)  Consulting, energy efficiency and new energy: Advising and aiding. 
Advisory companies like Rosnor Energo and Scandpower have gained a 
certain foothold, providing services related to the market reforms 
underway in the Russian power sector. Several consultancies such as Norsk 
Energi and Rambøll Storvik have carried out small-scale energy efficiency 
projects largely paid for through Norwegian-sponsored environmental and 
development programmes. The common denominator for this category of 
actors is that they have made little risk investment – they are either just 
scoping, delivering consultancy services with relatively low risk or carrying 
out projects largely sponsored by Norway within an aid framework. Some 
of our interviewees claim that there is limited commercial potential for 
Norwegian consultancy business in Russia, not least because of the high FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN THE RUSSIAN ENERGY SECTOR| 169 
hourly costs in Norway. Moreover, on the industrial hardware side of the 
energy efficiency business, interviewees express doubts as to whether 
Norway has companies with the necessary technological know-how. 
Swedish, Danish and Finnish companies a r e  s a i d  t o  h a v e  a  c o m p e t i t i v e  
edge over Norwegian companies in this area.  
What can we learn from the Norwegian experience? 
Companies we have interviewed are generally positive about the business 
environment and opportunities in Russia. Yet, for several companies, high 
levels of corruption, extensive red tape and difficulties in finding reliable 
Russian partners remain significant barriers to business. Additionally, there 
seems to be a cultural barrier that must be overcome if one is to succeed in 
Russia. 
It is hard to draw any substantial conclusions based on the experience 
of Norwegian firms in the Russian energy sector. There are too few 
Norwegian companies with such experience and those with relevant 
experience have normally been involved in Russia only for a short period.  
Still, some tendencies can be discerned. For instance, the larger an oil 
or (particularly) a gas field, the more likely it seems that participation and 
possible partnerships will be decided at the top political level. The political 
winds in Moscow appear decisive for the success rate of existing projects 
and contracts, and to the quest for new projects. Conversely, there might be 
less politics – and more business opportunities – in small-scale oil field 
development. As yet, the increasing drive for state control in Russia has 
apparently not affected the few Norwegian companies involved in this 
area. 
On the supply industry side as well, there seem to be good prospects 
in Russia. And this is not limited to internationally-managed field 
developments. Also, Russian-managed projects abound in business 
opportunities, with Prirazlomnoye as a prime example. In this business 
segment, the main competitive assets enjoyed by Norwegian companies 
would seem to be technological and managerial skills rather than political 
connections. From the experience of Aker Solutions, it would be tempting 
to suggest that it is currently easier and less risky to enter the Russian 
market solely as a provider of technology and services, than to aim for 
equity and control. 
In the power and heat sector, trends are less clear. To be sure, there 
are business opportunities, but the risks concerning the future market are 
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different from the Finnish one, with Fortum being one of the biggest 
foreign investors in the Russian power sector. Of course, Finland, as the 
largest importer of electric power from Russia, has closer ties to the Russian 
power market. Even so, the difference in both strategy and outcome 
between Norwegian and Finnish power giants is noteworthy (see chapter 
11). In energy efficiency projects and renewable energy, the Norwegian 
experience is very limited. So far, most projects have been funded by the 
Norwegian government, and have in essence been a form of aid rather than 
profit-seeking business ventures. 
3.  How the picture could change: Some driving forces 
There are several important trends that will affect the business 
environment in Russia and the chances of success or failure for foreign 
companies. The Putin presidency led to massive changes. Some 
developments have become more predictable while others now seem more 
uncertain. In the following discussion, we look at a few key uncertainties 
that are likely to influence possibilities and risks for companies involved in 
the Russian energy sector, while we also aim at shedding light on some 
current trends that are important to understand when considering 
investment in Russia.  
1) The Russian state is increasing its role in the economy, but will ‘state 
corporations’ work? One dominant trend in the Russian economy is the 
increasing role of the Russian state. This strengthening of the state is 
achieved partly through methods that in the West are regarded as 
illegitimate or at least questionable. How the role of the state in the 
economy will develop in the future is of critical importance to foreign 
companies operating at all levels in Russia. Yet, there are major 
uncertainties as to which sectors will be affected by the government’s drive 
for control, what form state control might take and the consequences for 
the economy. 
The Western business community has paid particular attention to re-
nationalisation in the oil and gas industry, following the 2003–04 takeover 
of the main assets of Yukos by the state-controlled company Rosneft and 
the more recent pressure against Shell and TNK-BP to cede their shares in 
projects in Russia’s Far East and Siberia. Growing state dominance is also 
evident in an increasing number of other sectors. The Russian 
government’s work on defining strategic sectors in which Russian players 
are to have a majority stake is one example. Another is the creation and 
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A crucial question is whether such a strengthening of the Russian 
state’s role in the economy can produce good economic results over time. 
On the one hand, it could help to create new, strong competitive sectors 
and national champions in Russia. On the other hand, the potential 
inefficiency of huge state corporations might vaporise the base of economic 
growth – in which case it would be an open question what Russia’s 
response to a possible failure would be. It could be that the pendulum 
gradually swings back to better and more predictable conditions for 
international companies operating in Russia; but we might also see an 
increasingly introvert Russia with xenophobic tendencies, blaming the 
failure on external forces.  
One test case of the consequences of a greater state role will be how 
the Russian side responds to the bids of international supply companies to 
participate in the Shtokman development project, at the possible expense of 
the development of a Russian gas supply industry.  
2) The Russian economy shows strong growth in a period of high oil prices, 
but how robust is the economy? Thus far, in the 2000s, the Russian economy 
has grown consistently at 6–7% annually. Although growth is naturally 
associated with business opportunities, it is not at all clear what effect 
Russian economic development will have on the opportunities for foreign 
companies in the energy sector. High oil prices and strong growth could 
contribute to a better investment climate, but they could also support the 
surge of Russian nationalism and protectionism. Similarly, an economic 
downturn could mean a greater need for foreign investments, paving the 
way for good framework conditions for foreign investors; on the other 
hand, it might also increase economic risk. 
Much depends on the nature of the growth. So far, growth has largely 
been driven by rising oil and gas export revenues, progressively supported 
by expanding domestic consumption. The Russian government has been 
building up the stabilisation fund since 2004, which was divided into the 
reserve fund and the national welfare fund from February 2008. At the 
same time, it seems that budget constraints are becoming softer. How 
robust will present growth trends remain if oil prices fall dramatically? The 
stabilisation fund will help to balance the budgets for some time, but a 
sustained oil price fall could threaten the growth prospects. And even with 
continued high export revenues, the government faces a huge challenge in 
handling the revenues in a sustainable way. Yielding to the temptation of 
increased budget spending could have severe consequences for the overall 
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Oil prices are also linked fairly directly to business opportunities in 
the energy sector, for upstream companies, supply companies, energy 
efficiency companies, power companies and consultants alike. Expensive 
foreign technology makes more sense when resource prices are high. But at 
the same time, high prices raise the resource rent. In Russia, as in many 
other resource-rich countries, this has spurred both nationalism and 
corruption, with the state and its leading actors striving to keep the rent for 
themselves. 
3)  Russia is approaching a gas supply squeeze, but will the response be 
adequate? Without substantial investments in upstream gas development or 
reform of domestic energy prices, Russia is likely to find itself in a gas 
supply squeeze some time before 2015, whereby it will struggle to cover its 
domestic consumption while also honouring its delivery obligations to the 
European market. Dealing with this challenge will affect a wide range of 
Russian policies and market conditions. Increasing import of Central Asian 
gas might be an answer, but this would appear to be a solely a short-term 
solution.  
How will the Russian government approach the supply squeeze? 
Three options stand out: the government could try to boost production by 
opening up for massive, upstream field developments with foreign 
participation. It could also speed up implementation of the painful gas- and 
power price reform to cool down domestic demand, although with 
indeterminate effects on demand and possibly high political costs. Finally, 
it could launch substantial, state-sponsored energy efficiency programmes 
aimed at the domestic market with its immense potential for energy 
efficiency gains. And such programmes could create opportunities for 
companies with relevant expertise. 
4) Climate policy is high on the global agenda, but how will it affect the 
energy market? Several international and global trends may influence 
business opportunities for foreign companies in Russia. One of the most 
prominent is the global climate-change agenda and possible alterations in 
global (and regional) climate policy. A strict global climate regime could 
affect the international demand for Russian hydrocarbons, but the impact is 
uncertain and the consequences for foreign companies in businesses related 
to the hydrocarbon sector even more so. On the other hand, a new global 
climate regime could open up opportunities in Russia for foreign 
companies involved in energy efficiency and renewable energy.  
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5) Gazprom is increasing its leverage in the European downstream gas 
market by swapping assets, but how would this impact the possibilities in Russia? 
Gazprom has set greater market access and market power in the European 
downstream gas market as one of its strategic goals. The company’s major 
successes in this field have come through asset swaps, creating stronger 
vertical ties between Russian and German, Italian, French, Austrian, Dutch 
and other European energy companies. The Yuzhno-Russkoye deal may 
serve as an illustration of this strategy: Gazprom gained a 50% minus one 
share in BASF’s gas distribution company Wingas by giving BASF a share 
in the Yuzhno-Russkoye gas field. The important question is how 
indicative this and similar examples are of what the future will bring. 
Ceding control of important downstream assets could be a prerequisite for 
participation in Russian upstream projects. For Norwegian actors, the 
relevant question will then be whether they have any tempting swaps to 
offer. Participation and partnership for Russian companies on the 
Norwegian continental shelf or in Norwegian gas pipelines could become a 
reality. But it is not clear whether the mature Norwegian shelf would be 
sufficiently interesting for Gazprom or other Russian companies.  
Discussion 
The state seems set to continue playing a central role in the Russian 
economy in the foreseeable future. The main uncertainties are how far this 
involvement will go, how it will be implemented and what effect it will 
have on property rights and foreign access to projects. Russia is headed 
towards a gas supply squeeze, but it remains to be seen what government 
strategies will unfold and when. There could be huge possibilities for 
foreign companies in upstream as well as in energy efficiency projects.  
Trends towards swapping downstream assets for access to upstream 
development can prove disadvantageous for companies with small home 
markets and no access to downstream infrastructure. Norwegian 
companies and Nordic actors in general are at a disadvantage in this 
respect compared with, for example, German actors, with their access to 
key markets and networks. 
Two questions are important in the discussion following the 
description of experience and future challenges for businesses in Russia. 
First, how can businesses adapt strategically to the challenges? Second, 
how and in what areas can the Northern Dimension help to promote well-
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4.  Still grounds for a cautious approach 
For firms engaged in business in Russia or considering involvement, past 
and present experiences provide an insufficient basis for future choices. 
When investing for the long term, it is necessary to identify the main 
drivers of change in Russia and assess how and the degree to which they 
can affect investment or contract possibilities. Some drivers have a fairly 
certain direction, while others are more uncertain. 
Both past lessons and the analysis of driving forces indicate that it 
will remain important to be cautious when entering sectors of possible 
strategic significance for the Russian government. So far, the Russian 
centralisation and re-nationalisation of oil and gas assets seem to have 
affected the smaller players and the supply industry to a lesser degree than 
the major players, and oil assets less than gas. Nevertheless, the recent 
decision to let Total and StatoilHydro enter the Shtokman project shows 
that the door is not closed to big projects as long as international financing 
and technology is needed and – importantly – the Russian side can still 
exert sufficient control. The central question is how this new type of deal 
will play out over time – whether trust and win–win will prevail over 
distrust and discord, given the uncertainties that remain in Russia’s 
business climate.  
Often it may be safer and easier to become involved in small-scale 
projects that are below the radar of high politics or to avoid challenging the 
Russian need for control. The big equity prize might be within reach if the 
game is played right, but the costs and risks must be assessed carefully. 
When aiming for control there is always a risk of stepping on someone 
else’s toes, and if that someone happens to be well connected, life can 
become miserable for the offender. 
For companies involved in energy efficiency projects and also for 
those in the renewable energy business, the driving forces that may 
influence the power prices in Russia are of utmost importance. If, because 
of gas supply shortages, carbon fees, international emissions commitments 
or other reasons, Russia is forced to implement a painful gas and power 
price reform that substantially raises domestic power prices, there will be 
an enormous potential for energy efficiency projects. As Russia is the 
world’s least energy-efficient country, there are huge possible challenges 
and gains in this area. But compared with the evident potential of German, 
Danish, Finnish and Swedish companies in this field, the question for 
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advantage of such a window of opportunity if it opened – or whether they 
would actually lack the necessary technology.  
All in all, there are numerous good opportunities for companies 
doing or planning business in Russia. But there are also considerable risks. 
Some of the trends that can be observed in Russia today suggest that there 
is reason to be cautious about going into the Russian markets, while other 
development trends point to huge opportunities and an increasingly 
attractive market for investments. The key point for any foreign company 
seeking to do business in Russia is to have a strategy that is both robust and 
flexible.  
Thus, it is crucial to study carefully a range of development trends in 
Russia, not only those that pertain to the market segment of interest in a 
narrow sense. Above we indicated some primary drivers to watch as a set 
of ‘early warnings’. In this way, investors can determine at an early stage 
whether Russia is headed in the right or wrong direction in relation to their 
business plans. Based on that analysis they can trigger a predefined 
strategy for what to do with existing or planned investments: whether to 
exit, stay, enter or wait and see. 
5.  How can the Northern Dimension make a difference? 
We have focused on some principal driving forces and uncertainties within 
Russia, such as the state’s role in the economy, the robustness of the 
economy, developments in the gas sector, global climate policy and 
Gazprom’s strategy, and noted that they are likely to have an impact on the 
climate for foreign investment in the Russian energy sector. The main goal 
has been to point out the importance of analysing possible long-term 
tendencies and outlining strategies for the different trends. Part of the 
rationale for this is risk mitigation.  
The Northern Dimension aims, among other things, at helping to 
build public–private partnerships in north-western Russia. The main effect 
of such initiatives for business is precisely risk mitigation. Project support 
through a range of Northern Dimension initiatives, including financial 
support and coordination, can help to reduce the risks and possible 
downsides of projects. Initiatives can also help in identifying possible 
partners and good projects, and in establishing cross-border contacts. 
Measures targeting issues such as easier border crossing, the fight against 
corruption and organised crime, and judicial cooperation, will also 
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How does the Northern Dimension contribute to risk mitigation for 
foreign companies in the Russian energy sector? So far, the new Northern 
Dimension has been rather unexplored territory for energy firms. This 
means that experience is limited, providing little empirical basis for our 
analysis. Still, the current discussion of an energy partnership and 
substantial projects underway in the Northern Dimension area, such as 
Shtokman, can very possibly elevate energy issues onto the Northern 
Dimension agenda.  
In general, large companies like StatoilHydro with a role in extensive 
projects as well as the major supply companies do not seek project support 
through policy initiatives like the Northern Dimension. Any financial 
support from partnership with governmental or intergovernmental bodies 
would be entirely marginal compared with the size of such projects. 
Furthermore, other more specialised organisations, like the Norwegian 
INTSOK,7 are better placed to address the needs of big oil and oil supply 
companies abroad. Of course, companies can benefit from a general climate 
of cooperation and cross-border contact generated by Northern Dimension 
projects, but this is probably not a key ingredient in their success formula. 
More important for these major oil companies than large, lofty 
multilateral cooperation programmes are bilateral contacts between 
governments and active state backing of their case. That Russian–
Norwegian bilateral relations were fairly good and that StatoilHydro 
received full backing from the Norwegian government were probably 
paramount factors for a partnership deal in the Shtokman project. Should, 
on the other hand, government-level bilateral relations worsen 
significantly, that could cause problems for a company like StatoilHydro. 
But the dependency works both ways: if the principal oil players do well, 
that can strengthen the bilateral ties between their home country and 
Russia.  
This perspective seems particularly r e l e v a n t  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  s t a t e -
controlled and national oil companies. Success in Shtokman can have a 
positive impact on state relations between Norway and Russia, whereas 
failure could deal a blow to the bilateral ties between Norwegian and 
Russian political authorities. And a massive project like the Shtokman 
development will itself have an indirect effect on the Northern Dimension 
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agenda: when implemented, the project will have a huge impact on the 
general business climate in north-western Russia, thereby affecting the 
policy agenda of the Northern Dimension. 
For the major power companies it is not clear how or whether 
initiatives under the Northern Dimension could be influential. It is stated 
that one of the possible areas for partnership support would be 
infrastructure programmes, but the extent to which that would facilitate 
investments in big power is uncertain. The strategic character of the power 
sector makes it more susceptible to shifts in governmental bilateral 
relations than to multilateral programmes. That notwithstanding, the 
Russian side has been seen to use the Northern Dimension as a platform for 
discussion and as a sounding board for its thinking on strategic sectors. The 
Northern Dimension could hence develop into a platform for 
intergovernmental dialogue and improved understanding of Russian 
views. Thus far, the Russian side has introduced the infrastructure and 
transport sectors to the agenda, and the power sector could be a future 
candidate for policy dialogue.  
What our analysis therefore indicates is that the greatest impacts on 
energy issues within the Northern Dimension area stem from outside the 
Northern Dimension platform. For the present, it seems that the Northern 
Dimension on its own is most likely to make a difference and influence 
project opportunities in the areas of consulting, energy efficiency and new 
energy. These areas are far less politicised than the more strategic oil, gas 
and power sectors. The need for good projects is also great in these fields, 
and will be even greater as climate and energy supply concerns gain 
prominence. Promoting business cooperation in these areas could do much 
good for the region, while also creating market opportunities for European 
companies with pertinent expertise (see Figure 10.1). 
Companies in the sectors of renewable energy and energy efficiency 
tend to be small, with clear limits to their capital base. Under the Northern 
Dimension Environmental Partnership, there are some opportunities for 
project support in these fields. Whether foreign companies will benefit 
from the Northern Dimension will depend on whether they have relevant 
competence and products to deliver. Small supply companies to the oil 
industry, typically sub-contractors, may also benefit from Northern 
Dimension projects. 
For companies that stand to gain from support through the Northern 
Dimension there are various different possibilities. The general model for 
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partners, as well as from international and private financial institutions 
where appropriate.8 For Norwegian companies, however, there are already 
ways to seek state support for such projects. These schemes include 
INTSOK, Innovation Norway, the Norwegian Guarantee Institute for 
Export Credits and the Barents Secretariat. Particularly the investment fund 
of Innovation Norway seems a measure that resembles investment support 
through the Northern Dimension. 
Figure 10.1 Directions of influence 
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help to promote synergies from existing arrangements. In addition, we 
should note that the success of governmental investment funding has not 
been unambiguous. So far, investment funding from Innovation Norway 
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successful in identifying the most profitable projects.9 There is a double 
edge to any investment support sword. On the one hand, such support 
                                                      
8 See European Commission, “Overview”, Directorate-General for External 
Relations, European Commission, Brussels, October, 2007 (retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/#Objectives). 
9 See Econ Pöyry, Evaluering av fondene for Øst-Europa og Nordvest-Russland, Econ-
rapport 2007-103, Innovasjon Norge, Oslo, 2007 (retrieved from www.econ.no/ 
modules/trykksak/publication_detail.asp?iProjectId=6731). 
? 
? 
Renewable energy, 
energy efficiency + 
and small oil supply 
Northern Dimension 
Bilateral relations  Major oil and supply 
industry 
Big power FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT IN THE RUSSIAN ENERGY SECTOR| 179 
should not encourage unprofitable projects: unsuccessful business activity 
does not foster mutual trust, stability or broader cooperation. On the other 
hand, the very purpose of governmental investment support is to promote 
investment activity where it otherwise would not materialise. That means 
taking on more risky projects.  
There are obviously also areas in which the Northern Dimension 
framework can be useful for companies working in Russia in more general 
terms. Infrastructure programmes, as well as programmes aimed at easier 
border crossings, combating corruption and organised crime, and judicial 
cooperation could all contribute to lowering the threshold for companies 
entering the Russian market. Furthermore, the Northern Dimension can 
have an important role to play as a provider of information, for example 
through informal channels such as the Northern Dimension business fora. 
These meetings may provide better information about business 
opportunities and enhanced understanding of emerging new policies, as 
well as contribute to an improved overall business framework. 
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11. STRATEGIC SECTORS OF THE RUSSIAN 
ECONOMY: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
DEVELOPING NEW NORTHERN 
DIMENSION PARTNERSHIPS 
KARI LIUHTO
∗ 
1.  The emergence of strategic sectors in Russia 
The new Northern Dimension agreed on in 2006 is structured around 
sectorally defined partnerships. Alongside the existing Northern 
Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP) and the Northern 
Dimension Partnership on Public Health and Social Well-being (NDPHS), a 
new partnership on transport and logistics is to be launched in autumn 
2008, while the prospects for a partnership on energy are being considered. 
Any steps in these new directions will mean an increasing need for 
cooperation between public and private bodies. Transport, logistics and 
energy are areas in which states as well as the EU as a supranational 
coordination institution issue legislation, regulations and strategic 
guidelines. Companies, for their part, are responsible for building ports, 
transport hubs and pipelines, along with extracting and processing energy 
resources, and distributing and selling energy to consumers. Also, pressure 
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to exploit the economic potential of the Northern Dimension area and to 
make the Northern Dimension a vehicle for practical cooperation 
accentuates the role of companies. Of particular interest will be their 
operating environment in north-western Russia, which is home to many 
energy resources, as well as a transit area for raw materials from more 
distant regions. Moreover, north-western Russia is a fast-growing market 
compared with the stalled growth in northern European EU member states. 
For these reasons, this chapter concentrates on the operating 
environment for foreign companies in north-western Russia, while also 
examining trends with some reference to the experiences of Finnish, 
Norwegian and other non-Russian companies based in the Northern 
Dimension area. The Finnish case is particularly illustrative, as Finnish–
Russian trade is intense and has generally been working well; therefore, 
any problems detected are likely to indicate similar or worse problems for 
other companies from the Northern Dimension area.  
A key issue here concerns the effects of Russia’s new policy of 
defining some parts of its economy as strategic sectors. President Vladimir 
Putin brought the idea into the global limelight in his annual address to the 
Federal Assembly in April 2005: 
Investors sometimes face all kinds of limitations, including some that 
are explained by national security reasons, though these limitations 
are not legally formalized. This uncertainty creates problems for the 
state and investors. It is time we clearly determined the economic 
sectors where the interests of bolstering Russia’s independence and 
security call for predominant control by national, including state, 
capital. I mean some infrastructure facilities, enterprises that fulfil 
state defence orders, mineral deposits of strategic importance for the 
future of the country and future generations, as well as infrastructure 
monopolies…Some industrialized countries use this approach and we 
should also use it.1 
Three years later, in May 2008, Putin signed a law on strategic sectors 
of the economy, restricting the participation of foreign-owned companies 
(see Box 11.1). 
                                                      
1 See V. Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation”, 
Kremlin, Moscow, 25 April 2005 (retrieved from www.kremlin.ru.eng/speeches/ 
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Box 11.1 Summary and evaluation of the 2008 law on strategic sectors 
Main sectors restricted: 
•  Nuclear installations and materials 
•  Ciphering-related activities 
•  Arms and military technology 
•  Aviation technology 
•  Communication services  
•  Metals and metal alloys important for the army 
•  Extraction of minerals on subsoil plots of federal importance 
•  Catching water biological resources (fisheries) 
•  Television, radio broadcasting, large-scale publishing and printing 
Main ownership restrictions: 
•  Foreign companies are not allowed to have control over companies 
of strategic importance to Russia – foreign firms may own only up 
to 50% of such companies. If ownership reaches the 50% mark or 
more, foreign companies need permission from a commission led by 
the prime minister. 
•  Foreign state-owned companies need permission from the above-
mentioned commission to own more than 25% of a strategic 
company. 
•  Stricter restrictions apply to the use of minerals on subsoil plots of 
federal importance. The ownership limit is set at 10% for private 
foreign firms and 5% for foreign government-owned firms. 
•  Foreign firms may own up to 50% of subsoil plots of federal 
importance if the plot is located on the continental shelf of Russia 
and the main partner is a Russian state-owned entity. 
Some weaknesses in the law: 
•  It covers some sectors that are non-strategic for the country’s 
defence and state security, like catching water biological resources, 
publishing, printing, television and radio broadcasting. 
•  It does not explicitly state what metals are deemed important for the 
army. 
•  The process of foreign companies’ participation in strategic 
companies is highly vulnerable to administrative misuse and 
political choice. 
•  Ownership restrictions are not clear for foreign firms regarded as 
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This new law forms only the tip of the iceberg, however – the explicit 
part of the strategic government policy. The implicit element of the policy 
is the creation of Russian-owned corporations in key industries of the 
economy (‘national champions’). This latter aspect can be accomplished by 
using state finance such as funding capital received from the state or by 
means of favourable loans from Kremlin-friendly financial organisations. 
Moreover, the authorities in relation to the environment, construction and 
taxation, for example, as well as regional administrations, can slow down 
the operations of foreign competitors or other Russian corporations 
perceived as not loyal to the Kremlin.  
By early 2008, Russia had formed several state corporations operating 
in fields such as strategic investments, nanotechnology, infrastructure, 
heavy industry and nuclear technology.2 Further state corporations may be 
founded for modernising the road network, for developing fisheries and in 
the pharmaceutical sector.3 In addition to such state-owned national 
corporations, the Russian government may treat private companies as 
national champions. This may be done to secure the loyalty of oligarchs or 
to establish the Kremlin’s invisible but de facto control over private 
companies. Means of establishing control include issuing licenses for   
 
                                                      
2 The term ‘state corporation’ refers to a hybrid of a joint stock company and a 
federal state-owned company. Upon their founding, these corporations become 
owners of state property in their own economic sector. Their financial reporting 
requirements are far less strict than are those of joint stock companies and they 
enjoy considerably more freedom in taking financial decisions. Their profits are not 
transferred to the budget; instead, they remain with the corporation, to be spent on 
the implementation of its statutory objectives. Finally, they are supervised directly 
by the president of the Russian Federation. See I. Wisniewska, “State-owned 
Corporations – A New Way of Managing the Russian Economy”, East Week 
Analytical Newsletter, No. 37/102, 24 October 2007 (retrieved from 
www.osw.waw.pl/files/EastWeek_102.pdf);  see also I. Wisniewska, “State 
Corporations – State Property in de facto Private Hands”, Baltic Rim Economies, No. 
1/2008 (retrieved from www.tse.fi/FI/yksikot/erillislaitokset/pei/Documents/ 
bre2008/expert_article170_12008.pdf). 
3 See the East Week Analytical Newsletter, No. 37/102, 24 October 2007 (retrieved 
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natural resource exploitation, giving priority access to pipelines, inviting 
the company to ‘friendly’ auctions, offering low-cost state loans or 
guarantees and using the authorities to harass competing businesses.  
2.  Impact on foreign direct investment inflows to Russia 
The Russian stock of foreign direct investment (FDI) jumped from $5 billion 
in 1995 to nearly $200 billion by the end of 2006.4 The annual FDI inflows in 
2007 supported this growth trend by surging to $52 billion.5 Still, without 
the re-nationalisation of Yukos and the introduction of strategic sector 
policies, Russia’s FDI inflows would have been even larger. Indeed, Russia 
seems prepared to sacrifice at least some of its FDI inflows to ensure greater 
state control over certain sectors of the economy (Table 11.1). 
Table 11.1 FDI and its significance in selected countries 
  Inward FDI stock 
($ billion) 
FDI stock per 
 capita ($)  
   1990  1995  2000  2006    2006 
Russia –     5    32  198    1,398 
Brazil 37   43  103  222    1,168 
China, excl. Hong Kong  25  137  193  298       221 
Poland     0.1     8    34  104    2,690 
Ukraine –     0.9      4    23       486 
US 395  536  1257  1789    5,941 
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report, UNCTAD, Geneva, 2002, 2006 and 2007. 
It should be noted that some of Russia’s FDI boom results from the 
repatriation of Russian capital. For example, during the current decade, the 
share of Cyprus, Switzerland and the British Virgin Islands has been 15–
25% of annual FDI flows into Russia (Table 11.2).  
                                                      
4 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World 
Investment Report, UNCTAD, Geneva, 2007. 
5 See Economist Intelligence Unit, Russia: Country Report, Economist Intelligence 
Unit, London, March 2008(a) (retrieved from www.eiu.com). STRATEGIC SECTORS OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY| 185 
Table 11.2 FDI inflows to Russia by origin (%) 
   1995  2000  2002 2003  2004  2005  2006 2007 
Q3 
UK 6  6  12 16  17  16  13 24 
Netherlands 3  11  6 6  13  17  12 20 
Cyprus 1  13  12 14  14  10  18 14 
Luxembourg   0  2  6 8  21  26  11 9 
France 4  7  6 13  6  3  6 5 
Germany 10  13  20 15  4  6  9 4 
Virgin Islands 
(UK) 
1  1  7 5  2  2  4 2 
Switzerland 15  7  7 4  4  4  4 9 
US 28  15  6 4  5  3  3 2 
Others 33  25  19 17  15  15  28 23 
Source: L. Vinhas de Souza, ”Foreign investment in Russia”, ECFIN Country Focus, Vol. 5, 
No. 1, 2008 (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/ 
publication10969_en.pdf). 
The repatriation of Russian capital may also explain why the 
emerging strategic sectors of the economy are not yet fully reflected in the 
statistics. For example, in 2007 17% of Russia’s total foreign direct 
investment of $52 billion went into the mineral extraction industries.6 That 
would mean non-Russian controlled firms investing some $10 billion in the 
sector – which seems unlikely without factoring in returning Russian funds 
(Table 11.3). 
The same ambiguous pattern is evident at the regional level. To take 
the case of Finnish investment in Russia, an educated guess might set the 
cumulated Finnish FDI in Russia at some €3–5 billion, mostly invested in 
St. Petersburg and Moscow. Official statistics, however, indicate a stock of 
less than €2 billion (Table 11.4). 
                                                      
6 See BOFIT Weekly, No. 15, 11 April 2008 (retrieved from www.bof.fi/NR/ 
rdonlyres/C13F0945-DA93-47EF-8BDB-B595A18E7106/0/w200815.pdf). 186 | KARI LIUHTO 
Table 11.3 FDI inflows to Russia by sector (%) 
 2003  2004  2005  2006 3Q2007 
Agriculture, hunting and forestry  0.5  0.3  0.2  0.6 0.3 
Mining and quarrying  19.3  24.5  11.2  16.6 17.3 
Mining and quarrying of energy 
producing products 
17.3  21.6  9.6  14.1 16.0 
Mining and quarrying, except of energy 
producing products 
2.0  2.9  1.6  2.5 1.3 
Manufacturing 22  25.3  33.5  27.5 24.6 
Manufacture of food products  3.4  2.3  2.2  2.5 2.5 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical 
products 
1.2  1.9  2.7  2.8 1.2 
Manufacture of metals and fabricated 
metal products 
10.3  12.6  6.4  6.8 12.6 
Manufacture of transport equipment  0.7  2.1  1.8  2.6 0.9 
Manufacture of coke and mineral oil  0.6  0.2  15.1  7.2 3.8 
Services 58.2  49.9  55.1  55.3 57.8 
Construction 0.3  0.6  0.4  1.3 1.2 
Wholesale, retail, repair activities  36.1  32.9  38.2  23.7 42.3 
Transport and communication  3.8  5  7.2  9.6 6.5 
of which communication only  2.3  3.4  6.1  8.5 2.9 
Financial intermediation  2.6  2.5  3.4  8.5 2.4 
Source: Vinhas de Souza (2008), op. cit. 
Table 11.4 FDI flows between Finland and Russia (€ million) 
 1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 2007 
Finnish FDI 
stock in Russia 
  91  196  314  458  342  374  559  1,097  1,676 1,797 
Russian FDI 
stock in Finland 
272  241  241  306  449  338  366    378    431    446 
Source: Bank of Finland, Tilastoja suorista investoinneista Suomeen ja Suomesta, 2008, Bank of 
Finland, Helsinki, 2008. 
On top of this estimate comes the major investment by the Finnish 
power-generation company Fortum. In February 2008, Fortum won the 
auction for TGC-10, part of Russia’s main electricity producer RAO UES. 
The deal in which Fortum acquired a 29% stake for €800 million was part of 
a wider electricity-sector privatisation launched in 2007. Fortum was also 
required to commit itself to buying a further stake of 34–47% through a 
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the minority shareholders, such a move would raise the overall investment 
to around €2.7 billion. This energy sector deal is thus by a wide margin the 
largest investment made by a Finnish company in Russia. Most other 
companies have so far operated mainly in the consumer goods sector, as 
well as the metal, construction and forestry sectors (Table 11.5).7 
Table 11.5 Largest Finnish employers in Russia 
Company Activities  Employees 
2007 
Fazer  5 bakeries, several AMICA catering firms  3,700 
Stockmann  4 department stores (Seppälä, Hobby Hall)  2,640 
YIT Construction  2,154 
Rautaruukki  Ventall, service centre  2,100 
Stora Enso  2 sawmills, 3 packing factories  1,950 
Sanoma  Magazines, kiosks, newspaper distribution   1,820 
PKC Group  2 assembling factories  1,820 
Atria  Meat product factory  1,500 
Kesko  8 construction material supermarkets  1,440 
UPM  Sawmill, plywood factory, logging company  1,210 
Kemira  6 Tikkurila paint factories, logistics centre  1,200 
Lemminkäinen  Several construction projects, Kaluga industrial park  1,000 
Source: Ostint Oy, ”Suomalaisyritykset työllistävät Venäjällä jo 35 000 ihmistä”, Kauppalehti, 
17 April 2008. 
3.  Main trends in Russia’s sensitive sectors 
The evolving Russian economy can be divided into the non-sensitive, 
economically sensitive, militarily sensitive and top sensitive sectors (Figure 
11.1). 
From the perspective of developing the new Northern Dimension 
partnership on transport and logistics and a possible partnership on 
energy, it is crucial to note that key activities within these spheres fall into 
the ‘top sensitive’ category. This means that in these sectors the Russian 
state will be an increasingly central actor that all partners must include as 
part of their strategies and plans. This proviso applies to the Finnish 
                                                      
7 See the article, “Raising New Doubts about State Capitalism”, Moscow Times, 10 
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Fortum’s electricity sector investments and even more so to the Norwegian 
energy companies currently establishing a presence in north-western 
Russia (see chapter 10).  
Figure 11.1 Strategic sectors of the Russian economy 
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Straddling the top sensitive and the militarily sensitive categories we 
find pharmaceuticals, shipbuilding and shipping, all of which have 
assumed this status during 2007–08. The telecoms sector, in which Nordic 
companies are active in north-western Russia, belongs to the militarily 
sensitive category, as does strategic innovations (which has recently been 
elevated there). Non-strategic metals, fisheries and forestry, for their part, 
have recently jumped into the economically sensitive category. Of the latter 
two, fisheries are important for Norwegian interests and forestry for STRATEGIC SECTORS OF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY| 189 
Finnish and Swedish industries. At the bottom end, the consumer goods 
sector, where most Finnish companies operate, has remained relatively 
independent of state involvement (Figure 11.1).  
These general trends are discussed in greater detail to highlight the 
possibilities of building new partnerships and promoting economic activity 
across borders in the Northern Dimension area.  
The top sensitive sector 
1) State takeovers in the oil business continue. The natural gas business is 
already strictly under state control. State-controlled Gazprom produces 
over 80% of the natural gas in Russia. It controls all gas pipelines and 
possesses an export monopoly, while the government decides on access to 
large gas fields. Even if the share of private companies in gas production 
should increase during the next few decades, and minority stakes be sold to 
foreigners, Russia’s natural gas is bound to remain under tight state 
control. 
In the oil business, the systematic takeover by the state has continued 
since the commencement of the Yukos affair in 2003. State ownership in 
publicly-traded oil firms increased from 32% in 2004 to 47% in 2007.8 The 
role of foreign companies has become more limited as a result of the new 
law on strategic sectors, which restricts their access to projects in large 
fields. Global oil majors like Royal Dutch Shell have also experienced 
setbacks as they have been forced to sell some or all of the shares obtained 
in the lucrative production sharing agreements of the 1990s. The recent 
difficulties of BP with its Russian partners in TNK-BP may indicate a 
continuation of this trend. On the other hand, firms such as the Finnish 
Neste Oil, which is a petroleum product trader rather than a crude oil 
producer, have not been directly affected. 
2) A Pyrrhic victory in the privatisation of the electricity sector. In July 
2007, the Russian government approved a charter for the nuclear giant 
Atomenergoprom. The company will control all state-owned nuclear 
                                                      
8 See Troika Dialog, “Who Owns Russia?”, Troika Dialog, Moscow, 2008(a) 
(retrieved from www.troika.ru). Oil companies owned by regions or the state 
accounted for 15% of oil production in 2003. By the end of 2007, their share had 
already risen to 36%; see the article, “Sähkön hinta noussut Venäjän 
sähköpörssissä”,  BOFIT Weekly, No. 35, 30 August 2007 (retrieved from 
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assets, including uranium production, electricity generation and 
engineering assets. Furthermore, the state seeks to increase the share of 
nuclear energy from the current 16% to 25–30% of all electricity production 
by 2030. As the country’s electricity consumption is growing, this means 
that Russia would have to build 42 new nuclear reactors. At present, it 
operates 31 reactors.9 
Non-Russian firms face legal restrictions in the nuclear sector. They 
may yet find business opportunities, however. For instance, in November 
2007, German Siemens signed a memorandum of understanding with 
Rosatom for collaboration in developing nuclear power facilities in Russia 
and abroad. The agreement envisages developing nuclear power reactors 
based on Russian design and using Siemens’ technology. Similarly, 
Japanese Toshiba has signed a preliminary agreement to design and build 
power plants and to develop production capabilities for nuclear fuel. 
Huge hopes were laid on the privatisation of RAO UES, which used 
to produce some 70% of Russia’s electrical energy. It is definitely a positive 
sign that four foreign companies – Italian Enel, German E.ON, Finnish 
Fortum and German RWE – have managed to acquire strategic stakes in 4 
out of 20 power generating units. At the same time, this is overshadowed 
by Gazprom’s entry into the business. According to estimates, Gazprom 
and SUEK (Siberian Coal Energy Company) are set to gain control over 
more than 40% of the generation assets formerly controlled by RAO UES. 
Together they will also have a near monopoly on the fossil fuels used in 
power generation. SUEK is by far the country’s largest producer of coal, 
while Gazprom is the natural gas export monopoly.10 In other words, 
Gazprom and SUEK will be able to exert supply leverage on all other 
private power-generation companies. 
                                                      
9 See the article, “President Putin’s State-of-the-Nation Address to the Parliament 
Stresses Higher Spending on Economic and Social Development”, BOFIT Weekly, 
No. 18, 5 May 2007 (retrieved from www.bof.fi/NR/rdonlyres/BB562C1B-0C0C-
4B3D-863A-7AC117AEC680/0/we07.pdf); Troika Dialog, “Government Reiterates 
Aggressive Plans for Nuclear Development”, Troika Dialog, Moscow, 19 March 
2007(a) (retrieved from www.troika.ru); and the article, “Rosatom Set for Big 
Expansion”, Moscow Times, 17 March 2008. 
10 See the article, “Gazprom and SUEK Reach Merger Deal”, Moscow Times, 27 
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The Pyrrhic victory concerning the privatisation of Russia’s energy 
sector also raises some doubts regarding the price reform pledged for 2011. 
There are some concerns that a full price liberalisation of industrial 
electricity prices may not take place. The liberalisation of electricity charges 
to private households is even less certain. The ministry for the economy has 
already proposed postponing the gas price liberalisation.11  
3)  Increasing state control over strategic metal producers and heavy 
industry. Some 70% of the metal and mining industry, which is important in 
energy production, is in private hands; the state’s share is only 3%.12 Yet, 
there are clear signs of the emergence of economic nationalism and 
consolidation here as well. Even without direct ownership, the Kremlin 
uses its indirect control through directors loyal to the state’s strategic goals. 
A classic example of such a Kremlin loyalist is Oleg Deripaska, Russia’s 
wealthiest person, with a fortune of $28 billion.13 Russia’s aluminium sector 
has de facto converged around Deripaska’s companies Basic Element and 
Rusal. Now he aims at acquiring the country’s leading metal producer 
Norilsk Nickel, which has large production sites in north-western Russia.  
In November 2007, the Russian state founded Rostekhnologii to 
increase the competitiveness of the heavy industry.14 Simultaneously, 
business in strategic metals, such as titanium, became concentrated in this 
state corporation. It would not be a major surprise if Rostekhnologii should 
proceed to acquire firms operating in the strategic metals sector, one by 
one.  
                                                      
11 See Troika Dialog, “Economics Ministry Proposes Postponing Gas Price 
Liberalisation”, Troika Dialog, Moscow, 2 April 2008(b) (retrieved from 
www.troika.ru). 
12 See Troika Dialog (2008a), op. cit. 
13 In July 2007, Deripaska even conceded that he would give up Rusal to the state if 
asked to do so; see the article, “Metal Moves”, Business Eastern Europe, 11 February 
2008. 
14 Rostekhnologii brings together the Russian weapons export monopoly 
Rosoboroneksport, the titanium producer VSMPO-AVISMA, the automotive 
manufacturer AvtoVAZ, the helicopter producer Oboronprom and several other 
companies; see Economist Intelligence Unit, Russia: Country Report, Economist 
Intelligence Unit, London, January 2008(c) (www.eiu.com). The company is headed 
by Sergey Chemezov, Vladimir Putin’s former colleague from his time as an 
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A positive sign in this sector is that Renault acquired a blocking stake 
(25%) of Russia’s leading car manufacturer AvtoVAZ through a $1.2 billion 
investment in March 2008. In the field of civilian aviation, Deutsche Bank 
has a 7% stake in the national carrier Aeroflot. Finally, in early 2008, the 
Italian Alenia was given the right to acquire a blocking stake in Sukhoi’s 
civilian aircraft division. 
4)  The state is strengthening its role in logistics. In April 2007, Putin 
signed a degree on the acquisition of the petroleum-product pipeline 
operator Transnefteprodukt through Transneft, the crude-oil pipeline 
monopoly operator. In November 2007, Transneft’s CEO Nikolai Tokarev, a 
former KGB general, stated that Transnefteprodukt would retain its 
independence within its new patron company.15 Still, the acquisition and 
the appointment of Putin’s former colleague to head the operation 
represent clear steps towards strengthening the state’s grip over strategic 
logistics. 
In November 2007, Sovkomflot started merger proceedings with the 
state-controlled shipping major Novoship. Once completed, this operation 
is expected to create the fifth greatest shipping giant in the world, with 
assets of nearly $5 billion. The merged company is expected to develop a 
strong focus on the Arctic region and the transport of energy supplies from 
Russia’s Far East. It would operate a fleet of 113 vessels with another 36 on 
order, including ice breakers designed for Arctic shipping lines.16 This 
implies the beginning of the consolidation of the shipping industry. The 
newly established, state-owned United Shipbuilding Corporation will 
support this trend. 
Signals of growing state control over major seaports are becoming 
stronger. For instance, in March 2008, Transneft started construction of the 
Kozmino oil terminal on Russia’s Pacific coast. In the Baltic Sea, Ust-Luga is 
considered one of the most strategically important ports and its further 
development ranks high on the Russian agenda. 
It is not yet fully clear whether the pressure applied by both Russian 
authorities and the company Rosstroy in 2007 concerning the facilities of 
                                                      
15 See Troika Dialog, “Putin Signs Decree of Accession of Transnefteproduct into 
Transneft”, Troika Dialog, Moscow, 17 April 2008(c); Troika Dialog, 
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the Finnish company Container Finance in Kronstadt was orchestrated by 
federal bodies or competing companies. After Container Finance decided to 
sell a major stake in two of its subsidiaries to Severstaltrans at the end of 
2007, the situation calmed down. It is to be hoped that this partnership will 
prove sustainable and does not lead to a cuckoo strategy whereby the 
expanding newcomer throws the original owner out of the nest. 
The militarily sensitive sector 
1) Telecommunications: A mixture of stagnation and turbulence. Vladislav 
Surkov, a senior member of the presidential administration, has indicated 
that national capital has to be dominant in the ownership of strategic 
communications. The term ‘national’ capital seems to mean ‘Russian’ 
capital, but not necessarily state-controlled capital. Russian entrepreneurs 
playing on the team with the Russian state may thus qualify. At the same 
time, a distinction is made between trusted oligarchs and ‘offshore 
Russians’.17 
It is difficult to estimate the long-term role of foreign companies in 
Russian telecommunications. Major fixed-line telecoms companies seem to 
be classified as strategic. For example, any sale in the government’s stake in 
the national fixed-line operator Svyazinvest would probably come under 
government scrutiny. The same most likely pertains to the long-distance 
services provider Rostelecom, which has a significant market share in 
several regions as well as in Moscow and St. Petersburg.18 
The privatisation of Svyazinvest has been postponed several times. 
The Russian military has followed this privatisation very keenly and has 
probably slowed down the process. The army has also been concerned 
about the destiny of Rostelecom.  
One of Russia’s leading mobile telecommunication companies, 
Altimo, has created considerable turbulence in Megafon, which is partially 
owned by the Swedish–Finnish TeliaSonera, and in Vimpelcom, which is 
partially owned by the Norwegian Telenor. A business divorce between 
Altimo and Telenor may well be in sight. Altimo has several times offered 
                                                      
17 See P. Hanson, “The Russian Economic Puzzle: Going Forwards, Backwards or 
Sideways?”, International Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 5, 2008, pp. 869–89. 
18 See the article, “Strategic Sector Bill Clears 2nd Reading”, Moscow Times, 24 March 
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asset swaps to TeliaSonera. A new page in this saga was Altimo’s 
announcement to sell its stake in Megafon in exchange for Telia-Sonera’s 
stake in Turkish Turkcell. 
2) Main media assets taken over by the state and its loyalists. The most 
important electronic media are currently under direct or indirect state 
control. Also, some print media have come into the hands of Kremlin-loyal 
tycoons. The new law on strategic sectors aims at restricting the 
participation of foreign firms in the publishing and printing business. It 
covers large-circulation newspapers and publishing companies with the 
capacity to print 200 million pages per month, and periodicals with a 
circulation of at least a million copies. Broadcast media covering at least 
half the country are deemed strategic. Non-Russians are thus effectively 
excluded from holding majority stakes in nationwide television stations 
like state-controlled Channel One, Rossiia and NTV.19 
Even if Internet service providers were not listed in Russia’s 2008 law, 
no one can guarantee their non-restricted status in the future, especially if 
the political regime turns more conservative and nationalistic. The role of 
foreign firms in leisure-oriented print media, such as fashion, sports and 
the yellow media, seems to be accepted by Russia’s ruling elite as long as 
political affairs and the main political figures are not touched.  
3)  Increasing risks for foreign firms in strategic innovation supporting 
Russia’s defence industry. The Russian state wants to invest in the 
diversification of the civilian economy and to increase its competitiveness. 
The establishment of the state corporation in nanotechnology in 2007 was 
one means to that effect. The state’s involvement might prove 
counterproductive, however, by restricting the formation of normal and 
sustainable competitiveness.  
In the defence sector, the army needs technological innovations to 
make a serious comeback in the arena of the world’s major military powers. 
According to the then first deputy prime minister Sergei Ivanov, “there is 
every reason to call the military-industrial complex the locomotive of 
diversification”.20 This assertion might have applied to the Soviet era, when 
most civilian high-tech goods were produced by the military-industrial 
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complex. But if Russia should resort to this strategy today, the results 
would be far from certain. It is clear that a military-led reform will be much 
more expensive than a reform conducted by private entities. Moreover, 
foreign firms will most likely hesitate to participate in any innovation 
development run by the Russian army. In addition, many army-related 
activities are already classified as strategic and thus they have become off-
limits to foreign firms. 
The economically sensitive sector 
1) Banking and insurance. Surkov has stressed the strategic importance of the 
financial system to the Russian state.21 The law on the strategic sectors does 
not concern banking or insurance, but even if Russia joins the WTO, it is 
likely to restrict certain segments of this branch. In the context of the 
Northern Dimension, this sector is important in funding large-scale 
transport, logistics and energy projects, and there are signs that the Russian 
state wants greater involvement by Russian private financial institutions in 
the Northern Dimension. 
At the end of 2007, there were more than 1,100 banks in Russia. 
Despite the large number of bank-like institutions, the sector is highly 
concentrated, with the five largest banks accounting for 42% of the assets in 
the sector. The three largest banks are all under state control. A positive 
trend here is the entry of foreign banks: in all, there are more than 200 
foreign-owned banks in Russia, 62 of which are fully foreign-owned. In 
2007, non-Russian ownership in banking grew from 16% to 25%, mainly 
owing to the initial public offerings of two major state-owned banks, 
Sberbank and VTB.22 Indeed, in terms of foreign participation, banking and 
insurance have developed most favourably among the key industries. 
Several operations exemplify this trend: 
•  In February 2007, Sistema agreed to sell a 49% stake in the Rosno 
insurance company to German Allianz for $750 million, with Allianz 
expected to become the major owner of this company. 
•  In April 2007, the Belgian KBC Bank acquired the Russian bank 
Absolut for approximately $1 billion. 
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•  In January 2008, French AXA signed an agreement to purchase a 37% 
stake in one of the largest insurers in Russia, Reso-Garantia, for €810 
million – the largest foreign acquisition in the Russian insurance 
market. 
•  In February 2008, French Société Générale finalised its acquisition of 
control ownership in Rosbank with some $7 billion, representing 
what is probably the largest-ever foreign investment in the Russian 
banking sector.  
Less encouraging are the activities of Kremlin-loyal oligarchs in the 
insurance world. Deripaska-led Basic Element has a dispute over 
ownership in Ingosstrakh. Although it is difficult to determine the real 
reasons behind the dispute, Oleg Ivanov, adviser to the State Duma 
Committee on Credit Organisations, has noted that “the Federal Security 
Service and other branches of the secret services do not buy insurance from 
firms with foreign investors. …There is nothing in the law that prevents 
these kinds of deals. But the agencies have fears that foreigners on the 
board would access private information.”23 Whatever the real reasons, this 
dispute does not encourage other foreign insurers to enter Russia. 
2)  Forestry becoming increasingly sensitive. The total wooded area of 
Russia is some five times larger that of the EU-27. Nevertheless, paper and 
paperboard production figures in the EU-27 are some 15 times higher than 
are those of Russia.24 Russia is the world’s largest exporter of raw wood, 
accounting for one-third of all raw wood exports.25 These figures may have 
motivated Putin to ask in his 2007 state of the nation address: 
Are we [Russians] really gaining maximum benefit from our natural 
resources? This question applies not only to oil, gas and mineral 
resources, but also to our forestry and water resources.26 
                                                      
23 See the article, “Shareholder Spat Hinders Ingosstrakh Acquisitions’, Moscow 
Times, 2007. 
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Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007. 
25 See the article, “Russia Raises Export Tariffs on Raw Wood”, BOFIT Weekly, No. 
7, 16 February 2007 (retrieved from www.bof.fi/NR/rdonlyres/BB562C1B-0C0C-
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26 See V. Putin, “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian 
Federation”, Kremlin, Moscow, 2007 (retrieved from www.kremlin.ru/eng/ 
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The objective of raising the processing level of raw materials in 
Russia resulted in the export tariffs of raw wood rising from €10 per cubic 
metre to €15 in April 2008, with further increases planned to €50 from the 
beginning of 2009. These rises will force Finnish forestry companies to stop 
their raw material imports from Russia. Even though the Finns, as well as 
the EU, understand Russia’s need to increase tariffs in order to improve the 
processing level of its paper and pulp industry, they also note that the tariff 
hikes may contradict the terms of the bilateral EU–Russian WTO accession 
deal agreed in 2004.27  
Another problem is that the transition period is far too short. The 
construction of a modern paper mill is a strategic investment that costs 
around €1–1.5 billion and takes a long time. Furthermore, the foundations 
of the Russian paper industry are anything but firm. The state currently 
owns 96% of the forests. The remaining 4% is held by the regions.28 Major 
foreign companies cannot simply rush into the Russian paper and pulp 
market, building new paper mills without guaranteed access to raw 
materials. An example here is the Finnish Ruukki Group, which withdrew 
from a planned project in Russia after failing to secure a priority position 
for obtaining wood from the Kostroma region.29 
A welcome gesture from the Russian side would be to postpone the 
introduction of increased export tariffs planned for the beginning of 2009, 
and instead give foreign paper companies a five- to seven-year transition 
period to facilitate a proper analysis of the business and political risks of 
Russia in this capital-intensive sector. 
Some Russian oligarchs have shown interest in the forestry sector. In 
particular, certain metal business oligarchs may well move into the paper 
and pulp industry as well. That would increase the political risks. The 
traditionally critical attitudes of Russian citizens towards private and 
                                                      
27 See the article, “Higher Raw Wood Export Tariffs Now in Effect’, BOFIT Weekly, 
4 April 2008 (retrieved from www.bof.fi/NR/rdonlyres/85803501-CE19-4909-
A3D3-2E22591CA89F/0/w200814.pdf); and the article, “Interregnum Delays WTO 
Accession”, Moscow Times, 7 April 2008. 
28 See T. Karjalainen and T. Torniainen, ”Venäjällä metsät säilyvät 
tulevaisuudessakin valtion omistuksessa”, Tieto & trendit, No. 5/2006, March 2006. 
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foreign ownership of the forests also give the Kremlin political support for 
potentially restricting the access of foreign firms to the forestry sector.  
3) Non-strategic metals elevated to economic significance. In the sector of 
ferrous metals, some oligarch-led businesses may assume the role of 
private national champions. Here also, Kremlin-loyal firms are always 
more favoured by the authorities. 
4)  Fisheries  included in the economically sensitive category. Oddly 
enough, the fisheries sector has been included in the economically sensitive 
domain. One reason may be that the Russian navy wants to restrict the 
movements of foreign ships in Russia’s territorial waters. Or it may be a 
result of the extensive corruption prevailing in the fisheries sector. In any 
case, ecological concerns are hardly the reason for including fisheries in the 
sensitive category. 
The non-sensitive sector 
Despite market-specific problems like tremendously increased corruption 
and ‘normal’ (i.e. not orchestrated by the federal level) bureaucratic abuse, 
the production and distribution of consumer goods and services have 
stayed below the Kremlin’s radar. On the other hand, some Kremlin-loyal 
oligarchs like Deripaska are already engaged in the area of strategic 
construction. 
Deripaska has expressed interest in investing heavily to develop 
Russian infrastructure and to create public–private partnerships. Through 
Rusal, Deripaska currently controls stakes in both Glavstroy and 
Transstroy. As Transstroy builds roads, ports and railways, it inevitably 
becomes more privileged than the majority of its competitors. Deripaska-
run companies have also shown great interest in developing the cities of St. 
Petersburg and Sochi (Deripaska has pledged to invest $20 billion in St. 
Petersburg by 2015).30 Even if Deripaska continues to focus on the 
development of major infrastructure projects in these two cities, his 
activities may distort competition in other construction-related sectors, 
especially when large projects are at stake. All this may also affect players 
like the Finnish construction company YIT. 
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Agriculture only narrowly stays within the non-sensitive sector. In 
March 2008, Prime Minister Viktor Zubkov intensified calls for the 
government to prop up Russia’s agricultural industry and raise the 
domestic proportion of food products to 70% by 2012.31 As food and 
agricultural products represented almost 17% of Russia’s imports in 2006,32 
exporters of foodstuffs to Russia may experience challenging times in the 
near future. 
4.  Genesis of Russia’s economic nationalism and the Northern 
Dimension 
With regard to developing the new transport and logistics partnership or 
any other new partnerships where public–private cooperation is pivotal (as 
in the energy sector), the consequences of the new law on the strategic 
sectors are significant and must be taken into account. Although the new 
legislation does not prevent cooperation, it sets clear limitations for it. 
Moreover, we must bear in mind that the legal changes are only the tip of 
the iceberg: they represent the genesis of economic nationalism rather than 
its final form. The major aspects of economic nationalism in Russia are 
developed outside the realm of legislation. As such, it is the operations of 
state corporations and Kremlin-supported oligarchs that represent the main 
risks to any foreign investors.  
On the one hand, it would not be surprising to see more state 
involvement in, for instance, the logistics and forestry sectors. This 
development might also assume an indirect format, through the use of 
Kremlin-loyal oligarchs. As long as state-owned companies are heavily 
involved in a sector, it is likely to remain sensitive; as a result, in sectors 
like electricity generation, the rules of international politics are more 
applicable than are those of international business. 
On the other hand, FDI inflows to Russia can be expected to remain 
at a high level. Despite the strategic government policies, foreign 
companies are attracted by Russia’s fast-growing private consumption. 
With regard to exploiting private capital to develop new Northern 
Dimension partnerships, this may generate considerable economic 
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dynamism in the Northern Dimension area as growth in the EU member 
states stalls. Most likely, the majority of future FDI deals will be conducted 
in the non-sensitive sectors of the Russian economy, especially in the 
private consumption-related branches. Major deals can also be expected in 
the sensitive sectors, but here foreign firms will have to be content with 
minority stakes. 
What does this all mean in practice? To take the case of Finland, the 
overwhelming majority of Finnish firms are currently operating outside the 
strategic sectors, although the largest investments – both current and future 
ones – relate to the sensitive sectors. This tendency reflects the 
attractiveness of Russia’s rapidly expanding, non-strategic, consumption-
related sector and the coterminous need for large investments with 
Western involvement in the energy and other strategic sectors. At the same 
time, economic nationalism appears to be the driving ideology in Russia. 
Indeed, it would seem that Russia has abandoned economic policies in 
favour of the concept of a political economy. This means that political 
actors, regional administrations and private companies from the EU area 
and beyond must work together and in close contact with Russian 
authorities. 
Putin’s endorsement of the law on strategic sectors, signing it as one 
of his last acts as president, does not detract from the task the current 
tandem leadership faces of stopping the implicit spread of economic 
nationalism in Russia. At the grand level, the consequences of this implicit 
economic nationalism may dramatically worsen relations between Russia 
and the EU. Within the confines of the Northern Dimension, they may 
prove detrimental for developing the public–private partnership format. In 
this light, Medvedev’s presidency will put his publicly voiced economic 
liberalism to a real litmus test. It is to be hoped that the test results will not 
prove too acidic for foreign firms operating in the Russian part of the 
Northern Dimension area. 
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12. END COMMENT: EU–RUSSIAN  
RELATIONS AND THE LIMITS  
OF THE NORTHERN DIMENSION 
IRINA BUSYGINA & MIKHAIL FILIPPOV 
1.  Introduction 
This chapter looks at the significance and limits of the Northern Dimension 
within the broader perspective of EU–Russian relations. In theory, the 
Northern Dimension is part of the strategically connected multilevel 
interactions between the governments of the EU member states and Russia. 
Various scholars have already stressed the importance of the multilevel 
nature of EU–Russian relations, focusing on the interactions between the 
Union institutions and the Russian government, Russian bilateral relations 
with member states and cross-border cooperation at the sub-national level.1 
Building on this literature, we go on to investigate more specifically the 
implications of the strategic interconnectedness at all strata of EU–Russian 
relations. 
Our theoretical premise is that representatives of Russia and the EU 
interact at multiple institutional levels, balancing several objectives at once. 
The key actors take into account consequences of interactions at all levels 
but assign differing significance (weights) to the outcome of various 
‘games’. In light of such a strategic linkage, choosing whether to collaborate 
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on one level could explain decisions made on others. Depending on the 
opportunities for cooperation at diverse levels, the existence of hierarchical 
or horizontal power relations on both sides and the perceived relative 
importance of attainable outcomes at each level, such a linkage across 
games could result in counter-intuitive strategies. In the following 
discussion, we focus on one of them: the dissonance between Russian 
foreign policy and its policy towards the Northern Dimension. 
2.  Does Russia welcome the Northern Dimension to compensate 
for political tensions with the EU? 
By now, it will hardly be news that the Russian leadership is willing to 
sustain a certain degree of political conflict with Western counterparts as 
well as with many former Soviet republics. Regardless of the reasons for 
this willingness, a strategic linkage among various interactions with the 
outside world could lead Russia to a foreign policy strategy founded on a 
counter-intuitive trade-off – the better the economic relations, the more 
conflict can be introduced in political relations. For instance, the greater the 
mutual energy-trade dependence between the EU and Russia, the more 
political conflict with the EU the Russian government can afford without 
causing a rupture. Similarly, the growing political tensions with the EU at 
large could be ‘compensated’ for by cooperation on other institutional 
levels. Political tensions with the EU could stimulate the Kremlin to 
develop a more extensive framework of bilateral relations and to welcome 
regional programmes promoted by blocs of EU member states – such as the 
Northern Dimension. 
To play this counter-balancing role, however, the content of bilateral 
relations and regional programmes must b e  s t r i c t l y  i s o l a t e d  f r o m  t h o s e  
issues of ‘high politics’ that serve as the context for tensions in EU–Russian 
relations. A programme of regional cooperation like the Northern 
Dimension thus has the greatest chances of success when it deals with 
specifically localised and non-political EU–Russian matters. It is less suited 
to deal with politically charged issues such as the development of 
democracy in Russia, freedom of the press, human rights, security or 
energy politics. Therefore, we posit that to be successful, Northern 
Dimension leaders must restrict the Northern Dimension by design to 
exclude certain issues – among these, Russian energy policies.  206 | IRINA BUSYGINA & MIKHAIL FILIPPOV 
3.  Continued tensions in political relations between Russia and 
the EU 
Relations between the EU and Russia are likely to remain tense for many 
reasons. Indeed, for politicians on either side there are few benefits to be 
gained from seeking compromises. In Russia, influential politicians can rely 
on the continuing tensions as a mechanism for generating rapport with a 
broad constituency. In the EU, relations with Russia represent a divisive 
issue. For some member states, the tensions with Russia have domestic 
political currency, whereas many key member states would welcome any 
moves that might help to reduce the tensions. 
The situation is aggravated by the fact that the political systems of 
both the EU and Russia are currently undergoing a period of constitutional 
choice and political transition, although with very different starting points. 
Russia is essentially at the stage of setting its basic constitutional principles, 
choosing between a competitive democratic system and an authoritarian 
model. Currently, the high price of energy and natural resources on the 
international market make the authoritarian model attractive for the 
Kremlin.2 
Energy trade relations with the EU are crucial to the Russian 
economy (see chapter 9). Economic objectives alone would require 
advancing cooperative relations with EU institutions as well as most of the 
EU member states. Unfortunately, domestic politics motivate the Russian 
government to continue picking numerous fights with the EU, the US and 
most of the post-Soviet states. These conflicts help the Kremlin to legitimise 
its authoritarian inclinations with the domestic audience, while continued 
cooperation allows it to profit from selling natural resources to the West at 
high prices. 
In short, in the case of Russia, the high share of national revenue from 
resource exports creates the wrong incentives, not just for its own economic 
and political development (i.e. the ‘resource curse’) but also for its foreign 
policy. Domestic political calculations often encourage key players in the 
Russian government to wage uncompromising rhetorical or virtual battles 
with various foreign counterparts, while seeking to reach primarily the 
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domestic audience. The battles in these virtual conflicts are chiefly played 
out on government-controlled television channels, with politicians and 
pundits competing to present the most vivid and creative extremist stances: 
they convey an image of ‘the Great Russia’ as surrounded by unjust 
enemies and suffering from Western media biases.  
4.  The EU’s strategic reaction 
With the rise in energy prices after the turn of the millennium, EU–Russian 
relations began to manifest a growing detachment between their economic 
and political components: as Europe’s reliance on trade with Russia 
increased, political relations deteriorated. Moreover, energy security came 
to define the most important lines of tension between Europe and Russia. 
Russia’s reputation in Europe as a reliable energy supplier had been 
built over decades of cooperation with the former Soviet Union and Russia 
prior to the leadership of Vladimir Putin. It was wiped out in a sequence of 
energy ‘wars’ between Russia and the former Soviet republics, although 
some observers have argued that Russia’s energy policy tactics have been 
used “exclusively within the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] 
space”,3 and that energy deliveries to Europe outside the post-Communist 
region were never manipulated. The relationship is truly one of mutual 
dependence, as two-thirds of Russia’s energy exports go to the EU. Russia 
does not have many market options for selling its natural gas and must rely 
on European demand. Furthermore, market prices for natural gas are much 
higher in Europe than in other potential markets such as Asia.4 
Unfortunately for EU–Russian relations, Russian domestic political 
rhetoric and its hardline attitude towards the former Soviet republics 
makes Russia a prime candidate to fulfil the emerging political demand in 
Europe for a unifying external threat. Despite the impressive success of 
economic integration, the very principles, forms and limits of political 
integration in the EU are still subject to continuing debates among and 
within member states. The design and implementation of a successful 
common foreign policy could be a crucial step in EU constitutional 
                                                      
3 See L. Póti, “Evolving Russian Foreign and Security Policy: Interpreting the 
Putin-doctrine”, Acta slavica iaponica, Vol. 25, 2008, pp. 29–42. 
4 Towards the end of 2008, the price of Gazprom’s natural gas for Europe peaked at 
an all-time high of over $500 per 1,000 cubic metres (information retrieved from 
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development, as it could be used to justify further expansion of the political 
powers of European-level institutions. Yet, foreign policy is also a topic on 
which member states are very likely to disagree Anticipating such 
divergences over policies, member states are also likely to disagree about 
whether to commit to delegate foreign policy decisions to the EU level. 
Constitutional steps towards having a joint foreign policy require 
identifying an unwavering consensus among member states, or as Romano 
Prodi aptly stated, “Europe needs a sense of meaning and purpose.”5  
Could conflict with Russia emerge as an attractive candidate for 
becoming such a unifying issue – a basis on which to form the consensus 
needed for acquiring EU competence in foreign policy? Alternatively, it 
might be that the issue of fostering democracy in Russia could work to 
create a positive consensus in the EU. For a while, it seemed that the more 
positive consensus on the need for Russia to democratise could indeed 
unify the EU, but the stance taken by Russia itself unraveled that 
consensus. By 2000, the democratisation trend in Russia had been reversed 
and any grounds for such a positive consensus had vanished. The strategy 
of confronting Russia, however, is not feasible within the consensus-
dependent EU institutions, where the biggest divisions vis-à-vis Russia are 
found between the Commission and the European Parliament. 
5.  ‘High politics’ conflicts and ‘low politics’ cooperation 
It is reasonable to assume that while some actors in Europe focus more on 
relations between Russia and the EU at large, other key actors are more 
interested in good bilateral relations. Similarly, some players concentrate 
on specific issues – such as security, the environment, energy supplies or 
democratic development. In general we can expect the main actors to 
define their strategies by first taking into account what happens at all levels 
of interactions with Russia, and second, by assigning differing priorities to 
the interactions at various levels and to diverse issues. This means that the 
Council, the Commission, the European Parliament, individual member 
states, regional blocs and the sub-national governments of member states 
are all likely to pursue distinct and even contradictory strategies towards 
Russia. In addition, the same actor is likely to adopt alternative strategies 
for different institutional playing fields. For example, the French president 
                                                      
5 See R. Prodi, “Shaping the New Europe”, address to the European Parliament, 
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can be expected to act differently in the European Council and bilaterally, 
and optimal strategies for Finland are likely to vary in the context of the 
European Council, the Northern Dimension framework, and in its bilateral 
dealings with Russia. Hence, lack of coherence in EU foreign policy is a 
natural reflection of its multilevel governance structure, and not so much a 
product of Russia trying to undermine unity through bilateral dealings. 
The development of the Northern Dimension is a good illustration of 
how conflicts in the sphere of high politics do not necessarily diminish the 
opportunities for practical cooperation on issues of low politics. Even 
though political relations between Russia and the EU as a whole have 
become increasingly tense in recent years, the Northern Dimension 
initiative has managed to develop successfully. As many authors in this 
volume have shown, diverse forms of regional cooperation within the 
Northern Dimension have achieved much more than some early critics 
believed possible. Although the Northern Dimension has encountered 
various difficulties, it has not been significantly affected by the 
deterioration in EU–Russian relations, and perhaps most importantly, 
Russia remains committed to it. 
A similar contrast exists between the current tensions in EU–Russian 
relations on the one hand and the friendliness of Finnish–Russian relations 
on the other. Although the 20th century was ridden with mutual territorial 
claims, interventions and repatriation of populations, with the winter war 
and the continuation war, and Finland fighting in the Second World War 
on the German side against the Soviet Union, a simple comparison of how 
the Russian media portray relations with Finland and with Estonia reveals 
a striking disparity. Russian television regularly reminds viewers about the 
crimes of Estonian Nazi collaborators, but it never portrays the Finns that 
way: Finland is always depicted in an amicable light. Apparently, as Timo 
Vihavainen points out, “history plays a very different role in Finnish–
Russian relations than it does in Polish–Russian or Estonian–Russian 
relations”.6 When he visited Finland, the then President Boris Yeltsin 
apologised for the Soviet aggression; his successor Vladimir Putin went 
                                                      
6 See T. Vihavainen, “Does History Play a Role in Finnish–Russian Relations?”, in 
H. Smith (ed.), The Two-level Game: Russia’s Relations with Great Britain, Finland and 
the European Union, Aleksanteri Series 2:2006, Aleksanteri Institute, Helsinki, 2006, 
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even further and placed a wreath on the tomb of Marshal Mannerheim 
during his visit to Finland in 2001.  
At the same time, the poor image of Russia in contemporary Finland 
is glossed over.7 Considering that only Kosovo displays worse attitudes 
towards Russia, this situation demonstrates impressive restraint by Russian 
journalists. Similarly, although it provoked strong reactions in Finland, 
Finnish defence minister Jyri Häkämies’ ‘three R-words’ statement in 2007 
in Washington (“the three main security challenges for Finland today are 
Russia, Russia and Russia; and not only for Finland, but for all of us”) went 
almost unnoticed in the Russian media. Neither was attention drawn to the 
news that Finland, normally a strong supporter of international initiatives, 
refused to sign the Ottawa Treaty ban on anti-personnel landmines, which 
it deploys on the Finnish–Russian border.  
6.  The Northern Dimension – Insulated from high politics  
The 1,340 km-long border shared by Russia and Finland itself guarantees 
that the Kremlin would not ignore major international initiatives by the 
Finnish government such as the Northern Dimension. Still, the success in 
implementation of the Northern Dimension relies on careful separation of 
regional cooperation in northern Europe from the issues of high politics 
that have been eroding EU–Russian relations. 
As Pami Aalto points out, the Northern Dimension was specifically 
intended as an attempt to overcome the emerging division between the EU 
and Russia by dealing jointly with the practical functional problems of the 
north rather than struggling with issues of high politics.8 It focused on the 
promotion of a few specific initiatives in Russia, avoiding controversies. 
Security issues were either excluded or dealt with on a very limited basis, 
as when addressing the ‘civil protection’ aspect of ‘external security’.  
Perhaps the most fortuitous decision was not to deal with matters of 
oil and natural gas supplies. Only nuclear safety and energy efficiency were 
included within the context of the Northern Dimension Environmental 
Partnership (NDEP). In chapter 8 of this volume, Indra Øverland notes that 
                                                      
7 For instance, a 2004 Gallup poll showed that 62% of Finns had a negative opinion 
of Russia. 
8 See P. Aalto, European Union and the Making of a Wider Northern Europe, New York: 
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nowadays the absence of “big issues related to hydrocarbons in the 
Northern Dimension is striking” in light of the significance of the north in 
energy production. Indeed, the importance of the north for the EU’s energy 
strategy is well understood by the EU bureaucracy: “The Northern 
Dimension represents one essential frontier for security of supply due to 
the importance of Russian and Norwegian energy supplies.”9  
Yet, as Øverland explains, when the Northern Dimension was 
launched in the 1990s, energy was cheap and a less relevant topic. Since 
then it has become the hottest issue in EU–Russian relations, but 
fortunately, by design, the Northern Dimension has been shielded from the 
resulting disputes. 
From the start, the Northern Dimension has been based on a partner-
oriented and ‘equal ground’ approach that is open to equal participation by 
non-EU states. As Erwan Lannon and Peter van Elsuwege emphasise, “the 
fact that these partner countries have become involved in the process from 
the very beginning and participated in the Foreign Ministers’ conferences 
on the Northern Dimension is rather unusual in the EU context. In other 
words, the partner countries were expected to be not only policy-takers but 
also policymakers.”10 Christopher Browning and Pertti Joenniemi agree 
that opening up for the participation of external partners as policy-makers 
is indeed the distinguishing feature of the Northern Dimension.11 For both 
EU members and non-members, their involvement in the Northern 
Dimension creates venues for discussing issues of mutual interest on an 
equal footing. This partner-oriented and equal ground approach has 
guaranteed that the Northern Dimension would only deal with a limited 
set of issues that were acceptable to all participants. And as a rule, it has 
only dealt with issues of functional cooperation in areas of low politics. 
                                                      
9 See European Commission, Communication on Strengthening the Northern 
Dimension of European Energy Policy, European Commission, Brussels, 1999, p. 11 
(retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/north_dim/doc/energy.pdf). 
10 See E. Lannon and P. van Elsuwege, “The EU’s Northern Dimension and the 
EMP-ENP: Institutional Frameworks and Decision-Making Processes Compared”, 
in P.G. Xuereb (ed.), The European Union and the Mediterranean: The Mediterranean’s 
European challenge, Vol. 5, EDRC, University of Malta, Msida, 2004, p. 25. 
11 See C. Browning and P. Joenniemi, “The European Union’s Two Dimensions: 
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7.  A ‘third way’ initiative? Smart strategies of small steps by 
small countries 
Over time, Finland skilfully transformed the image of the Northern 
Dimension from a foreign policy matter into a cooperative venture – “from 
a project of EU external relations to an initiative jointly owned by its four 
partners, namely the EU, Russia, Norway, Iceland”.12 It is noteworthy that 
the Nordic members of the EU are among the most cautious supporters of 
further European integration. Only Finland is in the monetary union, and 
even the Finns are sceptical on the subject of European defence. Thus, to an 
outsider, the Northern Dimension might seem like a framework for the 
countries of northern Europe to interact separately with the world and 
specifically with Russia (the ‘third way’). It could even be viewed as the 
‘northern’ alternative to the choice between the Western and the Eastern 
vectors of political and economic development. As Dmitri Trenin suggests, 
there is a possibility for the emergence of a new common global identity, a 
“[n]orthern” identity.13  
It is often said that the Northern Dimension proves that the small 
states of the EU can get a lot done by pursuing ‘smart small policies’. 
Contributors to this volume provide multiple illustrations to back the 
proposition that success in dealing with Russia has been tightly linked with 
the use of the ‘umbrella of smallness’. While various specific details have 
accounted for the success of each separate case, a common denominator has 
been the relatively low salience multiplied by the magnitude of the issue at 
stake – all of them were below the radar of the central political leadership 
in Moscow. Thus, in chapter 6 on the partnership in public health and 
social well-being, Aadne Aasland notes that “much of the practical project 
collaboration with north-west Russia has taken place without involving 
policy-makers at the federal level”. In chapter 5 on environmental 
                                                      
12 See A.V.G. Vieira, “Dimensionalism in the EU External Relations and Its 
Implications for the ENP: The Case of the Northern Dimension”, presentation at 
the Conference on “The EU in International Affairs”, Brussels, 24–26 April 2008. 
13 See D. Trenin, “Introduction: The Grand Redesign”, in A. Lieven and D. Trenin 
(eds), Ambivalent Neighbors: The EU, NATO and the Price of Membership, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 2003. The northern 
countries share many interests and their conditions are similar in many ways, 
including cold-climate economies depending heavily on the use of natural 
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programmes, Nina Tynkkynen comments on how in some cases the lack of 
interest of the federal government and the decentralisation of 
environmental administration has opened up windows of opportunity. 
Sub-national governments, on the other hand, have been quite involved in 
Northern Dimension activities, as Western money went in to deal with 
pressing problems for which, in the grand scheme called Russian 
federalism, those sub-national governments were made accountable. 
Naturally, the success is very dependent on local actors’ interests and 
commitment (see chapter 5). 
It is important to bear in mind how precarious the balance of political 
influence between the centre and sub-national governments is in Russia, 
and how aggressively it has been maintained by the federal administration 
in recent years. Any advances in regional development that might tip the 
scales in favour of any single regional administration are certain to be 
keenly watched. As Ian Bache has argued, even in the EU the state remains 
a ‘gatekeeper’ in the policy-making process: it allows the sub-national units 
to participate, but not to significantly affect the policy outcomes (or, we 
add, policy balance).14 In Russia today, successful cooperation at the sub-
national level will continue only as long as the federal politicians allow it.15 
At minimum, sub-national cooperation must not contradict the political 
objectives of the national leadership; it is best when the national leadership 
simply does not care. 
It is not by chance that cooperative venues tend to be at the sub-
national level – this is required not only by politics but also by the technical 
arrangements involved in successful practical cooperation: avoiding 
political traps is an important component in any efficient arrangements of 
this kind. Attempting to negotiate joint ventures directly between nations 
involves huge and possibly insurmountable transaction costs, as those who 
                                                      
14 See I. Bache, The Politics of European Union Regional Policy: Multi-Level Governance 
or Flexible Gatekeeping?, Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998. 
15 For example, Igor Leshukov points out that the Northern Dimension could 
become attractive for St. Petersburg and some oblasts of northern Russia, provided 
that Moscow allowed the regional authorities to grasp the opportunities of cross-
border cooperation with EU counterparts; see I. Leshukov, “Can the Northern 
Dimension Break the Vicious Circle of Russia–EU Relations?”, in H. Ojanen (ed.), 
The Northern Dimension: Fuel for the EU?, Finnish Institute of International Affairs 
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speak for entire nations are preoccupied with divisive issues of high 
politics. Keeping contacts regional helps to keep the costs low. Alf Håkon 
Hoel describes in chapter 4 how Norwegian–Russian cooperation in 
fisheries management is insulated from high politics. Cooperation proceeds 
as a common practice, attracting scant political attention – attention that 
could prove dangerous, considering for example how Russia has over-
fished its quota in recent years or the arrest of a Russian vessel at sea by the 
Norwegian Coast Guard. As Alf Håkon Hoel observes, it is mutually 
beneficial for the parties to keep a low profile and for their respective 
governments to look elsewhere:  
An important reason for this relative calm and isolation from high 
politics is probably that both parties have a strong interest in 
keeping the cooperation in fisheries management going. The cost 
of a breakdown could be severe, as both countries would then 
have to set unilateral quotas that would probably be far higher 
than are those dictated by management strategies aimed at 
ensuring the long-term sustainability of the fisheries. 
Morten Anker and Bjørn Brunstad remind us in chapter 10 that this 
principle of ‘going small’ is even more important in connection with the 
Russian energy sector. From a Norwegian perspective, Russia’s oil and gas 
industry is attractive mostly for small oil companies that can acquire stakes 
in small oil fields. They specifically caution that “often it may be safer and 
easier to become involved in small-scale projects that are below the radar of 
big politics or to avoid challenging the Russian need for control”. Energy in 
Russia, of course, is always politicised; state gatekeeping is explicit – our 
thesis is validated by these authors. The issue is not the economic risks 
associated with running a large-scale oil extraction operation, but the 
political risks involved in an attempt to capture a noticeable share of the 
resource extraction market. The present-day success of the Northern 
Dimension integrationist strategy is largely owing to its superior ability to 
evade precisely such political risks. This is succinctly captured by Indra 
Øverland (chapter 8), who writes: “One could get the impression that 
cuddly multilateral cooperation is acceptable – as long as it does not deal 
with the really big issues, which are to be handled in bilateral or narrow, ad 
hoc multilateral settings.” END COMMENT: EU–RUSSIAN RELATIONS AND THE NORTHERN DIMENSION | 215 
8.  Geopolitical visions of the Northern Dimension 
The role of the Northern Dimension has been changing with the changes of 
EU foreign policy towards Russia.16 At the same time, the very success of 
the Northern Dimension has lain “in its ability to deal with localised issues 
regardless of the general climate”.17 Yet, those localised issues may not 
carry the weight required to attract attention at high levels, especially if 
contrasted with the enthusiasm over the Mediterranean process. 
Russia has been mostly interested in Northern Dimension 
partnership programmes through which Western donors put up money to 
deal with pressing problems in Russia. The significance of those 
partnerships in economic terms has clearly declined with Russia’s 
economic recovery. In 1999, after the three-fold devaluation of the rouble, 
the country’s gross national product was about the size of Finland’s. Only 
10 years later, Russia can afford to spend billions of dollars on its various 
undertakings. Moreover, Western partners tend to keep track of their 
money in Russia, which makes their projects less attractive for corrupt 
bureaucrats and politicians than those that receive funding from the 
Russian government. But the Russian federal government allocates literally 
a penny for each dollar contributed by Western donors to Northern 
Dimension programmes. For example, the Russian government pledged 
€20 million towards the NDEP, which is expected to attract more than €2 
billion from the West.18 
Placing significant issues such as energy security under the Northern 
Dimension purview might seem like a logical step to raise the region’s 
prominence. But it would put the future success of the Northern Dimension 
at the mercy of the evolution of EU–Russian relations. Energy politics has 
been controversial and this situation is unlikely to change in the near 
future. Thus, if successful regional cooperation and good-neighbourly 
relations with Russia are the greater priority, it is best to stay away from 
                                                      
16 See P. Aalto (2006), op. cit. 
17 See C. Archer and T. Etzold, “The EU’s Northern Dimension: Blurring Frontiers 
between Russia and the EU North?”, Nordeuropaforum, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2008, p. 25. 
18 In 2006, the Russian government publicly pledged an additional €10 million 
towards the NDEP with expected Western participation of over €20 million. This 
brought Russia’s total contribution during 2006–10 to €20 million (information 
retrieved from www.minfin.ru/ru/press/speech/index.php?afrom4=11.04.2006& 
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energy issues or to restrict involvement to the least controversial aspects, 
such as renewable energy sources. Nevertheless, for politicians operating at 
the EU level and thinking in the high-politics terms of geo-political 
calculations, Northern Dimension expansion into energy policy is an 
attractive prospect. 
9.  The subsidiarity principle of EU foreign policy and the 
Northern Dimension 
In a geopolitical sense, “the dimensionalisation is a form of exclusion. You 
become a partner in a given dimension if you are not entitled to become a 
member of the Union itself.”19 As Sami Moisio put it, “the Northern 
Dimension is at least as much eastern as it is northern”.20 In this ‘eastern’ 
perspective it receives “a precise geographical content: it is literally a 
border between Europe and its outside”.21 And in Brussels, the Northern 
Dimension is in fact ‘located’ in the EU foreign policy cabinets.22 
Conceptualised as a part of the EU’s external relations, the Northern 
Dimension has been reduced to a regional application of the EU’s Russia 
strategy. 
An alternative future for the Northern Dimension could be based on 
a strategic decision to separate it from the controversies of high politics in 
Brussels and to maintain a certain degree of autonomy. The Northern 
Dimension already contains some important innovations compared with 
the EU’s traditional foreign policy instruments, making such a separation 
easier to sustain. The Northern Dimension was created as a coordination 
framework for existing programmes, involving low extra costs for the 
participants. It operates with a combination of partner-oriented, equal 
ground and multilevel approaches that cut across the EU’s pillar structure. 
Such a unique combination creates “a particular form of ‘subsidiarity’ in its 
foreign policymaking by accepting that the member states most concerned 
formulate and execute EU foreign policy in cooperation with those external 
                                                      
19 See H. Haukkala, A Hole in the Wall? Dimensionalism and the EU’s “New 
Neighbourhood Policy”, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, 2003, p. 7. 
20 See S. Moisio, “Back to Baltoscandia? European Union and Geo-Conceptual 
Remaking of the European North”, Geopolitics, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2003, p. 95. 
21 Ibid., p. 96. 
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actors capable of generating the needed problem-solving capacity”.23 
Subsidiarity of this kind enables the EU to establish multilevel foreign 
policy and to avoid “engaging in micro-management of every aspect of EU 
foreign policy” that could cause “ineffectiveness of its external policies”.24 
On the other hand, the member states most concerned can avoid the 
controversies of high politics, focusing instead “on areas of cooperation 
where a regional and sub-regional emphasis brings added value”.25  
The subsidiarity principle of the Northern Dimension is distinctive 
from the vision of a multi-speed Europe or a Europe of regional blocs. It is 
best explained in a theoretical framework of multilevel governance that 
posits that the key actors can participate in European policy-making 
through a range of channels – from working within the European 
institutions to indirectly exerting pressure through regional, national and 
sub-national authorities. The resultant EU policy is the “outcome of 
overlapping competences, tensions and conflicts in a system of multilevel 
governance”.26 
Applying the subsidiarity logic to the future of the Northern 
Dimension, we could expect decision-making regarding specific, localised 
issues to be diffused across multiple levels of government – regional, 
national and sub-national – even though the European institutions would 
prefer to reserve a role in formulating common policy towards Russia. 
Different issues are likely to remain subject to the competence of different 
institutional players, based on the criteria of importance and commonality. 
Such functional criteria for the involvement of diverse institutional 
players in decision-making on any given issue in the Northern Dimension 
means inviting to the table those players who ‘own’ it. As long as the 
Northern Dimension remains mostly a coordination framework for various 
                                                      
23 See M. Filtenborg, M. Sicard, S. Gänzle and E. Johansson, “An Alternative 
Theoretical Approach to EU Foreign Policy: ‘Network Governance’ and the Case of 
the Northern Dimension Initiative”, Cooperation & Conflict, Vol. 37, No. 4, 2002, p. 
390. 
24 Ibid., p. 395. 
25 See the Northern Dimension Policy Framework Document (Helsinki, 24 
November 2006). 
26 S e e  G .  M a r k s ,  F .  N i e l s e n ,  L .  R a y  a n d  J . E .  S a l k ,  “ C o m p e t e n c i e s ,  C r a c k s ,  a n d  
Conflicts: Regional Mobilisation in the European Union”, Comparative Political 
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programmes, assigning some aspects of issues associated with high politics 
to the Northern Dimension is likely to give the key role in Northern 
Dimension decisions on those aspects to EU-level institutions (the 
Commission and the Euro-bureaucracy). Such a move would reduce the 
role of the region, at least in that particular sphere of the Northern 
Dimension framework. Thus, it seems that our argument above, based on 
participants’ rationality and nested games, falls neatly in line with the logic 
of subsidiarity, which also indicates that adding issues of high politics to 
the Northern Dimension is likely to be more appealing to the EU than to 
the countries of the region itself. For the latter, a more attractive option is to 
retain the Northern Dimension as a certain niche of localised relations with 
Russia and to avoid the controversies attached to high politics. 
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13. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
NORTHERN COOPERATION 
PAMI AALTO, HANNA SMITH & 
HELGE BLAKKISRUD 
1.  Introduction 
In this volume, we have examined the lessons from various forms of 
practical regional cooperation in the Barents Sea and Baltic Sea areas, with 
a focus on engaging Russia constructively. We have also assessed prospects 
for cooperation in sectors where new institutional arrangements and 
structures are to be established or considered, such as transport and 
energy. Our overall policy research task has been to identify the potential 
role of the new Northern Dimension of the EU, Iceland, Norway and 
Russia in all this.  
Let us now summarise our findings and policy recommendations 
with regard to northern regional cooperation thematically, in the same 
order as presented in the introduction to this volume: principles, policy 
environment, institutional structures and implementation. Throughout the 
discussion below, we also indicate how these findings can be relevant in 
the wider EU–Russia neighbourhood.1 
                                                      
1 The recommendations are based on our earlier work within the project “The New 
Northern Dimension and the Possibility of an Energy Partnership – Cooperation 
between Finland and Norway”, see P. Aalto, H. Blakkisrud and H. Smith (eds), 
Energizing the New Northern Dimension, Policy Paper, Jean Monnet European Centre 
of Excellence, University of Tampere, 2008 (retrieved from www.uta.fi/laitokset/ 
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2.  Main findings and recommendations 
1)  Principles: How to put the equality principle into practice? The abstract 
principle of equality is best made concrete by ensuring that objectives in all 
regional cooperation projects are jointly defined. Activities under the aegis of 
the Northern Dimension are increasingly conducted in this manner. The 
experiences reported in this book show that jointly agreed objectives feed a 
sense of policy ownership. This is an important prerequisite for 
commitment, the development of trust and ultimately, success. Speaking of 
trust – defined as mutual expectations of the parties to honour their 
contractual or other obligations even if this cannot be legally guaranteed2 – 
might appear odd in the present policy environment characterised by the 
Russian–Georgian war in August 2008. Even so, gradually developed trust 
is indeed a real factor in the regional cooperation experience of the north.3 
Jointly defined objectives must be based on the fundamental common 
interests of the parties. In this way, they can be made durable in times of 
major political tension and economic uncertainty, as witnessed in autumn 
2008. There is a wealth of fundamental common interests. Some may sound 
trivial, but it is worth mentioning each of them briefly to remind ourselves 
of the building blocks for a common future in northern Europe, especially 
in the midst of mutual tensions at the strategic partnership level. 
International law can serve as an important starting point for thinking 
about fundamental common interests, but not much more than that. These 
laws are far too generic for most policy issues to be dealt with solely on that 
basis, so supporting principles and practices are needed (see chapter 4). 
And naturally, the EU–Russian controversy in interpreting the legal nature 
and consequences of Kosovo and the South Ossetian operations and 
arrangements further dilutes the role of international law as a shared 
fundamental interest that might help to structure mutual relations. 
                                                                                                                                       
isss/monnetcentre/english/briefingpapers.php). The recommendations have been 
developed further in this book, however. 
2 See R. Bengtsson, “Towards a Stable Peace in the Baltic Sea Region?”, Cooperation 
and Conflict, Vol. 35, No. 4, 2000, p. 363.  
3 For more, see also H. Rytövuori-Apunen, “Revisiting the Problem of Trust in 
Finnish–Russian Relations”, in H. Rytövuori-Apunen (ed.), Russia Forever? Towards 
Pragmatism in Finnish/Russian Relations, Aleksanteri Series 1/2008, Aleksanteri 
Institute, Helsinki, 2008, pp. 121–63. 222 | PAMI AALTO, HANNA SMITH & HELGE BLAKKISRUD 
Sovereignty is a key concept in today’s Russia and a widely shared 
principle in the wider European area, even though EU member states have 
delegated some of it to the EU. Drawing upon sovereignty, all states in 
wider Europe also underline the need for secure and clearly demarcated 
borders. At the same time, no one wants to seal those borders, not even in 
the circumstances of some remaining border disputes, which include the 
maritime border dispute between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea, 
and the non-ratified land border treaty between Estonia and Russia. 
Diplomacy in its bilateral and multilateral forms remains the primary 
means of solving conflicts among northern European countries. Where 
diplomacy has been lacking, as in Russian–Baltic and Russian–Polish 
relations, the best that the Northern Dimension can do is to provide a less 
controversial forum in which addressing practical issues is the rule. In this 
sense, the challenge for the Northern Dimension is to find regional 
cooperation projects in which the Baltic States and Poland can participate 
outside the shadow of sensitive foreign policy issues. Importantly, these 
must be projects in which these countries are willing and able to contribute 
financially. 
The market is a widely shared principle in the wider European area. 
Russia’s current trend of re-centralisation should not be confused with 
outright de-marketisation. What we are witnessing in broad terms is the 
creation of a state-led or state-supervised, socially-oriented, mixed 
economy in Russia. That model is not so fundamentally dissimilar from 
that of many EU economies, especially as the financial crisis of autumn 
2008 has led states to reinforce their role in the banking sector and overall 
economy. Flows of foreign direct investment into Russia have continued to 
expand regardless of re-centralisation, the abolition and redefinition of 
production sharing agreements in the energy sector, heightened tariffs on 
exports of Russian timber and many sectors of the economy becoming 
viewed as ‘strategic’ and thus state-protected (see chapters 10 and 11).4 Still, 
the full effects of Russia’s operations in Georgia and the drop in energy 
prices in autumn 2008 may yet prove to affect the positive foreign 
investment trend. 
                                                      
4 See also e.g. Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT) (2008), 
“BOFIT Forecast for Russia 2008–2010”, BOFIT Russia Desk, Helsinki, 11 
September 2008. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NORTHERN COOPERATION | 223 
The environment and its protection is increasingly a shared concern. 
This is clearly seen in the commitment to the Kyoto Protocol goals in the 
EU, Norway and Russia, with Iceland enjoying some exemptions. Many 
northern European companies have become integral participants in the EU 
CO2 emissions trading mechanisms. Despite many doubts about Russian 
commitments to environmental protection compared with the eagerness of 
most of the Nordic states, environmental problems are receiving more and 
more attention in Russian planning. 
In the public health sector, the bolstering of the Northern Dimension 
Partnership in Public Health and Social Well-being (NDPHS) is a shared 
goal and increasingly corresponds with national strategic priorities. 
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has developed a high public profile in 
this arena in recent years. Public health is becoming perceived as a long-
term security issue in Russia. Substantial extra federal funds have already 
been committed and are to be channelled to this sector in the short to 
medium term. One of the four ‘national projects’ coordinated by Medvedev 
prior to the 2008 presidential elections deals directly with health issues. 
There are strong signals coming from Russia that the authorities are 
considering spending significant amounts of money on this sector. This 
budget line increase may create a window of opportunity for augmenting 
the NDPHS. 
Education and research is clearly an underexploited common interest. 
Russian universities are entering the Bologna process aimed at unifying 
degree structures across Europe. Efforts in this area are key to the EU’s 
Lisbon goal of becoming the world’s leading knowledge-based economic 
area. Education and research cooperation with Russian actors provides a 
cost-minimising long-term strategy not only in the natural sciences but also 
in the social sciences, where there is a large pool of human resources in 
Russia and simultaneously shrinking research opportunities in universities 
in the EU area. This area can provide a very interesting and cost-effective 
channel of cooperation in the long term, potentially leading to increased 
integration. 
In the cultural  domain, there has been a history of exchange and 
mutual learning, and a clear interest has emerged in building on that in the 
future. The worldwide significance of Russian artistic culture is obvious 
even for those with conflictual interstate relations. The European tradition 
of the welfare state and related policy approaches, on the other hand, has 
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Transportation and logistics is an area in which public–private funding 
partnerships are very much in the common interest. Such partnerships are 
also favoured by the Russian side, which faces a major investment 
challenge. Awareness of the extent of mutual coordination in this sector is 
only beginning to surface, however (see below). 
Energy policy is a joint interest owing to EU–Russian energy trade in 
and across northern Europe. Both sides need each other. Russia’s available 
energy transport routes mostly point towards the EU area. Only in the long 
term is there any prospect of Russia significantly re-orienting towards the 
Asian energy market. And this will not be a question of Russia’s trading the 
bulk of its resources from the north-west eastwards, but rather of using 
eastern Siberian resources that are impractically distant from Europe. 
Norway, the other main energy producer in the Northern Dimension 
area, is slowly becoming a significant regional supplier alongside its 
traditional global and Western European markets. The Scanled gas pipeline 
from southern Norway is projected to reach southern Sweden, possibly 
Denmark and in some scenarios even Poland. Norway supplies 
hydropower to the Nordic electricity market, which in the medium term is 
set to become part of the all-European grid and market, very possibly 
including Russia. As for large-scale projects, a good number of actors could 
stand to benefit from energy projects like the Shtokman field. It is not only 
about constructing rigs or supplying technology, but also about 
maintaining adequate environmental standards; controlling the levels of 
CO2 that will be released during the extraction process (here Norwegian 
companies possess state-of-the-art technology); and building ports, 
terminals, roads, bridges and facilities for the army of workers. 
A good example of continuing interdependence in the energy sector 
is the shared interest in energy efficiency and energy saving technology and 
practices, as well as renewable energy. This common interest exists regardless 
of whether the motive is to guarantee domestic supply in energy-importing 
countries or to ensure that enough fossil fuels are left for income-
generating export. Furthermore, these issues are not as sensitive politically 
as for example questions of energy transport or field ownership. 
Finally, all Northern Dimension partners have an interest in 
maintaining the EU’s presence in the north, including the continued 
availability of its large funds. The transformative effect provided by the 
scale of European funding available should always be kept in mind 
whenever the institutional framework of Northern cooperation is 
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enumerated, all northerners share the same structural problems of putting 
together the necessary funds, developing the hardware and software for 
mutual relations and all-European trade (in addition to other exchanges) in 
conditions of sparse population, wide geography and harsh nature, and in 
the midst of climate change (see Table 13.1). 
Table 13.1 Common interests between the EU/European Economic Area and 
Russia 
Common interest  Current/emerging activity 
Respect for international 
law, sovereignty and 
inviolability of borders 
Maintenance of secure borders with well-functioning 
and regulated cross-border traffic 
Primary of diplomacy   Identification of non-controversial issues for drawing 
the Baltic States, Poland and Russia to the same table 
Market principles  Support for state-supervised, socially-oriented mixed 
economies; regulation enabling foreign investment 
Environmental 
protection 
Kyoto commitments, linking of energy and the 
environment, bolstering of the Northern Dimension 
Environmental Partnership 
Health  Public health investment, augmenting the NDPHS 
Education  and  research  Bologna process, student exchange, research 
cooperation by pooling the shrinking university 
research opportunities in the Nordics and 
competitively priced and abundant Russian human 
resources 
Culture  Cultural exchange, branding with ‘northernness’ 
Logistics and transport  Public–private partnerships 
Energy    Shtokman project and its support infrastructure; 
sharing of renewable energy technology, energy 
efficiency and savings technology 
Maintaining an EU 
presence 
Availability of funding and investment 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
2) Policy environment: How to compete/coordinate with other initiatives? It 
will be vital to ensure that the EU’s currently developed Baltic Sea strategy does 
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engaging Russia in a mutually profitable way. The passage of the Baltic Sea 
strategy through EU institutions so far seems to indicate that the 
Commission and the Council are aware of the possible conflicts between 
the two policies. 
The European Parliament’s resolution on the Baltic Sea strategy for 
the Northern Dimension, adopted on 16 November 2006, treated the 
initiative as a tool for refocusing the Northern Dimension into the relatively 
narrow confines of the Baltic Sea area.5 The resolution also included several 
references to issues to which Russia is a crucial party, such as facilitating 
border traffic between the EU and Russia, and turning Kaliningrad into a 
“more open and less militarised pilot region” – without, however, 
consulting Russia in any manner at all, or even specifying any mechanisms 
for doing so.6 Overlaps were evident with existing EU–Russia policies such 
as the roadmap for the ‘common spaces’, particularly the relatively 
promising work towards mutual visa-free access and the EU–Russia energy 
dialogue, not to mention priorities such as internal energy-market 
integration, where the EU’s binding regulation is a far more effective tool 
than any strategy-drafting. In its Presidency Conclusions in December 2007, 
the European Council asked the Commission to prepare the strategy, but 
only noted that the strategy should focus on environmental issues, and that 
the Northern Dimension should remain the tool for cooperation with non-
EU actors in the region.7 
One way of avoiding duplication and undesirable overlaps would be 
to use the planned EU-centred Baltic Sea strategy to agree on proposals 
forwarded to the Russian side, or to agree on joint responses to Russian 
initiatives within the Northern Dimension. Even then, the added value 
seems ambiguous. The same can be done without any time-consuming 
strategy drafting process, given sufficient political will among the member 
states concerned. A more profitable use of the new Baltic Sea strategy 
would be to deploy it as a tool for engaging the Baltic States and Poland in 
regional cooperation, for example in the field of the environment. This 
                                                      
5 See European Parliament, “A Baltic Sea Strategy for the Northern Dimension”, 
European Parliament Resolution on the Baltic Sea Strategy for the Northern 
Dimension (2006/2171(INI)), P6_TA(2006)4094, 16 November 2006.  
6 Ibid. 
7 See European Council, Presidency Conclusions of the Brussels European Council 
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would be a step towards engaging those countries constructively in case 
Northern Dimension cooperation involving Russia on an equal footing 
proves too sensitive for them at present. Deploying this tool could also 
speed up actions in this area, where quick results and inputs from all are 
needed to further the prospect of reviving the appalling state of the Baltic 
Sea eco-system. 
3)  Institutional structures: How to coordinate institutionally? It is 
important to invest time and adopt a mid- or long-term perspective to 
cooperation. A learning-by-doing method applies to all examples of 
established regional cooperation covered in this book. In the energy sector, 
such learning is only beginning, as this is at best an emerging field of 
northern European regional cooperation. The learning-by-doing method 
also means that there is no universal formula for success or failure (see 
chapter 5). 
Thus, we conclude that aiming at a very a rigid strategic document or 
setting up rigid institutional structures does not appear to be a useful way 
forward. In fact, the lack of formal institutions, for which the ‘old’ Northern 
Dimension was often criticised, may be a blessing in disguise. After all, it is 
well known that by the early 2000s fatigue was setting in at the ministerial 
and senior policy-maker levels in the north, with the endless and too-
frequent meetings under the various regional frameworks. In some cases, 
policy-makers turned up to face largely the same individuals, with largely 
the same matters on the table – only the name of the council was different. 
This is not to deny that the various regional councils in the north are 
important for making the case for extra attention and funding, and for 
selling project successes to interest groups at the national and sub-national 
levels. Yet, their simultaneous co-existence makes each project smaller and 
hence reduces the overall marketability of the results of cooperation, not 
least in larger countries where scale matters – such as Germany and Russia, 
or indeed EU institutions.  
There is a clear case for paying attention to competition among projects. 
Bilateral and multilateral cooperation could also be better coordinated. 
When planning projects within the Northern Dimension framework, the 
possibility of competing projects under other existing or planned 
cooperation formats should be addressed and if possible eliminated. An 
illustrative example concerns railroad projects. The Finnish priority is the 
high-speed rail connection between Helsinki and St. Petersburg, which, 
after long talks and some delays, is set to become operational by 2010, 
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Norway. Both these projects have been on the agenda for a long time but 
have been overshadowed by the priority the Russian authorities have given 
to the rail link between Kaliningrad and the rest of Russia via Lithuania. In 
general, only once one project has been finalised will Russia turn its 
attention to the next one. This tendency brings us back to the need to 
coordinate policy proposals on the EU side in which several member state 
governments are involved, compared with the one state bureaucracy on the 
Russian side (even if it is a complex one). Policy coordination should take 
place in the early stages of project planning, and if the EU’s Baltic Sea 
strategy project can help, that would be useful. It is also important to note 
that projects involving national interests can be completed faster. 
Avoiding unnecessary competition presupposes regular meetings 
and a policy direction, even if we do not recommend rigid institutional 
structures. In the new version of the Northern Dimension policy, the 
impetus seems to come from the experts of the steering group who have 
access to national and transnational interest groups. Continuing flexible 
coordination of the policy appears pivotal for the success of the Northern 
Dimension, but it will only work so long as activities are based on jointly 
defined objectives and grounded on the fundamental common interests of 
the parties. In the nuclear safety sector, flexible entry has also proven 
useful. EU member states and other states from outside the immediate 
Northern Dimension area have been drawn in – actors who might not 
perhaps have entered the policy at all if it were an all-inclusive, take-it-or-
leave-it or one-size-fits-all package. 
In more game-theoretical terms, to continue to offer cooperation is also 
an important institutional strategy even in conditions of soured overall 
relations between the EU and Russia. That the Northern Dimension policy 
was revamped in the aftermath of the Russian–Ukrainian gas transit 
conflict at the turn of 2005–06 shows that regional cooperation can proceed 
despite difficult conditions. 
Cooperation can be offered in both bilateral and multilateral formats. 
Particularly successful examples of bilateral work include the Norwegian–
Russian fisheries management regime (see chapter 4), as well as Finnish–
Russian environmental projects. Multilateral successes have occurred even 
in cases in which the partners have been in conflict with each other 
politically. One such case is that of the Gulf of Finland Mandatory Ship 
Reporting System (GOFREP) involving Finland, Estonia and Russia (see 
chapter 5). Moreover, the examples of fisheries management and GOFREP 
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regional needs for policy-making, simply because regional differences are real. 
Learning across cases can be useful. For example, the experience in the 
Baltic Sea area will be of great value if and when a stronger need arises for 
monitoring maritime traffic in the Barents coastal areas as a result of 
increasing traffic from northern energy-extraction projects. 
4) Implementation: How to develop existing partnerships and put into effect 
new and planned partnerships? The existing and planned Northern 
Dimension partnerships should be seen as important activities in their own 
right while also providing input into the broader common spaces of the 
EU–Russia strategic partnership. Using the partnerships as a testing 
ground presupposes good coordination between the strategic and regional 
levels. Once that is ensured, the Northern Dimension partnerships can 
provide platforms on which concrete and clear tasks are easier to define, 
funds and consortia can realistically be assembled, and impact can best be 
monitored within clear-cut issue areas and reported back to the funding 
bodies. Such a compact and transparent set-up enhances perceptions of real 
project returns and fits with the requirements of the public sector, 
supranational institutions and other funding bodies to show that their 
projects have tangible and measurable results. 
In developing the Northern Dimension partnerships, depending on 
the particular case, there may be a need (on top of expert-level cooperation) 
to  include public information and other campaigns directed at the broader 
population at the grass-roots level. Significant outcomes related to 
awareness-raising and policy returns in the areas of public health, the 
environment, and energy savings and efficiency can be achieved in this 
way, especially if accompanied by the provision of low-cost devices that 
help consumers to change their habits (see below). Towards these ends, a 
project selection mechanism needs to be further developed, to avoid situations 
whereby the Russian side comes to meetings with concrete proposals 
without getting any firm or satisfactory response, as happened in the 
unfortunate old Northern Dimension. Timescales should be flexible. 
Actors, their responsibilities, funding and evaluation mechanisms need to 
be clearly defined in all projects. 
We propose the following policy recommendations for developing 
existing and potential Northern Dimension partnerships: 
i) To develop the Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership 
(NDEP) further and generate trust, it is essential to move towards doing 
away with single-hull ships in the Baltic Sea. Such a regulation should not 
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are merely an exchangeable medium whereas the goods flow and core 
business would remain intact. But the measure would provide greater 
environmental security and help to strike one highly controversial question 
off the policy agenda. A similar need may arise in the Barents Sea; there the 
example of GOFREP could well be exploited. Overall, the list of priorities 
should be kept short to generate success stories supporting the whole 
programme. Besides flagship projects, smaller ones may prove successful. 
For the Baltic States and Poland, the €10 million threshold for 
contributing to the flagship instrument, the NDEP projects, has proved too 
high. Solutions can be found, however, if there is sufficient political will. 
The Baltic States and Poland could well combine their efforts and 
contribute as a trio or quartet. 
ii) As for the NDPHS, greater emphasis should be put on involving 
the Russian parties in the monitoring and evaluation of the public health 
programmes. The federal level should be widely engaged, although in 
some issues the federal district level will suffice, because of the 
decentralised decision-making in this sector in Russia.  
Some projects require engaging the research community better, 
through funding research collaboration to create advocacy coalitions that 
are broad enough for achieving the stated project objectives. The 
partnership should work at drawing together a larger number of potential 
funders for projects, including funds for multilateral activities, and hence 
strengthening the independent role of the project ‘pipeline’. 
iii) As for the planned transport and logistics partnership, there is a 
great need for investment, which is best achieved through public–private 
partnerships. There is new legislation laying out the structure for such 
partnerships in Russia. Experience of how this has worked in 
infrastructural projects so far should be taken into account. It will also be 
useful to keep in mind that on the Russian side, the companies involved 
may be state-owned or state-controlled. Although the sector is increasingly 
seen as ‘strategic’, Russian authorities will most likely welcome the 
involvement of international financial institutions. 
All non-infrastructural bottlenecks should be eliminated. This 
includes standardising transport-related technical and administrative 
structures, and developing spatial planning and transport corridor 
strategies together. For example, at present each party has its own transport 
strategy, even though we are talking about transport volumes where there 
is a shared interest in ensuring smooth flows. The roles of a Northern 
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European transport axes and the EU–Russia transport dialogue should be 
clearly defined. 
The Russian side should be encouraged to abandon double invoicing 
at the borders in order to save time. It should also be encouraged to reduce 
the number of unnecessary border staff. Such a step would serve as an 
incentive for reducing multiple and unnecessarily time-consuming controls 
and release some of the workforce – a resource that is becoming scarcer in 
the country’s north-west – for more productive purposes. 
In energy transit, land-based pipelines should be encouraged and 
viewed as a trust-generating strategy to address the Russian–Baltic–Polish–
Swedish controversy evoked by the Nord Stream pipeline. In return, transit 
fees should be lowered or not charged at all, against Gazprom’s 
commitment for guaranteed long-term supplies priced competitively. 
iv) Developing transport and logistics, as well as possible energy 
cooperation, must involve public–private partnerships. A thriving market 
environment is the key to greater involvement by private companies. To 
promote a mutually beneficial market environment, it may not be ideal to 
have each party supporting its own ‘national champions’. If national 
champions are the rule regardless, partners should be informed of when 
and how these are to be privileged by the state. 
A useful tool for developing a predictable business environment 
would be to create an independent expert team/forum of policy-makers, 
entrepreneurs and academics reporting biannually to the Northern 
Dimension steering group and to wider societal, political and business 
circles. The model of the EU–Russia Roundtable of Industrialists could help 
to develop this concept. National and cross-country comparative research 
measures might include systematically monitoring the success of various 
business strategies – acquisitions, ‘go-it-alone’, low-risk strategies, etc.  
Supporting the underlying robustness and growth of the domestic 
consumption market in Russia will bolster Russia’s economy and help to 
maintain a market for exporters from the EU and European Economic Area 
(EEA) outside the  potentially volatile energy sector. Asset swaps in the 
fashion of German–Russian energy relations should be considered a model 
for overall economic relations; if no partner is available in the home 
country, allying with another EU area actor should be considered. 
v) In the energy sector, a prerequisite for multilateral large-scale 
cooperation would be for the EU to first assume more competencies. This 
would be the best way of developing a more convergent approach to 
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developing an external energy policy to match the record the EU has set in 
dealing with Russia in some other policy spheres. Today’s prevailing 
bilateralism results in collective losses in EU–Russian relations that are 
characterised by a high degree of interdependence.8 
Further alarmist security talk in energy policy should be consciously 
avoided, and the interests of energy buyers (security of supplies) and 
energy producers (security of demand) should be ensured. Energy chains 
should be considered jointly and responsibility for their development and 
maintenance shared. The strengthening of energy links between old and 
new EU member states should be continued, as this may help to reduce 
some of the former socialist countries’ fears of being hostages to Russian 
energy (even though the energy supply may well be of Russian origin). 
Every opportunity should be used to support the rise of domestic 
energy prices in Russia, as this will stimulate efficiency in energy use, spare 
non-renewable resources, reduce environmental impacts and help to 
maintain sufficient reserves for energy exports to the EU area. There should 
be a very proactive governmental policy at the EU and Northern 
Dimension levels on developing energy efficiency and savings, as well as 
renewable sources of energy, as these are in the interests of buyers, 
producers and transit states alike. Specific support in the field of 
sustainable energy should include the following measures: 
•  Technology transfers and the joint development of renewable energy 
technology should be promoted. German and Danish actors should 
be involved given their expertise in building large-scale windmill 
parks, as Russia has a strategic interest but lacks the necessary 
technology. Finnish and Swedish expertise can be useful in the 
exploitation of peat, which the Russian energy strategy identifies as 
the second, major ‘new’ energy resource. Icelandic firms could enter 
the picture, with their know-how in geothermal and wave energy. 
•  A Northern Dimension scholarship programme on renewable energy 
could be considered. In Russia there is considerable unexploited, 
latent technical expertise on these questions that could be brought 
into more integral contact with expertise in northern Europe and the 
rest of Europe. 
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P. Aalto (ed.), The EU–Russia Energy Dialogue: Securing Europe’s Future Energy 
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•  Commissioning a study on the ‘ownership’ of energy-efficiency 
issues in Russia should be considered, to shed light on the prospects 
for promoting and institutionalising the concept there. 
•  As a simple measure, the installation of heating regulators in 
households and blocks of flats should be supported financially and 
campaigned for at the bureaucratic and grass-roots level to 
popularise the good results attained in pilot projects. 
•  Environmentally viable wood-burning facilities should be promoted 
in Karelia, where coal is currently transported from thousands of 
kilometres away to feed the heating facilities. 
•  Finally, electricity should be a priority area in grid interconnection 
and market integration. In this sphere, there is relatively little 
alarmism and a fair amount of market development on both the 
EU/EEA and Russian sides. As a specific measure, the strengthening 
of grids on the Russian side should be supported, to erode opposition 
to cross-border electricity traffic at the level of local authorities and to 
deter threats of grid collapse as a result of increased load. 
vi) A partnership on culture, possibly extending to research and 
education, might be considered to recognise the common interests towards 
each other’s culture on both sides of the EU/EEA–Russian border. A 
partnership in this field would help the Northern Dimension to become a 
more useful testing ground and could serve as a regional example of the 
EU–Russia common spaces project in which culture, research and 
education make up one of the four key areas. On the other hand, education 
and research issues in the Northern Dimension might best be integrated as 
academic components into the other partnerships to provide additional 
support (as suggested above). 
As for cooperation in higher education, useful lessons can be learned 
from evaluating the experiences of the Finnish–Russian Cross-Border 
University (funded by the Finnish Ministry of Education and the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs), where the joint teaching of International Politics is 
arguably the field that is advancing most successfully. The work of the 
Norwegian University Centre in St. Petersburg could also be relevant. In 
research cooperation, the evaluation underway of the large-scale Russian 
programmes of the Academy of Finland’s “Russia in flux” project (2004–07) 
can provide useful pointers as to future opportunities and directions. 
vii) Finally, it is particularly recommended to set up and fund joint 
European–Russian research teams to study drivers of change in the 234 | PAMI AALTO, HANNA SMITH & HELGE BLAKKISRUD 
Northern Dimension area and to support the development of the 
partnerships. Further comparison of Finnish, Norwegian and other 
experiences of working with Russian actors would be useful. This could 
also include some non-northern countries, to widen the scope and bring in 
other experiences. Interesting ‘new’ actors could be Hungary, Greece, 
Turkey and Ukraine, which all have very different stories to tell of both 
expanding ties (Hungary, Greece and Turkey) and of problems along the 
way (Ukraine). Such a research fund could provide crucial input for the 
further successful development of cooperation within the Northern 
Dimension area. 
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GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AC Arctic  Council 
BEAC  Barents Euro-Arctic Council 
BRC  Barents Regional Council 
CBSS  Council of the Baltic Sea States 
CEE  Central and Eastern European 
CIS  Commonwealth of Independent States 
EBRD  European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
EC European  Community 
EEA  European Economic Area 
EESC  European Economic and Social Committee 
EEZs  Exclusive economic zones 
ENP  European Neighbourhood Policy 
e-PINE  Enhanced Partnership in Northern Europe 
EurAsEC Eurasian  Economic Community  
FDI  Foreign direct investment 
GOFREP  Gulf of Finland Mandatory Ship Reporting System 
GUAM  Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova 
ICES  International Council for the Exploration of the Sea 
IDUs  Injecting drug users 
ILO  International Labour Organisation 
IMO International  Maritime  Organisation 
LNG  Liquefied natural gas 
MNEPR Multilateral  Nuclear Environmental Programme 
NGOs Non-governmental  organisations 
NDEP  Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership 
NDPHS  Northern Dimension Partnership in Public Health and 
Social Well-being 
NEI  Northern European Initiative 
NIB  Nordic Investment Bank 236 | GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 
PAC  Partnership Annual Conference (of the NDPHS) 
PCA  Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
PECs  Pan-European transport corridors 
PSA Production  sharing  agreement 
SEA  Strategic Environmental Assessment 
SES  Single Economic Space 
SMP  Strategic Master Plan 
TAC  Total allowable catch 
TACIS  Technical Aid to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States 
TEN  Trans-European transport network 
TEN-T  Trans-European Network for Transport programme 
UNAIDS  Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS 
UNECE  United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 
WHO World  Health  Organisation 
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